Volume 1 – 2000

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The papers that made up the inaugural edition of e-merge were united by the challenge they posed to old ways of studying international affairs. In the lead article, Joe Clark urged students to be 'political weathervanes', understanding today so we could re-invent tomorrow. Clearly, the papers presented in the first volume demonstrated that today's students are answering this challenge.

In fitting with the original concept behind e-merge, the first edition displayed views that deviated from established schools of thought and reflected facets of diverse fields of study. Yuzhuang Deng, an accomplished author in Chinese Public Administration literature, used the backdrop of Chinese history to recast the way we think of trade policy – and indeed, of economic issues in general. Jennifer Helsing, by analyzing the evolution of NATO in the Post-Soviet era, explored the dynamism of international institutions in changing eras and reminded us that breaks from the past are far from clean. Shifting the focus from institutions to actors, the papers of Heidi Jackson and Barbara Franz reflected the increasingly heavy emphasis that international affairs places on non-state players. Jackson took a close look at the trends surrounding the emergence of NGOs as new actors in the international decision-making environment, while Franz focused on two important but oft-neglected elements in international affairs – the community and the individual.

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POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN A REGIONALIZING WORLD

In fifty years from now a group of students will sit in a classroom and discuss the events of recent history that have shaped the world they live in. Just as students now dissect the political, economic, and social ramifications of Marshall Plan aid, colonization and decolonization, so too will future generations pour over minutes from Security Council meetings and G-7 Summits.

As students of international relations, you will know that there are no singular causes in history that have led to so-called "ages". History is divided into time periods for the sake of convenience. Events define dates – not the other way around. Russia in the early part of this century, for example, is only 'revolutionary' because of the revolution. While timing played an important role, time itself was merely a pedestrian observer.

Try as we might, it is impossible to foresee what will actually *happen* in the next fifty years. Attempts to do so may be manifestations of the human desire to plan. It would be much simpler (and more honest) for me to try to identify what will be important to *know* about the world in the next fifty years. The trends that we identify now will be all that the next generation of decision-makers (you) will have to go on. In effect, you must act as political weather vanes.

One important trend that will have to be contended with and interpreted is that towards regionalism. In various areas of the world and for various reasons, Nation-States are facing the prospect of playing a subsidiary role to their surrounding regions on issues such as possession of powers and sovereignty over policy decisions. In many parts of the world, regional concerns could come to dominate national politics and overwhelm our current State-oriented understanding of international relations.

If we use the European example to examine this emerging trend, we see a collection of countries becoming increasingly inter-dependent. Many of these nations will soon share a currency and, as the recent NATO initiative in Kosovo shows, the defence of continental interests is as important as the provision of human security.

In North America, rumblings of a similar shared currency can distinctly be heard. (Though they are presently dismissed in this country as heretical.) Those who study defence policy will also see a current towards increased equipment and intelligence sharing between Canada and the United States.

If a more obvious example of heightened inter-dependency within regions is needed, look no further than to Asia where economic downturn led to a painful and unmanageable domino effect. The reasons for the recent recession are intricate and numerous but the economic characteristics of the affected countries are similar and peculiar to the region.

There are, of course, still many instances of identity-assertion by States. Russia clings to geography as one of the remaining vestiges of power that it can still control, Yugoslavia - in the most amoral way possible - has attempted to instil a Slavic pride in its people. Even Australia, by moving away from the Imperial Monarchy, has sent a symbolic message concerning its sovereignty and identity. On a macro scale, however, the trend is towards increased regional power-sharing. The challenge for policy makers will be to identify how a nation can survive and how the distinctive voices of its people can continue to be heard in a globalizing and regionalizing world.

Because it is my firm belief that we seek to live in and define ourselves through a community, the next generation of decision makers will have to attend to the needs of both the small and the large societies. They will have to make room for tradition and experience and be aware of cultural sensitivities as they

establish the common practices of a regional world.

While the watershed events that will precipitate increased regionalism are, as yet, unknown (or identified), current trend tells us that this is the way much of the world is headed. This is a rare opportunity to address some of the inequalities of the world. Restructuring of politics can mean a restructuring of priorities. It will be incumbent upon those who make important decisions to use this opportunity to nurture emerging economies and address the dire needs of much of the globe. Poverty, inequality and disease affect every region, a regional world may, indeed, be the best forum to finally deal with them.

--The Right Honourable Joe Clark, P.C., C.C.

ETHNIC IDENTITY AND GENDER ROLES IN FLUX:

THE ADAPTATION OF BOSNIAN REFUGEES TO AUSTRIAN PROGRAMS OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 1992-1999

BARBARA FRANZ[1]

This essay explores the changes in gender relations among Bosnian refugees who arrived in Vienna, Austria, after the outbreak of the Yugoslav civil war in the spring of 1992. Women refugees seem to have adapted more successfully to their host community than have male refugees. While evaluating the gains and losses of migration, current research on migrant women stresses that these women are frequently victims of not only of racial discrimination and class exploitation but also of a discrimination based on their gender. The dominant interpretation of women in migration is that having access to paid employment does not guarantee an improvement in their status. The argument of following paper, however, emphasizes that for a distinct group of Bosnian refugee women, the experience of residency in Austria has, over time, increased their personal freedom and influence in family decisions. Based on an identity not rigidly linked to a particular area of origin or a social status, Bosnian women compromised economically and socially within the new economic environment more successfully than Bosnian men. Bosnian men hold on to their previous ethnic and social identity by continuous nostalgic revelations of their lost privileged social status and economic position. Furthermore, the restrictive Austrian labour policy paradoxically resulted in the increased participation of Bosnian refugee women in the "black labor market". Women were relatively non-selective and willing to take any available job, while men, it seems, did not adapt quickly to the discriminatory segregation of the labor market and in their subsequent loss of social status. The paper concludes that male Bosnian refugees' identity is linked to their places of origin, their homes, and their related economic and social status held in their communities of origin. Women refugees, on the other hand, quickly realize the need for personal sacrifice and adaptation in the host society and define themselves through their family relations, their cultural and religious traditions, and their individual projects of adaptation to the host society.

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This paper focuses on the changes in gender relations among Bosnian refugees who arrived in Vienna after the outbreak of the Yugoslav civil war in spring 1992. The civil war in Bosnia was an excruciating and traumatic experience for all Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Today, seven years after the outbreak of the war and more than three years after the signing of the Dayton Agreement in Paris on December 14, 1995, more than 7 000 Bosnian displaced persons in Austria still live in refugee camps and have not managed to adapt to their new environment. According to Austrian government sources, about 65 000 Bosnian refugees, however, have "integrated". People are considered integrated when they can provide adequate housing and support for themselves and their dependents through legal employment. Despite legal, social and economic segregation and discrimination, the large majority of Bosnian displaced persons residing in Austria were considered economically integrated at the end of 1998.[2]

Refugee women seem to have adapted more successfully to their host community than have male refugees. The findings in this paper do not correspond with the general trend in current migration literature which describes female migrants' losses and gains, frequently without analyzing the individual motivations and identities of women and men. Authors such as Cherryl Walker (1990) or Tracy Bachrach Ehlers (1990) argue that the migration process, or any other change in the relations of production, can undermine the existing patriarchal structures of a society. They, however, also emphasize the price women have to pay for their new independence. While Bachrach Ehlers (1990:6) argues in *Silent Looms* that women's economic influence and social status declined, Walker (1990:8) shows that a change in gender relations results in a devastating increase of economic and emotional insecurity for women. Mirjana Morokvasic (1984:891), in her analysis of Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) women in Europe, finds that women are victims of not only gender discrimination, racial discrimination of migrant workers, and class exploitation as working class, but also of a "gender asymmetry" in *Gastarbeiter* families and host societies. According to Morokvasic (1993:476), "migration and access to paid employment is certainly not a guarantee of improvement in women's status." She concludes that gender inequality in the arriving group remains largely what it was prior to the migration process. This author, however, found that Bosnian women have managed to "integrate" into the labour market more effectively than have Bosnian men. Thus, for a distinct group of Bosnian refugee women, many of whom were raped and otherwise severely traumatized during the war, the experience of residency in Austria has, over time—but rarely without additional personal suffering—increased their personal freedom and influence in family decisions. Most of them neither want nor, after the Dayton Agreement, are able to return to their places of origin. The exodus thus paradoxically also seems to have served as a catalyst for increasing feelings of independence, emancipation, self-understanding and revised identity for a particular group of Bosnian women.

A substantial number of displaced Bosnians in Austria cannot return to their homes because other ethnic groups now dominate their places of origin. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has changed not only the pre-war political and social structures, but also the demographic characteristics in the country. Before the war, the population of Bosnia totaled 4.3 million of whom 43.7 percent were Bosnian Muslims, 31.3 percent Bosnian Serbs, 17.3 percent Bosnian Croats, and 7.7 percent other groups. The signing of the Dayton

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[2] Concerning the settlement of Bosnian refugees, Austria is an interesting case for assimilation scholarship because the country implemented neither a rigid repatriation scheme as Germany did, nor sought total integration through social welfare policies as exemplified by some Scandinavian states. I rather want to argue that Austria presents a mix of both policy approaches that evolved throughout the 1990s from isolating Bosnian refugees to economically integrating them into the labour market as cheap labourers. Austria was one of the first Western European countries that was affected by the violent conflict in neighbouring Yugoslavia. According to government sources, Austria has accepted more than 90 000 Bosnian refugees since 1992. This resulted in the highest refugee-population density in the EU countries (11.2 refugees per 1 000 Austrian inhabitants, in comparison to the second highest density ratio in Sweden which was 7.2 per 1 000 inhabitants). The majority of these 90 000 Bosnian refugees are women and children. About 18 000 refugees moved on to other countries or returned to Bosnia by the end of 1998. (BMI 1998).

agreement near the end of 1995, theoretically included and anticipated the option of return to their places of origin for the 2.3 million displaced persons and refugees. More than 20 percent of all internally displaced persons have now returned to their places of origin, and about 40 percent of all refugees who came to Western Europe have now returned to the Federation area of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of the more than 520 000 refugees and displaced persons who have returned, 90 percent benefited from the 'majority returns option' of the Dayton Agreement; that is, Bosnian Muslims from the Federation area return to *Bosniak* areas of the Federation, Croats to the Croat areas, and Serbs to the *Republica Srpska*. The Dayton agreement does not allow for relocation, for example, of Bosnian Muslims originating in the *Republica Srpska* to the Federation because this would be tantamount to accepting ethnic cleansing. But relocation increasingly takes place on an individual basis as the years pass and no other opportunities are available. Nearly three years after hostilities came to an end, figures decreased merely to some 700 000 displaced persons and 500 000 refugees still in need of 'durable solutions'. Of those abroad without a settlement solution, the bulk are in Yugoslavia (250 000 Serbs from the Federation area), in Croatia (80 000 of which 75% are Croats and 25% Bosnian Muslims) and in Germany (130 000, mostly Bosnian Muslims from *Srpska*) (Stacher 1999; Danish Refugee Council 1997).

The findings in this paper are based mainly on 23 qualitative interviews with Bosnian refugees (three of which were follow up-interviews), 10 interviews with refugee and aid organizations, three interviews with Austrian government officials, and one interview with a Bosnian government officer. While the officials are cited with their full names, the names of Bosnian refugees have been changed to protect their privacy. Conducted in German, the interviews were open and semi-constructured. The methodological approach followed the suggestions of DeVault (1990:96-116) and especially Anderson and Jack (1991) who emphasize the need of listening 'in stereo', receiving both the dominant and muted channels and tuning into them carefully to understand the relationship between them.

Discrimination in the labour market against *de facto* refugees, in combination with the refugees' experience of new social challenges and economic struggle in the host community, resulted in varying levels of refugee engagement with the host society. Such variation is more gender based than dependent upon education, age and place of origin, although these latter variables also influence successful adaptation to the host society. To understand the preponderant role of gender we should bear in mind that gender inequality changes according to economic and social premises and has no features common to all societies or historic periods. Based on an identity not rigidly linked to a particular area of origin or a social status, the motivation and intent of women interviewed seemed to be anticipatory and creative while simultaneously economically and socially compromising within their new environment. In contrast, Bosnian men appeared to hold on to their previous ethnic and social identity by continuous nostalgic revelations of their lost privileged social status and economic position. This paper, therefore, argues that male Bosnian refugees' identity is linked to their places of origin, their homes, and their related economic and social status held in their communities of origin. Women refugees, on the other hand, quickly realize the need for personal sacrifice and adaptation in the host society and define themselves through their family relations, their cultural and religious traditions, and their individual projects of adaptation to the host society. The gender-based differences in self-perception further resulted in a number of paradoxical economic and psychological consequences for displaced Bosnians in Vienna.[3]

[3] The term 'identity' has become an all-encompassing hybrid of traditional historical, cultural, social, and political variables. Social scientists themselves have noted that the complexity, ambivalence and 'Janus-faced' dimensions of identity are difficult to grasp. In this paper, the term is used to describe the self-perception and self-understanding of Bosnian refugees (Walby 1996; Karlegger 1995; Morokvasic 1987).

THE AUSTRIAN SPECIAL ASSISTANCE SCHEME FOR BOSNIAN REFUGEES: THE BUND-LÄNDER AKTION (FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL PLAN) AND TEMPORARY RESIDENCE WITHOUT WORK PERMITS

The majority of Bosnian refugees benefited at one point or another from the Austrian relief program initiated especially for Bosnian refugees in the spring of 1992. In agreement with the *Länder* (provinces), the Austrian Ministry for the Interior (BMI) set up the *Bund-Länder Aktion* (federal-provincial plan) which became the key relief program for displaced Bosnians. From May 1, 1992, until the August 31, 1998, more than 91 000 persons registered in the program, which provided the refugees with food, shelter and health care. The *Aktion* (plan) consisted of two packages of contracts: one dealing with housing in private accommodations, the other, with public housing. In short, the administrative obligations of the *Länder* were to register displaced persons, arrange their housing facilities, and pay a monthly cash grant of 1 500ATS (about $135US) to the hosts in the case of private accommodation. At the end of 1992, out of 42 545 refugees in the *Aktion*, 33 392 lived in private accommodations while 9 153 were registered in large-scale public accommodations, mostly military compounds. The relief program did not directly support with cash payments the refugees staying in private accommodations but rather the providers of those accommodations. For many refugees, such as 41 year old *Bosniak* Husein C., his 35 year-old wife Selma[4] and their two children, who arrived in Vienna from Zvornik, this meant that they received no regular income for more than five years.[5]

The *Bund-Länder Aktion* was based on the *de facto* refugee status which granted official recognition and temporary right of residence to war expellees. The legal status of displaced Bosnians in Austria, however, changed over time. Throughout the 1990s new provisions were introduced which considerably altered the legal position of the people fleeing from war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Arriving in Austria in April 1992, Husein's family, for example, applied for political asylum twice. Although Husein and Selma considered themselves war expellees rather than asylum seekers. As was the case for the majority of Bosnian refugees, Husein's family intended to return to Bosnia when the war was over. Their asylum application was denied. At the end of 1992, they changed their status to *de facto* refugees and, since July 1998, they hold a *Niederlassungsbewilligung* (residence permit) which allows them to remain in Austria as *Gastarbeiter*. From the beginning of the Bosnian refugee influx in spring 1992, entry into and temporary residence in Austria was guaranteed to the refugees without major difficulties, it seems, while regular employment was prohibited to them.[6]

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[4] All interviews referred to in this paper took place in 1999 and so will not be subsequently indicated. Their details are in the reference section of the paper.

[5] The *Bund-Länder Aktion* calculated the distribution of refugees throughout the Austrian provinces according to a ratio negotiated between the *Länder* and the federal government, with each financing the program in nearly equal amounts. The highest number of displaced persons in the *Aktion* occurred at the end of June 1993, when 47 746 persons were registered for the assistance scheme (BMI 1998). However, this number, provided by BMI, appears too high due to multiple registrations in select cases (ICMPD 1999:25).

[6] This is not the place to elabourate on the legal provisions that influenced Bosnian refugees in Austria. To demonstrate the large amount of such provisions here is a short overview of the changing laws concerning foreigners (non-EU citizens or convention refugees): the first arrivals were subject to the *Austrian-Yugoslav Agreement on Visa Policies 1965* (BGBI 1965) which guaranteed entry into Austria and residency without visa requirements for three months, the *Passport Law* (BGBI 1969), the *Law for The Alien's Branch of Police* (BGBI 1954), and the *Asylum Law of 1968* (BGBI 1968). On June 1, 1992, the new *Asylum Law 1991* (BGBI 1991) was introduced. During 1993, the legal situation of non-nationals in Austria changed again: on January 1, 1993, the *Aliens Law 1992* (BGBI 1992) and on July 1, 1993, the *Residence Law* (BGBI 1992b) were introduced into the Austrian legal system. On January 1, 1998, a revised *Asylum Law* and a new *Aliens Law 1997* were enacted, harmonizing both the former *Aliens Law* and the *Residence Law*.

In July 1993, a time-limited right of residence without an individual eligibility procedure was introduced into the Austrian legal system for the first time in the country's history by the enactment of Paragraph 12 of the *Residence Law*, which enables the Federal Government to pass decrees:

> during times of heightened international tension, armed conflict or other circumstances that endanger the safety of entire population groups,…and to order that directly affected groups of aliens who can find no protection elsewhere shall be accorded a temporary right of residence in the federal territory (BGBI 1994).

The government issued a decree concerning Bosnian displaced persons, which guaranteed them, *en masse*, a time-limited right of residence until June 30, 1994. In the following months and years, the time limit was repeatedly extended: first for every half year, then for a full year, then for 17 months and finally until July 31, 1998.

Throughout their stay in Austria, however, the Bosnian *de facto* refugees' residence rights were frequently doubted. Legal extensions of Bosnian residence rights were issued by decrees usually only a few weeks before the expiration date of the prior permit. A heated public debate in the media and on the streets habitually preceded the extension. While officially Austrians prided themselves on their generous support for the refugees and the Neighbor in Despair NGO, during periods prior to the up-coming residence permit extensions, the press extensively covered exclusivist Austrian opinions. Focusing on the public mood, print media headlines expressed the rising Austrian xenophobia about the "refugee-wave" by emphasizing statements such as "The End of *Gemütlichkeit*" and "They Should Stay at Home". In a way typical of the Austrian mode of dealing with problems, however, last minute extensions of the residence permit were repeatedly issued throughout the years. This pattern of last-minute reprieves in public debate frequently terrified the Bosnian refugees because it implicitly contained the threat of sending them back to their places of origin, which in many cases were by then controlled by other ethnic groups.[7]

THE "BLACK LABOUR MARKET": WOMEN'S PRAGMATIC ADAPTATION TO ECONOMIC DEMANDS

Although a substantial number of Bosnian refugees felt psychologically terrorized, many realized that the political situation in Bosnia would not allow them to return home any time soon. They also recognized that they needed money not only for their personal lives but also to support family members and relatives who were displaced in Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia or other Eastern European countries. The labour market, however, remained closed to the majority of Bosnian refugees throughout the first half of the 1990s. As the institution responsible for Austrian labour market regulations, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was reluctant to open the labour market to *de facto* refugees as these refugees were only under temporary protection. The exception to this rule was the possibility of working for humanitarian organizations, where earnings were frequently under the minimum wage (*Geringfügigkeitsgrenze*). One of the few refugees whose skills were needed, Azemina M., a now 40-year-old *Bosniak*, began to work in her profession as a social worker

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[7] Nachbar in Not (Neighbor in Despair) is a humanitarian aid organization initiated in 1992 by Caritas, the Red Cross, and the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) to provide humanitarian relief for Bosnians in the war-torn areas. Probably because of the status of Nachbar in Not Austrians seem to have trusted the organization's objective to aid people in despair in the Bosnian war. Nachbar in Not collected between 100 and 500ATS million annually in donations and sent aid trucks into war torn areas such as Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla, and Sarajevo (Cernin 1992:9; Murlasits 1992:16). The terrorizing effects of the media campaigns prior to each extension of the residency permit for Bosnian refugees were emphasized by Ljubomir Bratic, vice-manager of the Integrationshaus, a NGO that provides refugee housing on a temporary basis; Dr. Melita Hummel Sunjic, spokeswoman for the UNHCR, Vienna; and Christine von Kohl, founder and head of the Culturni Centar, a NGO mainly concerned with intercultural exchange between Bosnians and Austrians.

for an Austrian organization concerned with the acculturation of Bosnian children and teenagers. Her monthly income as a social worker, however, was not enough to provide for her two teenage children and herself. As did many other Bosnian refugee women, she therefore went to work illegally as a maid.[8]

Despite the legal restrictions, all refugees needed money. The restrictive Austrian employment policy thus resulted in the increased participation of Bosnian refugees in the 'black labour market'. Women were relatively non-selective and willing to take any available job, while men it seems, did not adapt quickly to the discriminatory segregation of the labour market and in their subsequent loss of social status. Azemina M. explains the refugee womens' motivations: "Bosnian women wanted to prove to their relatives that they were industrious and hard-working. They wanted to demonstrate to their families that they were worthy,…worked hard and were successful". The social worker at the NGO *Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen* in Vienna, Angela Ivezic, herself the daughter of a migrant family from Herzegovina, explains that even though they were victims of war and exodus traumas, Bosnian women behaved more pragmatically than did their male counterparts during the time of adaptation. Ivezic explains that although many of the women had had a professional career in Bosnia, in Austria they took the jobs that were available:

> A job in tourism or cleaning services is a woman's job. It was more difficult for the men to deal with the flight and the loss of the land. Women deal with this easier. They see it more pragmatically: OK, I am now here and I have to rebuild my existence here. I have to think about my children and how we will survive here. It is more difficult for men because they were very depressive and passive and also hoped to find a job in their old profession. Women saw it simply more pragmatically: OK, even if I have a university degree I need to begin in the cleaning industry. It does not go any other way. And then I will see if I can get a job in my old profession and how this all will develop.

Working illegally as maids, baby-sitters or dishwashers, many of the Bosnian refugee women soon found themselves earning the main income for the family. Bosnian women living with their families in private accommodations in Vienna took advantage of both the city's infrastructure and the existing demand for unskilled labour. They developed social networks that transmitted information about available maid service jobs. Every woman in interviewed who lived in private accommodations found an illegal part-time occupation in the first months after her arrival. In 1994, the local Viennese authorities estimated that about 40 percent of the Bosnian refugees, mostly women, were working as cleaning staff, baby-sitters or in other illegal occupations on the 'black labour market' (Fréchet 1994:32).

All the refugees interviewed worked illegally at one time. The Bosnian women and men who still live in the Caritas refugee camp St. Gabriel do what they call 'work therapy'. According to Irma K., a 62-year-old *Bosniak*, this is "any work that distracts my mind from the memory of the war experience". Initiated and managed by the Caritas camp management, a program puts the men to work as gardeners in the neighborhood while the women grow bio-vegetables in the camp's garden or knit socks and sweaters all year round, to be sold at special refugee bazaars. Such seasonal occupation for refugees in camps seems to have been tolerated by the local authorities.[9]

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[8] Professionals, such as lawyers, physicians, or teachers, had to pass exams that tested their knowledge of their field and their necessary adequate knowledge of the German language in order to get their Bosnian degrees accepted. For certain fields, such as medical specialists, this process of "Nostrification" frequently takes years.

[9] Illegal occupation deprived the refugees of their social benefits and health insurance. During my interviews with the women who still live in the camp, I recognized that they seem to knit or crochet all day long. They continue with their needle work while talking to each other. They like to do it and it seems to have a distracting and calming effect on them. During the off-season, the men in the camp, however, only watch television for escapism. The TV shows, however, are broadcast only in German (Irma K.).

The people in camps, many of which were located in rural areas without appropriate infrastructure, only had the 'work therapy' on which to rely. Numerous refugees in private accommodations, however, soon adapted to the restrictive policies of the legal labour market. For example, only two months after his arrival in Austria, Husein C., the former manager of an export company, worked illegally on the farms around Heinburg, a village in Lower Austria. He lived with his family and other Bosnian refugees in a Bed and Breakfast in Heinburg for two years, accommodated by the *Bund Länder Aktion*. As was the case for many others, he needed money to support his relatives in Bosnia and to buy school supplies for his children. Husein states:

> One year Zlata (his 9-year-old daughter) needed a typewriter for school, and I went to work illegally in the fields of the farmers in the neighborhood to earn the money. The next year, she needed a computer and I worked illegally in the woods as a lumberjack to earn the money.

Husein moved his family from Heinburg to a suburb of Vienna in the fall of 1994 and continued to work illegally in the construction industry. In the meantime, his wife Selma cleaned other peoples' houses.

THE PARTIAL OPENING OF THE LABOUR MARKET: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SEGREGATION

In July 1993, more than a year after the arrival of the first refugees, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs issued an ordinance that permitted a modest number of work permits (*Beschäftigungsbewilligung*) to be issued to *de facto* refugees. Bosnian war expellees thus were listed as a 'third category' after nationals (including EU citizens and Convention refugees) and migrant workers who had already lived in Austria for a longer period of time. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, by the end of 1993, 4 800 work permits were issued in Vienna. Many of these, however, were valid only for temporary and seasonal jobs. At the time, more than 8 000 Bosnian refugees lived in the city. In that year, a total of 15 020 work permits were issued in Austria. To be sure, this number of work permits had to be shared among all foreigners who sought legal employment for the first time, including the children of *Gastarbeiter* families as well as the Bosnian refugees, 47 746 of whom were registered in the *Bund-Länder Aktion* alone. (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 1993; ICMPD 1999:20-24; BMI 1998).

In practice, however, this meant that a *Beschäftigungsbewilligung* for a *de facto* refugee was granted only for a job that could not be filled by an unemployed Austrian citizen or a migrant worker holding a residence permit. Work permits were usually denied to Bosnian refugees for jobs in their own professions, for example technical engineering. The regional Employment Centre (*Arbeitsmarktservice*) would seek instead to fill an open position with an Austrian citizen who collected unemployment benefits. Furthermore, work permits were difficult for Bosnian refugees to acquire due to the reduction of such permits issued for non-nationals in the following years.[10]

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[10] All non-Austrian or non-EU citizens wishing to work in Austria are subject to the *Law on the Employment of Non-nationals* (BGBI 1975). According to this Law, the employment of foreigners requires a work permit which is issued to the employer under several conditions. The regional *Arbeitsmarktservice* was not responsible for the job search for Bosnian refugees. Bosnian refugees themselves needed to find a company that was willing to employ them. The government excluded from the *Bund Länder Aktion de facto* refugees who received a work permit. In the course of finding legal employment, the legal status of the Bosnians was changed from *de facto* refugees to migrant workers. Legal employment is, however, a condition for the residence permit, for migrant workers, according to the *Residence Law*. In general, the employer applies for a *Beschäftigungsbewilligung* at the regional Employment Center. The Center issues a permit for one year if the country's economic situation is considered stable. *De facto* this control mechanism lead to explicit discrimination against Bosnian refugees in the labour market. Furthermore, the foreign worker had to be legally

This legally based segregation on the labour market resulted in a concentration of Bosnians in the lowest segments of that market. Thus Bosnians continued working in maid service, tourism, construction, and farming, the same occupations they had already been working in illegally. Such de *facto* discrimination against Bosnian refugees on the job market enhanced the already preferential employment of women in the same sort of jobs they had held on the 'black labour market'. The gender-based distinction on the labour market severely impacted existing gender roles and relations in Bosnian refugee families. Applying for work permits for maid service or tourism jobs, Bosnian women not only began to provide the main family income but also were frequently employed in legal occupations sooner than were Bosnian men. By finally holding legal employment, Bosnian women secured their families' residence rights as well as such social benefits as health insurance. The women considered the cleaning work—although often strenuous and causing detrimental skin conditions and diseases—a flexible part-time occupation that left them time to take care of their families. Throughout the 1990s, about 30 000 to 40 000 Bosnian refugees, many of whom were women, changed over time their *de facto* refugee status to the more permanent *Gastarbeiter* status (BMI 1998).

As did all the interviewed Bosnian refugee women—with the exception of Azra who was 11 years old upon her arrival in Austria—Selma worked illegally for years in the maid service industry. In June 1998, Selma C. finally got her *Beschäftigungsbewilligung* to work as a room attendant in a Viennese hospital. Her new legal employment enabled the family to change their status from *de facto* refugees to migrant workers, and they were then excluded from the *Bund-Länder Aktion*. In the meantime, her husband, Husein C., took German and computer courses before he got his current job in September 1998 as a manager of the beverage section at a grocery store chain. Selma and Husein's gradual adaptation to the Austrian labour market seems to follow a certain pattern that was typical for many Bosnian refugee families. Indeed, Husein adapted more successfully than many other Bosnian men to the Austrian labour market..

SELF-PERCEPTION DURING ACCULTURATION: A GENDER-BASED EXPLANATION

Based on a future-oriented view of life and a perception of themselves as valuing family and children, refugee women acculturated quickly to the new environment in Austria. Refugee men, however, identified themselves through their social status and material belongings left behind in Bosnia. Through the exodus the men thus experienced severe feelings of loss and emotional trauma and tended to remain in a state of nostalgia lasting, in some cases, for years.

The story of Amra K., a 22-year-old *Bosniak* from Rudo who arrived with her brother Sead in Vienna at the end of June 1992, after spending two months in a refugee camp in Belgrade, has similar features to Selma's story. While studying German and Architecture, Amra cleaned the households of middle-class Viennese families because her brother could not find work. When he finally got a job in the construction industry, Sead's hands became "too blistered to hold a spoon" and she decided that her brother should quit the construction job immediately. Amra wanted to work harder and provide the family income rather than to see her brother agonizing in pain.

Selma's and Amra's stories about their economic acclimatization are similar to the stories of Irma H., Rijalda H. and Azemina M. Imra, a 43-year-old Bosnian Serb, came from Doboj to Vienna with her *Bosniak*

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employed in the same company for at least 52 weeks in the previous 14 months to move up in the hierarchically structured labour market. After the first 52 weeks of employment with a *Beschäftigungsbewilligung* the person could gain her *Arbeitserlaubnis*. The *Arbeitserlaubnis* is valid for two years. It is locally restricted but no longer bound to only one employer. Bosnians were keen to keep their jobs because their residence rights were dependent on their legal employment. This set of legal restrictions, however, resulted in whole companies specializing in employing and exploiting Bosnian refugees in Vienna. The employers knew, as Husein C. put it, what they got: "Foreign work is dirty, hard and with little pay". While working long hours under strenuous conditions for little money, Bosnians did not dare complain because they could not possibly afford to lose their job and residence permits.

husband and their two daughters at the end of October 1992. Rijalda, a 29-year-old Montenegrin, came from Brcko to Vienna in June 1992 with her *Bosniak* husband, Alija, and their two daughters. Azemina, a *Bosniak*, arrived in Vienna at 33 years-old with two children while her husband, an engineer, remained in Travnik. Three times he came to Vienna and tried to acculturate to the city. The third time, already living in her own apartment, Azemina had even arranged a job and a work permit for him. In spite of this, he returned to Bosnia. Azemina now is legally separated from him. Alija, Rijalda's husband, had been the owner of a sawmill and a cafe back home, was determined to open a restaurant in Vienna. He failed to do so and fell into a severe depression lasting two years. Irma's husband, who had been the manager of a plumbing company, wanted to return by any means to Doboj, he became depressive, alcoholic and violent towards other family members. He committed suicide in Vienna three and a half years ago. Bosnian men frequently have not yet acculturated to the host community and accepted their loss of social status. The women, in spite of their war experience and exodus traumas and the loss of social status for those who had pursued professional careers in Bosnia, adapted quickly to the new economic demands. Thus, Selma the former bookkeeper, Amra the student, Azemina the social worker, Rijalda the former housewife, and Irma the former manager of the municipal finance department became cleaning women.

Of course, many of these women experienced severe emotional and physical difficulties during their time of acculturation. The Azemina referred to the women's processes of adaptation to the labour market a "work trauma". Selma, Mira and Dubravka cited their working conditions as being responsible for their physical problems: hair loss, the loss of eyesight, fingernails and skin on their hands. Worse, however, was the discrimination and humiliation many Bosnian refugee women experienced at work.[11]

Prior to the war, approximately 200 000 Yugoslav citizens lived in Austria, many of whom settled in Vienna. Mainly Serbs, they came as *Gastarbeiter* in the 1960s. By the end of the 1980s, according to Fassmann and Münz (1996), this group of migrant workers was still employed in low-wage jobs as unskilled or semi-skilled workers. The system of work permits and the discriminatory segregation in the labour market pushed female *Gastarbeiter* and Bosnian refugee women into the same sectors of the economy, mainly cleaning and tourism. Due to seniority, however, *Gastarbeiter* frequently held the position of fore(wo)man, for example, in the cleaning teams. The clash of different ethnic origins, but more importantly of social classes, often resulted in conflicts in the work environment. Azemina M. explains:

> There is a great deal of discrimination among the colleagues. Decades ago, women who were not well educated had to leave [Yugoslavia] to find jobs in Western Europe. Now these women have been in Austria for 20 years. They are not Bosnian women but women from other parts of the former Yugoslavia because Bosnian women traditionally took care of their families and rarely left their home province. [The older *Gastarbeiter* women] are the bosses or lead the cleaning teams. Therefore, the better educated (refugee) women have to work according to the guidelines that the less educated give to them.

The class differences caused numerous conflicts among women working as maids. Bosnian women, many of whom have professional backgrounds, had to repeatedly endure severe humiliation and discrimination from working class women of other ethnic origins rather than lose their jobs.

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[11] The women's physical problems could also result from suppression of their war traumas. The argument that psychological treatment seemed to be less important for female rape victims and war survivors than the adaptation of certain practical skills, such as computer skills, has recently emerged. For Bosnian women, these priorities typically derive from the factors of daily economic need and the psychological repression of the humiliations they have experienced. There is evidence, however, that an increasing number of traumatized women are beginning to seek professional help in Vienna now, six or seven years after they have left Bosnia. (Irma H.; Dubravka).

Nevertheless, such Bosnian women found ways to endure the discrimination of the labour market, the decrease in their social status and the psychological humiliation frequently experienced at work. Bosnian women, furthermore, held legal jobs earlier than did their fathers and husbands. The reasons for the women's ability to acculturate and adapt to the rather restrictive economic possibilities are, however, not entirely based upon their, in a paradoxical sense. preferential treatment in the labour market. Although many Bosnian women were severely traumatized during the war and have difficulties articulating these issues, today they also seem to think about their experience of war, exodus and adaptation in Austria in terms of problem solving and negotiation. In their narratives, women tend to disregard notions of ethnic identity and the politics of national exclusivism entirely. They minimize or even joke about the humiliation and harassment they have experienced but emphasize their social and economic aims and achievements. Focusing on their friendships and their love and care for their children, these women speak about their personal objectives in terms of individual security, comfortable homes and dynamic strategies to find jobs with higher salaries. They are deeply engaged in their children's education, the search for bigger, more comfortable apartments, the responsibilities they took on through taking out loans, and the pursuit of jobs in their former professions. Women's self-understanding seems to be marked by their experience of everyday life struggles, such as their children's sickness or their encounters with bureaucratic officials. The women's narratives manifest a dense modeling of problems deeply seated in the psychological conflicts of socialization as well as in political and economic conflicts; but they manifest even more strongly solutions—ways these women planned and began to rebuild their new existence and identity.

Here lies the strongest juxtaposition of contrasting points of view based upon gender. In their stories, women focus on their families' future and on compromises that can advance their social and economic acculturation, while men more frequently compare their current living situation with memories of the past. In their stories, Bosnian men tend to link their identity to material possessions and social status. For example, Alija H.'s narrative includes many comparisons of his current life to his life in Brcko. He was a well-known innkeeper, but now in Vienna nobody knows him. Borrowing money and trusting each other was normal in Bosnia. In Vienna, he was cheated out of the restaurant he tried to rent. He was a respected person in Brcko, while in Vienna the *Fremdenpolizei* (foreign police) harassed him and his guests with frequent searches during the year he managed a restaurant. Male Bosnian refugees still struggle more than do their female counterparts with political events, their personal loss of belonging and status, and the war that changed their life forever. The men have more trouble accepting the exodus and status degradation than women do.

All Bosnians identify themselves as Europeans and now feel abandoned by Europe. Men expressed this in their narratives. For example, *Bosniak* men frequently pointed out that Bosnians are "Europe's Palestinians". Some *Bosniak* men emphasized that Europe did not act according to its democratic responsibilities toward the Bosnian people. In their stories, *Bosniak* men frequently focus on the effects of Serbian nationalist politics on their particular Bosnian identity and on their lost feeling of belonging. The definition of the Bosnian people becomes the ethnic definition of Bosnian Muslims in some parts of the stories. Ethnicity defined in a primordial sense, as an exclusivist marker based upon blood and land, frequently appears in the men's narratives. Rijalda H. describes her and Alija's different approaches to Bosnian politics: "My husband listens to the Bosnian news every night. I have not listened to it for quite a while…Now I have been here for seven years. They went by fast". Rijalda also clearly expresses how she feels about her new life with Alija in Vienna:

> Men were Pashas in Bosnia. Now they have to accept that women have an opinion, too. Women adapt better than men do. He still is not acculturated…He does not like it that I became more independent. In former times, down [in Bosnia] women had difficulties finding jobs, they stayed at home and thus were less emancipated. Now in Austria, women are more emancipated and he has to listen to what I have to say. This is also a reason why I do not want to return home.

Through their exodus and the loss of social status and material possessions, however, it appears that important social and ethnic boundary markers of men's identity disappeared. Because of this loss, many Bosnian men still feel paralyzed, it seems, in a limbo, unable either to move forward into a new life or to return to their roots. They live in a world of memories, idle talk, jokes, folkloristic references, and parables. Women, however, are more likely to find inspiration and renewal in the spaces in which they encountered Austria.[12]

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to demonstrate that Bosnian refugee women and men describe and understand themselves and their acclimatization processes in Austria differently because of the gender-based dimensions of their identities. Originally incorporated into the *Bund-Länder Aktion* relief scheme, women adapted more quickly to their economic segregation than did their male counterparts and either found regular illegal work in the first years of their residency in Vienna or were employed later in low-wage jobs in tourism and room attendance. Thus, the relatively rapid acclimatization of Bosnian women in Austria was paradoxically advanced through a discriminatory labour market policy, which at first excluded Bosnian *de facto* refugees entirely from the labour market and then gradually opened the job market but only for unskilled labourers. Based upon their own interpretation of the refugee situation and their construction of identity, which is manifest through cultural and religious traditions and focuses on the family and children, Bosnian women realized that they had to act pragmatically and thus began rebuilding their future from the bottom of the economic ladder. Bosnian women tend to be highly motivated and focused on their family's future, while the men's identity seems to be intrinsically linked to their places of origin and the social status they have lost.

In their narratives, women frequently minimized the abuse and harassment they experienced during the war, the exodus and the encounter with xenophobic Austrians. Instead, they emphasize their objectives and their children's achievements. Bosnian men, however, seem to have experienced the loss of material belongings and social status more severely. This has caused, for some, psychological nausea and resulted in lasting depressions. In the best-case scenario, they found employment after attending language and special-skills courses. In the worst-case scenario, they remain unemployed, became alcoholics, or left their families. Consequently, many Bosnian women provide the main income for their families today. Although most have experienced a severe loss of social status and now work jobs in tourism and the maid service industry, many of these women emphasize a new kind of independence and emancipation in their narratives.

Thus, the findings in this paper do not support the arguments put forth by womens studies scholars and Marxist anthropologists, such as Tracy Bachrach Ehlers (1990) who analyzed the influence of globalization on production relationships among entrepreneurial Indian women in Guatemala. She found that "changing relations of production have actually deprived women workers of the economic control they once had" (Ehlers 1990:6). Ehlers, among others, argues that the decrease in women's economic independence leads subsequently to a decline of women's influence in social relations. Rather, this paper illustrates that the self-perception of women in this study is focused upon being a "Bosnian in Austria" with all the social, cultural and economic dilemmas and hopes. Exodus and adaptation to a host society based on status decline has nevertheless lead a number of these women to increased notions of independence within their families. In comparison to Bosnian men, the women defined their Bosnian identity through cultural and religious

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[12] The definition of ethnicity by Fanke Wilmer (1997) is applied here. For the political scientist, ethnicity is a social organizing principle based upon a common language and a shared world view. It functions as a boundary maker, a way of designating who is 'we' and who is 'them'. While Wilmer emphasizes that ethnicity is constructed, this paper tries to demonstrate that ethnic identity is just one category of a fluid identity or self-perception among numerous others such as class and gender. It appears that in the self-perception of displaced Bosnians the emphasis upon ethnicity, class or gender are constantly changing.

traditions such as traditional methods of food preparation or for Muslims, fasting during Ramadan. Thus, the women understand their own ethnic identity as not being necessarily linked to a particular place, primordial ties or even political categories. Furthermore, the women's energies and ambitions are focused on the dynamics of processes that they anticipate will improve their families' social and economic lot. In contrast, the majority of Bosnian men tend to remain in a state of nostalgia, which has been prolonged, in some cases, for years. Most of the Bosnian women in my sample do not want to return to their places of origin mainly because of their children, many of whom have lived nearly their entire life in Austria and know Bosnia only through stories. The realization that life has changed in Bosnia, and that most friends are dead or have left the country is also part of their decision to remain in Austria. The decision to remain in Austria seems frequently to have been a family decision made by the women and children, rather than by the husbands and fathers. Thus, paradoxically, the Bosnian war has indirectly increased a feeling of personal freedom and independence for numerous Bosnian women in the diaspora.

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DEVELOPMENT:
CHINA'S ENTRY INTO THE WTO

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With respect to international economic growth and integration, China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become a very controversial issue. In spite of the legal, political and technical factors, one can argue that China's process of entry involves a contradiction between its developed and developing status, based on its high economic and trade growth and low per capita index. While China continues to pursue institutional, economic and financial reform in order to participate in the international trading system, China also acknowledges its status as a developing country. This paper examines the WTO's objectives as a multilateral trading system and includes a cost-benefit analysis of China's entry into the WTO—its chance and challenge. It also examines the relationship between the WTO and developing economies, and China's development within an international perspective.

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INTRODUCTION[2]

The world is in change and development (Chinese proverb).

Trade conquers the world (Harold James).

After World War II, three important international organizations were established to promote global trade and economic development: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established to promote international monetary cooperation (James 1996:50); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), part of the World Bank group, was to encourage the flow of capital internationally; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was the result of an international conference held in Geneva in 1947 to consider a draft charter for the International Trade Organization (James 1996:53). As an extension of the GATT, the World Trade Organization (WTO) came into force in 1995.

The Director General of the WTO, Renato Ruggiero, spoke of China's entry into the organization in a speech at Beijing University on April 21, 1997. He stressed that the successful integration of China into the global economy is "key to many of the international challenges we face." He also claimed that "China increasingly needs the opportunity and security of the WTO system to fulfill its potential for growth and development. And the WTO increasingly needs China as a full and active member to be a truly universal system" (Ruggiero 1997:1). Unfortunately, China's effort to accede has become a very complex negotiation process with certain developed countries.

As one of the twenty-three founding members of the GATT, China became a contracting party on May 21, 1948. Later, due to the fact that the Chinese Nationalist Government moved to Taiwan, China withdrew from the GATT on May 5, 1950. In 1982, China was granted observer status in the GATT. In June of 1986, China requested "resumption" of its contracting party status on the basis that the withdrawal of the Nationalist government in 1950 was null and void. On March 4, 1987, the GATT established a working party on China's status. China had wished to resume its GATT membership before the WTO came into force in 1995 but it was not realized because there were disagreements between China and the US; for example, the dispute concerning intellectual property rights in 1994. Since then, China has continued its twelve-year effort to enter the WTO.

China's attempt to enter the WTO must be placed in the context of the debate concerning China's status as a developed or developing country. China maintains that it is a developing country, but its entry into the WTO as such is contested by a few WTO members, including the US. On December 15, 1998, China's vice premier Li Lanqing stated during a press conference that "China must be admitted to the WTO as a developing country" (Chinese Embassy 1997-98). On January 7, 1999, the Chinese Foreign Ministry's news brief further confirmed that China wanted to join the WTO, but only with a *developing country* status, and it would not sacrifice this principle for the sake of membership in the WTO (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 1999). The US, whose large trade deficit compels it to demand market access to China, argues that China's economy is too large to join the WTO as a developing country. On June 20, 1998, US trade representative Charlene Barshefsky said that China's entry into the WTO would have to meet certain US demands. Jay Ziegler, Barshefsky's spokesman, stated that "the bottom line is China must open its market more fully to more agricultural products, industrial goods and services." Barshefsky stated that the US

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[2] On November 15, 1999, Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Shi Guang Sheng and US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky signed a bilateral trade agreement on behalf of their respective governments. While Barshefsky said that the signing of the agreement is a profound historic moment in US-China relations, one of the strict points in the negotiation was that China insisted on joining the WTO as a developing country, which its counterparts refused to accept (www.china.org.cn and www.strafor.com).

wanted more progress in the opening of Beijing's service sector to foreign competition—including the fields of legal, architectural and distribution services and the key area of financial services (*CND* 1998:2).

It is clear that the US, as well as other developed countries in the WTO, does not consider China to be a developing country; however, China continues to proclaim its developing country status because of its economic situation and transitional features. This paper investigates the likelihood of China's entry into the WTO as a developing country. Specifically, it will explore the WTO as a multilateral trading system in terms of its objectives and special policies for developing countries, and China's integration into the international trading and economic system. The paper also explores the conception and measures of "development" in terms of various historical factors regarding developed and developing countries from the Industrial Revolution until World War II, and examine China's development within the international context.

CHINA AND THE WTO

China's economic growth has attracted the attention of the outside world. It has begun to join a variety of international organizations. Following its involvement in IMF activities and the World Bank, China has pursued membership in the WTO since the 1980s. China's entry raises important issues regarding its status as a developed or developing country. It appears that China's entry depends on certain terms and conditions, including the degree and level of tariffs, financial services, and agricultural market access. The issue of China's WTO membership has provoked considerable discussion in both developed and developing countries. In these discussions, most comments have not only favored China's integration into the world economy, but have also favored resolving the issue sooner, rather than later.

The following section explores the objectives of the WTO, as well as the reasons why the world perceives it to be an integrating organization. It also undertakes a cost-benefit analysis of China's entry. Finally, it looks at the likelihood of China's entry as well as the challenges faced by China in its attempts to integrate its economy with the global economic system.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE WTO

The WTO is a multilateral trading system. Since the creation of GATT in 1947, dominant countries have pursued their own strategies and interests within the organization: the promotion of trade growth and economic development. But as US Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated, GATT was to "promote *mutually* advantageous economic development and the betterment of worldwide economic relations" (James 1996:35, emphasis added). In order to effectively improve trade growth, the GATT obligated each country to apply non-discrimination measures and most favored nation (MFN) treatment to other contracting parties. However, if this threatened to seriously injure domestic products, an escape clause allowed contracting parties to withdraw or modify concessions.

In his speech at the GATT 50th Anniversary Forum, Ruggiero stressed that "the world we see around us—a world of growing economic integration widening circles of development and unprecedented prosperity—is in many ways the fulfillment of an idea which arose out of the destruction of the World War II" (1998:2). The past fifteen years have witnessed more and more trade reform policies in developing countries. The share of developing countries in world trade has increased from 20 percent to 25 percent. Specifically, the share of developing countries in the manufacturing sector has doubled from 10 percent to 20 percent and is expected to exceed 50 percent by the year 2020 (Ruggiero 1998:2).

China's economic and trade growth has become a very important issue in the world trading system. Frederick M. Abbott questions how the WTO can claim to govern world trade while more than one-fifth of the world population, the second largest national economy and one of the top trading nations is excluded from its ranks (1998:6)? It is also estimated that China's modernization will require imports of equipment and technology valued at approximately US $100 billion annually. Moreover, infrastructure expenditure during

the next decade will amount to approximately US $250 billion, not to mention the rising demand for energy, mineral resources, food, and farming imports which, despite the size and resources of the Chinese economy, cannot be satisfied by domestic output alone (Ruggiero 1997:2).

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

According to the principle of "special and differential treatment," developing countries have greater ability to impose trade restrictions than industrial countries, they benefit from preferential access for their exports in industrial country markets, and they may grant preferences to each other's exports with conditions less stringent than normal under GATT (Kirmani 1994:16).

It is an important fact that the GATT has had such a special treatment principle to promote trade by developing countries since 1965. The treatment gives priority to the reduction/elimination of tariffs on products and internal taxes which discourage the consumption of primary products. Truly reciprocal commitments between developing countries and other members are not expected. China's entry into the WTO must meet certain terms designed to balance the competing interests of developed and developing members. Although its entry may affect the balance of these interests, China has not been looked to for leadership on economic issues affecting developing countries. While China's leadership role may evolve, the difference between China's economic interests and those of other developing countries seem sufficient enough to argue against a major realignment of interests within the WTO.

China has to consider whether the costs of entry outweigh the benefits, given the challenges posed by its level of trade growth and its domestic problems. China has expanded its trade relations with WTO members even though it is not a member. China currently enjoys the same mutual benefits as the WTO members. For instance, it already enjoys permanent MFN treatment from major countries in the world.

CHINA'S OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

As China pursues entry into the WTO and greater integration into the world trading system, it faces great opportunities and challenges. Given the concept of 'developed' economies and the experience of developed countries, it is hard to classify China as a developed country. In other words, China's economy can only be characterized as a developing economy according to its economic situation. There are some members of the WTO who, because of their own interests, want to assign China 'developed' status in the WTO. The 1998 Human Development Report of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) indicated that China still faces social and environmental problems despite its rapid economic growth. For example, public spending on primary and secondary education in some developed countries averages US $15 500 per capita, but in China public expenditure in education averages at US $57 (UNDP 1998:28).

As a developing country, China can only enter the WTO with developing status. Having been oppressed by some developed countries, China had difficulty in developing its national economy. China lost its postwar economic development opportunity due to the conflict between the Nationalists and Communists. Until the end of the 1970s, China made real efforts to encourage economic growth and social development. Now, China's development is still uncertain, facing further difficulties and problems. The future of China's development depends on a solution for these problems.

China's entry into the WTO will require rapid internal changes and external openings, as well as greater commitments to other WTO members. First, membership in the WTO would institutionalize many market measures that China has already effectively adopted. Quotas, licensing requirements and other non-tariff barriers have been eliminated on more than one thousand imports in recent years, and tariff levels have been reduced significantly. If China belonged to the WTO, any increase in protective trade measures would be subject to international monitoring. Second, China's entry would guarantee a transparent schedule of future reforms and opening-up measures, thus releasing some important information to foreign firms and

agencies that would have access to China's closed sectors. China will also have to meet its commitments to the international community.

WTO AND DEVELOPMENT

In order to understand whether China is a developing country, it is necessary to investigate the relationship between the WTO and developed and developing countries. In other words, we need to investigate historical factors regarding the status of developed and developing countries. Strictly speaking, the concept of developed and developing countries is unclear in both the academic community and the policy field. For example, some researchers have been consistent in dividing the world into the First World (which includes developed capitalist countries), the Second World (which includes developed socialist countries), and the Third World (which includes underdeveloped countries). Peter Boettle (1994:4) argues that the term 'third world' emerged merely to represent those countries receiving foreign aid from the developed world. In the policy fields, the GATT contracting parties in 1965 established the Department of Trade and Development and a Special Provision to promote developing economies. Alternatively, the WTO uses the term 'least developed country' (LDC) for some developing countries and transition countries, which are transferring from a central planning economy to a market oriented economy. It is clear that the WTO raises the concept of LDC while keeping the difference between developed and developing countries. The following discussion examines the concepts of 'developing' and 'developed' countries and how they relate to the WTO. It will also examine the problems which arise in defining China as a 'developing' country in the WTO.

THE CONCEPT OF "DEVELOPED"

In general, the appearance of many post-World War II international organizations was related to the needs and objectives of 'developed' countries, particularly the US. According to Greg Mastel (1997:98), the US, as a developed country, was the initial driving force behind the world trade system. In the immediate postwar era, the US was the only major economic power that was not devastated by the war; this gave the US an enormous economic edge over the rest of the world. In order to be a part of an international organization within the trading system, the developing countries might be granted "special/different treatment" to access the markets of developed countries.

The concept of developed countries can be traced to the middle of the 19th century when the effects of the industrial revolution came to be seen in the economies of Western countries. According to Harold James, in the 17th and 18th centuries better roads and canals, as well as railroads, bigger sailing ships and then steamships in the 19th century, created a manufacturing revolution. As James analyzed, this industrial revolution created the economies of developed countries. The economic growth brought about by the industrial revolution, and later the war experience, further developed the economies of the US and other western countries. In the developed countries, "for most of the period of very dynamic growth after World War II, trade grew even quicker than output: in the initial growth spurt between 1948-1958, the volume index of the world exports grew at an annual rate of 6.2% while that of manufacturing output grew by 5.1% annually" (James 1996:5). In particular, the two World Wars dramatically increased the level of industrial production in the US. Economic growth and 'free trade' brought about international economic and trading integration while the gap between developed and developing countries continued to widen.

THE CONCEPT OF "DEVELOPING"

In the 20th century, the difference between developed and developing countries became more and more obvious. While GATT negotiations were taking place there were no effective representatives from the developing world because some developed countries, such as the US, dominated the system. Moreover, many developing countries were still under colonial rule at the time. Therefore, the economic problems of developing countries and the concept of developing economies were not crucial matters of discussion and

negotiation.

During the postwar period, the widening gap came to be seen as an international concern. It became clear that there was a problem about 'development'. Certain countries defined themselves, and were defined by the developed world as "developing" countries. While developing countries attempted to establish a material base with which people might eliminate economic dependence and meet their socio-economic needs, they continued to be regarded as 'developing', 'underdeveloped', or 'less developed'. According to James, despite the flow of capital from developed countries and trade liberalization, with the exception of a few countries in East Asia (e.g. Japan and South Korea), most developing countries did not develop as expected. Therefore, the problem of developed and developing economies continued to persist. James (1996:122) argues that three factors contributed to the problem of developing economies. The most obvious factor belongs in the realm of ideas: the problem was a consequence of the application of what proved to be an inappropriate theory of development. For instance, some economists envisioned a powerful role for the state in overcoming barriers to development and in planning growth. This idea did not appear very practical. Another factor relates to domestic policies, such as the bias against agriculture, which were regarded as necessary kick starts for development. The third factor relates to some features of the international system which deterred economic growth in developing countries.

As the developing countries achieved independence, they started to join international organizations and the international community with the hope of promoting economic growth and social development. The number of countries in the IMF and World Bank were 58 and 47 in 1948; this rose to 99 and 68 respectively, in 1960; and it rose to 126 and 117 in 1970. International institutions with developed countries also started to be interested in the issues of developing economies. In 1993, for instance, the GATT Uruguay Round addressed various trade related issues considered important for developing countries. The Round concluded with various policy measures on agriculture, industry and services that would help developing countries promote their trade and economic growth in the global arena. Richard Harmsen and Arvind Subramanian (1994:2) claim the Round was important for developing countries in the area of trade policies because it reduced tariffs in goods and services.

CHINA AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY

In the 1950s and 1960s, the 'developing world' had begun to define itself. States regarded themselves as 'developing', 'underdeveloped', or 'less developed'. James (1996:122) points out that development would be an important part of the assertion of national independence: it meant evolving a material basis that would eliminate economic dependence, and also satisfy the new demands and expectations of citizens.

According to the World Bank, the average GNP of the developing countries is US $380 per capita. Middle income countries (MICs), which possess 28 percent of the world's population, have an average GNP of US $2 540 per capita, while developed countries or high income countries (HICs) have an average GNP of US $23 420 per capita. There are 120 developing economies, having approximately 85 percent of the world population. The 1997 World Bank Report (1997:120) indicates that more than half (58%) of the world's population lives in low income countries (LICs), including China.

In recent decades, China has had an unprecedented GNP growth of 8-10 percent. However, Mahbab ul Haq reminds that many social indicators still have not improved. For instance, health indicators deteriorated with the disappearance of the communes and the nationwide system of primary health care (Haq 1995:88). Unemployment emerged in a society with no previous experience of such a phenomenon. China's economic growth was not even and sustainable. More facts include:

- According to Qingfang Zhu (1995:81), in 1994 the income of urban residents was 2.6 times that of the peasants, which presents the widest gap since 1978.

- According to Angang Hu and Shaoguang Wang (1996:20), the relative regional disparity coefficient declined from 32.7 to 28.7 between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, but increased from 28.8 in 1985 to 33.6 in 1992.

- According to Amei Zhang (1993:3), the number of rural poor increased to 103 million in 1989 from 86 million in 1988, and the incidence of poverty rose to 12.3 percent from 10.4 percent. Urban poverty rose from 0.2 percent in 1988 to 0.4 percent.

- According to *Statistic Yearbook of China* (SYOC 1991:852), the adult illiteracy rate rose from 23.5 percent in 1982 to 26.8 percent in 1987, and it is reported that more than 2 million new adult illiterates were added each year during the late 1980s. Of the 3 million school-aged children who did not enroll in school, 83 percent were girls.

- According to the World Bank (1991:96), the water supply for 77 million people has excessive fluoride levels, 100 million drink saline or alkaline water, 130 million use untreated surface water contaminated by domestic, industrial or agro-chemical wastes, and 43 million live in water-scarce areas.

Perhaps this is why the Chinese government is pursuing gradual change and is weighing, more carefully, the balance of economic and social progress. This might be the reason why China continues to proclaim itself a developing country.

DEVELOPMENT AND CHINA

China's entry into the WTO is affected by the demands of other members, but it should be more involved with China's developing situation and reality. China's development experience and its reality ought to determine how China enters into the WTO. After the British Opium trade in the mid-19th century, China did not achieve its development until recent decades even though China's economy has been impacted by the global economy and the development of western capitalism for a long time. The following will provide more details on China's development experiences.

BRITISH OPIUM TRADE IN THE 19TH CENTURY

In *Capital*, Karl Marx wrote about the English East India Company's monopoly over the transport of goods to and from Europe, and Chinese trade in general. The monopolies it held over tea, salt, opium, betel, and other commodities were inexhaustible mines of wealth (Thomas 1997:4). Opium was first manufactured in China for medical purposes toward the end of the 15th century and was used to treat dysentery, cholera and other diseases. It was not until the 18th century that there emerged accounts of opium smoking in China.

The opium trade seriously influenced China's economy and, in particular, influenced the health of Chinese people. The Chinese government was taking stronger measures to end the opium trade. However, the British were doing all they could to increase it. In 1729, the Chinese imperial government, alarmed at its debilitating effect, prohibited the sale of opium mixed with tobacco and banned opium-smoking houses (Thomas 1997:5). In response, the East India company waged three wars on the people of China in order to secure the right to sell opium, where opium sales had risen from 2 330 chests in 1788 to 4 968 chests in 1810. The company forced opium sales up to 17 257 chests—worth millions of British pounds in 1835. A British governor-general of India wrote in 1830, "we are taking measures for extending the cultivation of the poppy with a view to a large increase in the supply of opium" (Thomas 1997:5). The first opium war of 1839-42 started when the Chinese imperial government confronted foreign merchant ships and demanded they surrender their illegal cargo. After the deaths of thousands of Chinese, the war ended on August 29, 1842, with T*he Treaty of Nanjing* (Thomas 1997:6). The treaty forced the Chinese government to pay $15 million to British merchants, to open five ports to English trade, and to cede Hong Kong to Britain for 155 years.

The British opium trade did not encourage China's development, and the actions of Britain damaged the Chinese economy. The opium trade and opium war revealed that China's economy was not strong enough to trade equally with other countries. When it considers entering the WTO, China realizes that it must promote economic development without damaging its economy. In other words, China's access to the WTO would profoundly shape the future evolution and direction of global economic relations, while Chinese people see that the British opium trade in China was not an equally shared interest in prosperity and peace.

MARSHALL PLAN IN CHINA

During World War II, the US emerged as a major actor in Chinese affairs. As an ally, it embarked in late 1941 on a program of massive military and financial aid to the hard-pressed Chinese Nationalist government (Poon 1998:8). It was called the Marshall Plan in China. In 1943, an agreement was signed between the US and China for the stationing of American troops in China to defend against Japan. China's development was connected to the US's economic and military program. The wartime policy of the US to China was thought to help China become a strong ally and a stabilizing force in postwar East Asia. As the conflict between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists intensified, the US sought unsuccessfully to reconcile the rivals for a more effective anti-Japanese war effort.

Through the mediation influence of the US, a military truce was arranged in January of 1946, but the battles between the Nationalists and Communists soon resumed. Realizing that American efforts (short of a large scale armed intervention) would not stop the war, the US withdrew the American mission headed by General George C. Marshall in early 1947 (Poon 1998:8). Even though the Nationalist government sought to enlist popular support with internal reforms, its efforts were in vain because of the rampant corruption in the government and accompanying economic chaos. As in the case of the British opium trade, the US aid plan did not encourage China's development. In the mid-20th century, China's economy was still backward.

CHINA'S EXPERIMENT SINCE 1978

After 1949, China pursued economic development on a Soviet development model, which proved to be unsuccessful in the Chinese development context. In 1978, China started to explore a development path which incorporated and reflected so-called Chinese characteristics, namely a "socialist market economy". Although an initial success, this developmental model still posed numerous difficulties and problems.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

In 1982, Deng Xiaoping, a former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, stated that "some of our current systems and institutions in the Party and state are plagued by problems which seriously impede the full realization of the superiority of Socialism" (Deng 1984:180). In order to promote economic growth and integration into the international system, including the WTO, China has introduced institutional and economic reforms at macro and micro levels, as well as in the areas of foreign trade and economic cooperation, since the 1980s.

Economic reforms mainly concerned development policies in an attempt to reform its central planning system. One indicator of the retreat of central planning has been the decline in the command of national resources through central government budget revenues, which fell in the first decade from 37 percent to 22 percent. The extra-budgetary revenue, largely controlled by state-owned enterprises and local authorities, increased from 11.5 percent to 19.3 percent during the same time. The task of reforming state planning mostly focused on extensively reforming the rural economy, readjusting and coordinating inter-industry structure, and implementing and improving the policy of opening borders to the outside world.

The micro-economic system reform had two features. Collective farming was replaced by a household-based system now known as the household responsibility system (HRS). At the end of 1983, 98

percent of the agricultural collectives in China were covered by the HRS. When the HRS first appeared, the land lease was only one to three years; however, such a short lease reduced the incentives for land improvement by farmers. In 1984, therefore, the land lease could be extended for 15 years. In 1993, the government allowed the lease to be extended for another 30 years. Meanwhile, a reform of state-owned enterprises was initiated by the government in the following stages: from 1979 to 1983, it emphasized greater enterprise autonomy and expanded the role of financial incentives within the traditional economic structure. From 1984 to 1992, the emphasis shifted to a formalization of financial obligations of state enterprises to the government, and exposed enterprises to market influences. Since 1993, the Chinese government has attempted to introduce the modern cooperation system to state enterprises. The objective of this reform is aimed at establishing a mixed property system (Lin. et al. 1996:86).

Having considered entry into the WTO in recent years, China has intensified its reform in foreign trade and economic cooperation. First, the reform of the operational system of foreign trade was accelerated in order to facilitate the examination and granting of foreign trading rights. The experimental approval procedures were institutionalized to grant China's textiles producers the right to export their own products. Second, the reform in the administration of foreign trade was also intensified to allow foreign trade and economic cooperation to operate within a legal framework. Third, the allocation mechanism for export quotas was further improved and many Chinese enterprises were given a relaxed business environment which allows them to retain their foreign exchange earnings. Fourth, a series of policies and measures were published to promote exports (MOFTEC 1999:1).

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Due to the institutional reforms and the economic experiment in the late 1970s and 1980s, China underwent rapid economic growth. Over the past fifteen years, the Chinese economy has grown at a nearly double digit rate. From 1989 to 1991, China experienced slow economic growth, during which the economy grew at about 5.4 percent. Since then, China's annual growth rate rebounded solidly to double digit rates. In 1995 and 1996, China instituted some restrictive economic policies to dampen inflation, and began to experience an economic slowdown. In spite of these policies, development growth for 1996 held at 9 percent, in 1997 at 8 percent, and in 1999 at 7.8 percent.

China's efforts in soliciting foreign investment and trade garnered great attention from the outside world. Greg Mastel (1997:12) argues that foreign investment has been an important factor in China's growth in the 1990s. From 1979 to 1991, the cumulative value of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China was US $50.4 billion. In 1992 and 1993, FDI contracts totaled US $58.1 billion and US $111.4 billion, respectively. China now ranks second to the US as a recipient of foreign investment. In foreign trade over the last two decades, China's exports have grown at three times the world average. From the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, China's exports grew at a rate of nearly 20 percent annually. China has been catapulted onto the list of the world's top ten exporters. At the outset of its economic reforms in the late 1970s, China was an insignificant participant in the international markets for goods and capital. In 1977, the sum of its imports and exports, or its total trade turnover, was less than $15 billion, and it was only the 30th largest exporting country in the world (Lardy 1998:197).

DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS

In China, the reforms in macro policies lagged behind the reforms in micro management institutions. For this reason, the institutional arrangements of the macro environment and micro management governance are incompatible. The first problem involves state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In June 1998, *China News Digest* revealed that in the first season of 1998, China's 59 000 SOEs lost 8.7 billion RMB yuan (equal to more than US $1 billion). Included in this figure was a 48.5 percent loss by 14 000 large and medium size SOEs. According to Justin Lin, the SOE losses stem from the separation of ownership and control. Because of the separation, the incentives of the manager and the owner (i.e. the state) are potentially incompatible. The state

owner is not fully involved in the management process, so its information about the costs and revenues of the enterprise is incompatible with management's information. Therefore, managerial discretion may become a serious problem (Lin 1996:16).

The stagnation of farm income and the widening of regional income disparities are also serious problems in China. Since 1984, the income earned by Chinese peasants has slowed down and stagnated. From 1985 to 1988, the average annual growth rate was 2 percent. Adjusting for price increases, the annual growth rate fell to only 0.7 percent in 1989-91. While the national economy experienced rapid growth, the slowdown in the growth of peasant income caused a widening of the urban-rural income gap. The main reason for the stagnation of farm income and the widening of urban-rural income gaps and regional disparities is the continuous suppression of prices—a legacy of the planned economy. Given these circumstances, the Chinese government must be cautious about opening up its agricultural industry, its service industries and its financial market to the WTO members, especially the US.[3] Otherwise, the Chinese economy might be out of order for a country of such huge population, and it would be difficult for China to realize its development objectives.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

China is trying to enter the WTO in order to promote its economic growth and social development, as well as its integration into the international community. Perhaps no accession process has been as complex as that involving China's entry. During this difficult and time-consuming process, some WTO members, especially the US, are still not willing to accept China as a developing country. Even those who object to China's entry, admit to China's developing country status. Mastel indicates that the issue of China's developing country status is probably the most difficult one in China's WTO negotiations, and its resolution may affect many other issues, such as legal, political and diplomatic debates. China's demand for developing country status seems reasonable. By the normal definition of the term, China is a developing country. Although its exact level of development is open to debate, China's per capita income is still quite low because of its population size. Despite its economic progress in the coastal provinces, China's interior provinces still suffer from crushing poverty and a lack of economic development (Mastel 1997:163).[4] Some suggestions regarding the entry of China into the WTO follow.

China should be admitted as an "exceptional" developing country. As a developing country, China will not concede its developing country status. However, what the Chinese government wants is an acknowledgement of its original status along with some general rights and obligations. In reality, China has already accepted the idea of negotiating new rights and obligations under the protocol of accession with other contracting parties. Therefore, it would not be difficult for other contracting parties to accept the term of "developing" since other related rights and obligations might not be bound by the term, such as its tariff level or licensing requirements. If the understanding of acknowledging its "exceptional" developing country status is reached, common ground between China and the contracting parties might be established. Other related issues may be solved through negotiation between China and contracting parties in a flexible and constructive manner.[5]

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[3] The US is very interested in the Chinese agricultural market. The States Farm Bureau Federation President Dean Kleckner stated on May 5, 1998: "if each person in China were to eat one more slice of bread a week, they would need 60 million bushels more than they consume now; and one more slice a day, they would need 400 million bushels more—that was about Kansas state's entire output last year" (*CND* 1998).

[4] Mastel objects to China's entry into the WTO unless China implements reforms along the lines of those demanded by the US; see his book *The Rise of the Chinese Economy* (1997).

A pragmatic approach should be adopted. There is no official restriction on the subject matter dealt with under Accession Protocols, including China's status as a developing country member. China's economic status might be somewhat exceptional in the WTO context. It has, for example, a relatively low per capita GDP but a very large and growing export trade surplus. For this reason, a compromise on developing country status spelling out the WTO obligations that might be relaxed in China's favor should be workable. China, for instance, might be entitled to take advantage of certain transition arrangements, but might not be entitled to favorable treatment in the granting of future trade concessions (Abbott 1999).

The US and other contracting parties should modify their domestic policy towards China. Clearly, China's membership would strengthen the organization. The US wants China to dismantle most of its trade barriers and come into compliance with WTO standards as a precondition for membership. Given the weak condition of China's state-owned sectors, especially its banking system, the immediate dismantling of all trade barriers could lead to the collapse of a significant part of the economy. China would be forced to absorb all the costs of restructuring (Lardy 1998:217).

It is not possible to draw a completed picture of such a complicated issue as China's entry into the WTO. On April 26, 1999, Ruggiero told the *International Herald Tribune* that he believed the WTO can have China by November 1999, even though Chinese Primer Zhu only reached an agreement with US President Clinton early that month. More efforts are needed to reach a resolute objective. However, China and the members of contracting parties in the WTO need to find a practical solution that balances the cost and benefits of developed and developing countries in order to achieve real trade and economic growth and social development on a global scale.

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[5] The European Union has raised the concept of "observer with privileges" for China at the WTO if there is no deal on membership by the end of this year [http:lateline.muzi.net/topics/China_WTO].

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FITTING IN: NATO'S SPLIT PERSONALITY

IN THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

JENNIFER HELSING[1]

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been struggling to justify its continued existence following the collapse of its primary enemy. The new security environment, for its part, now presents challenges that go far beyond NATO's traditional balance of power and deterrent role as a regional military alliance. This paper seeks to reveal how the Alliance's response to these new tasks has been one best characterised by a paradigmatic dichotomy – that of Cold War realism and collective defence, versus the new world order of neo-liberal institutionalism and cooperative security. Using the latest enlargement round as a primary example, NATO's concurrent embodiment of both these world views is demonstrated. The essay ends with a brief consideration of where the Alliance is heading beyond the upcoming Strategic Concept review, and concludes that for now, the dualism that is NATO's current policy is not inconsistent with the security realities it is presently facing.

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In the aftermath of World War II, the future members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came together with the hope of attaining territorial security in an atmosphere of hemispheric mistrust. In an effort to counter a Soviet Union that was openly prepared to propagate its own ideology, the five Brussels Treaty powers[2] and seven other Western nations[3] formed a military association in 1949 that would possess its own nuclear arsenal, and thus be capable of effectively countering any potential attack the Soviet Union might launch. At that point, there existed a general understanding among members that the Organization would be simply a temporary security grouping for the sole purpose of collective defence. But four rounds of enlargement later,[4] the Alliance remains. Given that its primary opponent, the Warsaw Pact, is no longer in existence, many argue that the Organization has not only outlived its usefulness, but it weakly survives with a mandate that is, in their view, incompatible with the security realities of today. Moreover, some suggest that maintaining NATO, let alone expanding it, is in itself a security liability for Europe, for it could serve to aggravate Russia and ultimately be a cause of new instability in the region. The ongoing NATO involvement in Yugoslavia makes this debate both immediate and compelling.[5] While it is true that NATO is a Cold War by–product, struggling for redefinition post–1989, the recent events in the Balkans suggest that NATO's future (at least in the immediate term), is more certain now than it has been in over a decade. With this in mind, this analysis will show that the Alliance is evolving to reflect the new security environment by adapting to new threats, while remaining (perhaps a little too) mindful of the old. This adjustment is not an easy one, containing fundamental contradictions which the Alliance is attempting to reconcile. It will be seen that NATO is struggling to remain relevant by embracing contemporary notions of inclusion, (read collective and/or cooperative security). At the same time, however, many of the realist notions that the Alliance was founded upon continue to be upheld despite rapidly changing international security circumstances. This paper will explore the dichotomy between the old, Cold War mentality of crisis, and the new challenges presented by the current era to identify how NATO is evolving and where it is headed, using the lenses of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as contrasting approaches to the dilemma. It will show that these two concepts are indeed reconcilable within the current security environment. While frequent references will be made to the Kosovo crisis, and what NATO's activities in the Balkans have revealed about its role and future, this paper's aim is to examine the theoretical path the Alliance is on, rather than to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the campaign recently carried out against Yugoslavia.

The argument will unfold in five parts. First, in order to frame the investigation, a brief discussion clarifying the theoretical frameworks will be undertaken. Next, the new security environment will be addressed to decipher what the Alliance is facing by way of challenges to its member states and regional stability. The distinction will be made between the implications of "new" forms of threat and those that have persisted from the days of the Cold War, with the backdrop of the aforementioned theories. The third section will then turn to how NATO has responded to both kinds of security quandaries. It will also define

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[2] France, Holland, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg.

[3] The United States, Canada, Italy, Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal.

[4] Under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance was broadened with the addition of Greece and Turkey in 1951, West Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and on March 12, 1999 added the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to its ranks.

[5] While the NATO intervention into the Kosovo–Serbia crisis lays much bare regarding what NATO has become and what the future may hold, regrettably it is too current to be a comprehensive focus in this analysis. Notwithstanding this, however, occasional references will be made at relevant points to the ongoing situation in the Balkans.

the terms collective defence, and collective, common and cooperative security to provide clarity when they are used as descriptors. The fourth part will use evidence of the most recent enlargement decision to illustrate the Alliance's internal and external institutional change by considering how NATO has defended its choice, both in terms of collective defence *and* cooperative security. It will be seen that the geopolitical transformation in Europe has indeed had an enormous impact on the Alliance, yet it will underline the fact that NATO continues to harbour fear of old threats. The fifth section will take a broader view beyond enlargement to analyse the implications of a NATO now based on competing paradigms. The final part will consider what lies ahead for the Alliance, including ramifications for future expansion, and what the 1999 Strategic Concept[6] foretells about NATO's ongoing self–prescribed mandate as it continues to balance strategies of collective defence with the activities and rhetoric of cooperative security.

I. THEORETICAL PARADIGMS

There have been innumerable publications in the last decade devoted to predicting whether NATO as a defence alliance will endure or collapse in the new environment. A useful way to approach this topic is to examine two theories that come to different conclusions on this front. Neorealism, and neoliberal institutionalism are excellent starting points, for both are systemic level theories that are concerned with outcomes rather than the political processes underlying alliances (Hellman and Wolf 1993: 4).

Neorealism, growing out of the realist perspective, regards the international system as one of anarchy, where states are concerned primarily with relative gains, and security is the overarching goal. According to these theorists, states are predisposed to conflict and competition, and contrasting interests often make cooperation difficult (Grieco 1990). States are unconvinced that institutions will prevent other states from "cheating", and they feel that any given member state will always have misgivings that other partners are gaining more from the alliance than they themselves (Hellmann and Wolf 1993:8). With this in mind, they explain the development of alliances as "primarily affected by common interests resulting from the structure of the international system and specific conflicts" (Waltz 1979; Snyder 1990), and forecast that should the circumstances under which an alliance was formed disappear, disintegration of the institution will inevitably follow (Hellmann and Wolf 1993). Under this theory, NATO was destined for expiration the moment the Eastern bloc began to collapse.

On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalists see institutions as a force that is underestimated by the neorealists. Robert Koehane and others postulate that institutions in fact are a reflection of member states' interests and therefore embody them, hence promoting cooperation "even when the state interests that led to the institutions' creation no longer exist" (1984:7). For neoliberal institutionalists, institutions are formed because they are more cost effective for state interaction, they reduce uncertainty, and they increase transparency between partners (Hellmann and Wolf 1990). These benefits, they argue, will remain even if an alliance's original purpose has faded. Therefore, they would suggest that, in the case of NATO, the Alliance would either simply persist for longer than the neorealists would predict, or it would begin to adapt itself to its new environment.

With the intention of keeping these two perspectives in mind, and further developing them throughout this analysis, attention can now turn to the security situation faced by NATO in the late 1990s.

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[6] Released in April 1999 at the Alliance's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington DC.

II. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

How one interprets NATO's continued existence and actions at the end of this decade depends not only on one's theoretical bent, but also on one's understanding of conflict. As there has been an overwhelming amount of discussion in recent years dedicated to the redefinition of security in the new world order, this is no easy task. However, it is necessary to conceptualize the threats that member states perceive[7] before being able to accurately identify how or why the Alliance has adapted since the end of the Cold War. It must be borne in mind that the transition the international environment has undergone in the last ten years is not clear–cut, and the dangers facing Alliance members, while they have indeed broadened, have not moved from a definitive 'Cold War Set A' to a 'Post Cold War Set B'.

Given the atmosphere of 1949, NATO was created as a "single issue" institution (Rühle 1998), constructed to act as a deterrent and a defence against a specific threat. It was designed to operate within the realist framework of a bi–polar system characterized by two hegemonic powers, with states as the primary actors. This is the type of alliance that neorealists continue to perceive. Most analysts agree that the Cold War arrangement was comfortably predictable and, some hold, extremely stable, as two clearly delineated blocs worked to balance each other with what can be understood as strong and credible deterrent mechanisms. Of course, any certainty allowed by such an arrangement was lost as the Eastern Bloc began disintegrating in the late 1980s, leaving in its trail an emergent system with one single hegemony, and an explosion of non–state actors making their way into the realm of international politics.

TRADITIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS VS. THE NEW THREATS

Neorealists argue that power politics and the understanding of security as directly related to territorial integrity remain paramount in the current international arena. Conversely, many suggest that the importance of realpolitik has diminished relative to other concerns that ignore borders. John Barrett has declared that it is now highly unlikely that any NATO member will be subject to a direct attack, and has forecast the dilution of the Alliance into a 'NATO Lite', with fewer capabilities and a diminished mandate (Barrett 1994:114). But if the threat is no longer direct, what dangers remain or have developed? The prominent topic of discussion among contemporary conflict analysis scholars is intra–state conflict—that characterized most often as regional or local, with ethnic or other non–state actors choosing violence as a means to an end—be that end inter alia, desired territory or boundary disputes, self–determination or even basic recognition as a national entity within the international system. Further complicating the security landscape is the fact that there is no simple surgical solution to these usually deep–rooted issues.

But the current threats are not limited to such things as ethnic representation or disputes over territory. Beyond these, and often stemming from them, the global community must face such nebulous issues as weapons proliferation (both conventional and weapons of mass destruction) to state and non–state actors alike, terrorism, environmental degradation, and uncontrolled refugee flows. In short, these factors all have the potential to lead to destabilization of the European region, and ostensibly, could pose a threat to a country's territory by increasing the possibility of an outbreak of conventional warfare.

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[7] When discussing how NATO as a collection of countries perceives threats and responds to them it is essential to remember that the decision making structure of any organization is composed of its member states, all vying for the opportunity to further their own national interest within the larger body. Thus, when considering statements made, or policies ultimately adopted, by the Alliance, one cannot forget that, while the outcome may be regarded as a choice of the Alliance, the process is decidedly less homogeneous.

So while the realist/neorealist[8] perspective is often immediately dismissed by liberals touting the growing importance of non–state actors, destabilizing factors that are not restricted by state boundaries, and issues that transcend the quest for power, the traditional view retains several salient points. It is true that threats to NATO members no longer take the form of a single enemy; however, the new components of security have already shown themselves to be un–detachable from earlier notions of state integrity by the fact that any of the above mentioned problems could bring instability onto the lap of member states.

The link between traditional risks and new problems is indisputable. It is essential to recognize, however, that the Western world tends to approach the two in vastly different ways. NATO, then, is faced with the arduous task of confronting all threats—both old and new—with a coherent strategy, unbroken by the opposing security paradigms represented. The evidence suggests that it is indeed succeeding at reconciling these two notions.

III. THE NATO RESPONSE: PERSEVERANCE

So as the Alliance emerged on this side of the Cold War, it was confronted with a collage of paradigmatic obstacles, security threats, transboundary concerns, and myriad other seemingly insurmountable issues, few of which immediately resembled NATO's original *raison d'être.* Given that the initial unwritten goal had now changed from "keeping the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out," many observers called for the Alliance's immediate dissolution (Vlahos 1991:187–201; Bandow 1991:22–23; Kissinger 1990:A23; Mearsheimer 1990:5–6; Joffe 1992:47; Krasner 1993). As outlined above, neorealists suggested that since the overt external threat had dissolved, and there was now little chance of the re–nationalization of any European defence policies (Drew 1995), there was no sense in maintaining the regional military body and it would therefore be destined for extinction. Others held that sustaining the Alliance could contribute less to security than to the angering of a weakened and humiliated Russia, potentially pushing the latter to align with, or perhaps forge a counter military alliance to replace the Warsaw Pact, with China (Gaddis 1998:147), Iran (Sieff 1996:A12), or Iraq (Kosovo Crisis 1999). More recent recommendations for disbanding NATO rest on the premise that the importance and solidity of a transatlantic link is eroding as the United States becomes less willing to involve itself in the problems of Europe as a result of weakening economic and cultural ties and the development of a European defence identity independent of American involvement.[9]

But despite all the questioning of its continued existence, the Organization has persisted. In its 1991 Strategic Concept,[10] the Alliance pledged to retain a flexible strategy to reflect new developments in the 'politico–military environment.' This was reiterated in the 1999 revision, where members again promised to keep all concepts, policies and arrangements continually under review "in light of the evolving security environment." Both documents were explicitly mindful of progress in the European security identity and of

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[8] Neorealists derive the core of their beliefs from those of traditional realists, but recognize that non–state actors are increasingly important in considerations of state security.

[9] For a more comprehensive survey of this view, see Walt (1998/99). Further evidence of this can also be found in writings on the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and the latest Strategic Concept which places renewed emphasis on the development of the ESDI, the WEU and the OSCE.

[10] Released at the Rome Summit of that year.

changes in risks to members' security. Though they were released nearly a decade apart, both attested to the same fundamental challenges and goals. The document coming out of the Rome Summit acknowledged that ethnic and territorial disputes in the neighbouring countries of Central and Eastern Europe could:lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance. (1991)

Similarly, the Washington Summit's Concept produced the following warning regarding potential threats to NATO countries' integrity that remain and continue to develop:

> The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non–military risks which are multi–directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro–Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly… Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro–Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries. (1999)

The obvious example of this can be found in the situation that emerged in the Serbian province of Kosovo. As President Slobodan Milosevic repeatedly refused to cooperate with international diplomatic efforts or comply to continued demands for a halt to his aggressions on the ethnic Albania population in Kosovo, NATO's nightmare scenario gradually moved toward becoming a very real possibility. The chance that the instability in the region would spill over into neighbouring Albania and Macedonia given those countries' ethnic links with, and proximity to, the Serbian province, could have been the beginning of the collapse of security in the region. As the Alliance and the rest of the world watched, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled their homes into the neighbouring countries, causing widespread unrest,[11] and a recognized humanitarian disaster, as Albania and Macedonia in particular struggled to accommodate the unrelenting waves of displaced persons. The potential for Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey to be drawn into the fray (BBC News Online 1998) became too evident, as the possibility of regional conventional warfare moved closer toward becoming a palpable reality. With the latter two nations as NATO members (already harbouring old tensions), failure of the international community to prevent such an escalation could have ultimately threatened the security and cohesion of the Alliance; and was thus impetus enough for the Alliance to undertake a campaign of air strikes against Yugoslavia.[12] The implications of this conflict are explicit evidence to the severity of regional conflicts, and the importance that NATO places on them.

The Alliance's reaction to the most recent Balkan crisis is a manifestation of its acknowledgement of the changing global context. Other threats were also acknowledged in April's Strategic Concept. Members stated that:

> Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of

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[11] Witness violent protests held outside NATO members' embassies in Macedonia and Albania, etc.

[12] Also at stake, of course, was NATO's reputation, for diplomatic efforts had been candidly backed up by the threat of NATO action had Serbian compliance not been realized.

> armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. (1999)

The two Strategic Concepts could, however, be little more than fabricated documents put on paper to exhibit that NATO is indeed attentive to the context it now finds itself in, to bear testament to an organization keeping up with the times in an effort to remain pertinent.

Before the Kosovo crisis erupted, some neoliberal institutionalists embraced a bureaucratic explanation for NATO's stamina, proposing that this endurance was a result of the entrenched bureaucracy the Organization has developed, which in itself acts as a sustaining mechanism in the life of the Alliance (Walt 1997; 1998/99). Old school realists have put forward the hypothesis that NATO was, and remains, unconvinced of the end of the Cold War, and has been disguising its continued primary directive of military defence under the rubric of adjusting to the new environment. Some have suggested that activities in Bosnia and the 1997 announcement to enlarge were NATO's attempts to create a new purpose for itself (NATO at 50 1999). It has also been postulated that the Alliance's demise has been staved off by the United States in an effort to maintain that country's pre–eminence over the European members through its power in NATO (Walt 1998/99:10). On the other hand, some hold that those very Alliance states at the mercy of American whims through the Organization's institutions have kept NATO alive for the purpose of enjoying the almost free American protection that has been implicit therein (Walt 1998/99:10).

Any of these hypotheses could be argued relatively convincingly were it not for several institutional changes, decisions and actions since the beginning of this decade that have suggested otherwise. Although some of the above suppositions contain components of truth in explaining NATO's perseverance, individually they do not account sufficiently for why and how the Organization has transformed in the last ten years. To develop a picture more representative of NATO's evolution, one must look beyond single issue explanations and consider the larger international context. Elements of the path NATO has taken can be clarified by the assumptions of both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. NATO's continued emphasis on the importance of Article V[13] finds its explanation in the former, while at the same time, the latter theory shows the Alliances as beneficial in its promotion of cooperation, facilitation of communication, and its impact on interest formulation and norm creation (Hellman and Wolf 1993:15). Further on this point, liberal thinkers suggest that:

> international institutions are easier to maintain than they are to create because they are so difficult to construct that, once created, 'it may be rational to obey their rules if the alternative is their breakdown, since even an imperfect (institution) may be superior to any politically feasible replacement.' (Keohane 1984:100)

Indeed, the evidence does suggest that the Alliance is recognizing that the best way to protect against these dangers is to assume a role that is compatible with the new, increasingly integrated structure of European and transatlantic relations, and the argument is often made that a common defence structure alone no longer provides enough cohesion for NATO (Haglund and Pentland 1998:107). But, as will be seen, NATO's actions reveal that it continues to foster traditional notions of security as a threat to territory (and Kosovo reaffirms this), suggesting that observers cannot be quick to dismiss the optic provided by the neorealist alliance theory.

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[13] This Article will be discussed in more depth later in the paper, but essentially it declares that an attack against one member is an attack against all.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE VS. COLLECTIVE AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Before exploring this hypothesis further, it is essential to understand several concepts that are often used to describe paths the Alliance has followed, and is following. In recent years NATO statements, communiqués, and publications have all taken to utilizing the terms of collective, common, or cooperative security, in contrast to the collective defence that had previously been the Organization's definitive feature. However, these expressions are seldom officially explained, and it is questionable whether those employing them completely understand either their meanings or their implications.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

The easiest of all of these concepts is that of collective defence. Though the term existed before 1949, a common understanding of collective defence with regards to NATO can be found in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self–defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (NATO Handbook: 232).

In the context of NATO, then, collective defence is based on countering traditional challenges as understood by the realist/neorealist paradigm, specifically to territory, and finds its focus on an identifiable external threat or adversary. For example, George Liska has pointed out that "Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something" (1952:12). Glen Snyder reiterated this in postulating that they are constructed solely as a means of security against an adversary (1990:106).

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Another expression that has been in existence for some time is collective security. Employed often during the construction of the League of Nations, this concept goes beyond the pure idea of defence to include, according to Inis Claude, "arrangements for facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes," assuming that the mechanisms of preventing war and defending states under armed attack will "supplement and reinforce each other" (1984:245). Writing during the Cold War, Claude identifies the concept as the post WWI name given by the international community to the "system for maintenance of international peace... intended as a replacement for the system commonly known as the balance of power" (1984:247). Most applicable to widely inclusive international organizations such as the League and the United Nations, ideally, the arrangement would transcend the reliance on deterrence of competing alliances through a network or scheme of "national commitments and international mechanisms." As in collective defence, collective security is based on the risk of retribution, but it can also involve economic and diplomatic responses in addition to military retribution. From this, it is theorized that perfected collective security would discourage potential aggressors from angering a "mass of states" (Claude 1984:247). Like balance of power, collective security works on the assumption that any potential aggressor would be deterred by the prospect of joint retaliation, but it goes beyond the military realm to include a wider array of security problems. It assumes that states will relinquish sovereignty and "freedom of action or inaction" (Claude 1984:253) to increasing interdependence and the premise of the indivisibility of peace (Claude 1984:250). The security that can be derived from this is part of the foundation of the neoliberal institutionalist argument.

Isabelle François offers a more recent definition of collective security which includes a "moral obligation felt by the members," of a pact, based on common interest, which "may not be direct nor vital, but

still sufficiently compelling to prompt a collective decision to act" (1999:2). Thus, collective security can be interpreted to be an almost idealistic situation. It raises collective defence to a higher level by international arrangements that establish the notion that *all* states will react to *any* sort of instability—from direct attack to indirect situations that may have the potential to place the international order in jeopardy—thus effectively dissuading such an occurrence. As Karl Deutsch articulated in the late 1950s, an arrangement of this kind would eventually replace 'the logic of anarchy' with the 'logic of community' (Deutsch 1957:5). Almost utopic in nature, collective security as understood in this way seems to assume that conflict can be eradicated. Therefore, though it represents an admirable goal that appears to be the objective of neoliberal institutionalists' development of organizations, it is unlikely that true collective security can be achieved within the current international structure.

COMMON AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Common security, in contrast to collective defence and distinct from collective security, places the emphasis on working *with* former adversaries to face non–traditional and transboundary dangers that include social and economic aspects above and beyond military issues (Koerner 1997:1–2). First employed by NATO at the London Summit of 1990, and institutionalized in the declaration produced there, the notion of common security marked the beginning of a shift in the Alliance mindset from one of exclusivity and reaction to positive inclusion across the region.[14] This concept was subsequently broadened to that of *cooperative* security, suggesting not just de–emphasizing the restrictive nature of collective defence, but actually adopting a proactive stance that would push for increased transparency and enhanced dialogue with former adversaries and other non–member states (Koerner 1997:1). To this, François adds that cooperative security is made up of a "community" which allows member states to define some interests in terms of this grouping, almost supra–nationally (1999:2). In this way, threats need not be addressed by all members, for the arrangement is more flexible than either collective defence or collective security. Another definition that has been offered sees cooperative security as a:

> demilitarized concept of security that has resulted in imbuing security with political and human dimensions, and in basing security on confidence and cooperation, the elaboration of peaceful means of dispute settlement between states, the consolidation of justice and democracy in civil society, and the advancement of human freedom and rights, including national minority rights. (Leatherman 1993:414)

The North Atlantic Treaty also left room for this in its Article II, which pledged that the members would:

> contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well–being.… (NATO Handbook:231)

Since the 1991 Rome Summit, "cooperative security" has begun to appear in communiqués of ministerial and summit meetings of the North Atlantic Council, suggesting that this concept is one that is increasingly being adopted by the Alliance members as a guide to policy. Cooperative security clearly reflects the concepts imbued within neoliberal institutionalism in the internal stability that it posits to result from states cooperating through institutions.

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[14] This inclusion was based on geo–strategic assumptions, though, so it would not be unlimited.

The tone set by the London and Rome Summits was unmistakably a response to the changing security architecture that had begun to characterize Europe in the early 1990s. The trend of integration had taken off, as the European Community (EC)[15] and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)[16] solidified, and the region saw the role of transnational organizations elevated by broader participation. However, it would be a mistake to take NATO's declarations and the terms they employ at face value, for it is clear that there was and is more going on than simply an alliance deciding to befriend all to keep up with an emerging European tendency toward inclusion. For while NATO's response to its new surroundings can be interpreted as part of the Western movement toward integration and inclusion, cooperation and positive engagement, the threat–based strategy of deterrence has remained central to the Organization's mandate. According to John Baylis, "the Alliance itself embodies two 'diametrically opposed world views'"—that of the optimistic utopians, and that of the pessimistic realists—where the former sees a harmonization of interests in Europe and a "taming of power," and the latter re–emphasises the importance of "threat–based deterrents" (1998:23–25). This dichotomy of motives is most clearly evident when one examines the grounds of the July 1997 Madrid Summit decision to once more enlarge the Alliance.

IV. WHAT ENLARGEMENT REVEALS ABOUT NATO'S EVOLUTION

Since its inception, NATO has seen three completed processes of enlargement, and has recently undergone a fourth. Based on the arguments for and against this latest round, it is evident that NATO is indeed cognizant of its evolving environment and the shift of priorities therein, but it is also apparent that the Organization is in no hurry to surrender its neorealist central tenet of collective defence and national interests. However, NATO has been careful to place the emphasis on the more progressive notion of security, and the merits of inclusion as the neoliberal institutionalists propound, perhaps in an effort to appear more forward–thinking to both its critics and its former enemies. It is an uneasy marriage of policy, but a marriage nonetheless, and the process of enlargement has laid this bare.

One of the central problems remains the issue of East–West relations. This latest round brought former adversaries into the Alliance fold, and its boundaries closer to that of Russia. Because of this, as well as the fact that many of the candidates are rebuilding or discovering democratic systems for the first time, more stringent requirements were placed on these nations than those that acceded before. The criteria reflected the changing nature of the global security environment with a focus on democratic systems of government, a free market economy, and civilian/democratic control over the military (Study on NATO Enlargement 1995).[17] The process also gave attention to relationships with NATO and neighbouring nations, as well as the treatment of minorities within the applicant states. It is true that these requirements did stress features of stability and humanitarian concerns more than in the past, and are thus indicative of new NATO policies of reassurance and cooperative security.

But there were purely realist criteria included as well. The 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement* emphasized the importance of new members being capable of contributing to collective defence efforts. Other factors that were also taken into account included ability and/or willingness to comply with NATO

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[15] Since renamed the European Union.

[16] Renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994.

[17] As will be discussed later, a fourth requirement focused on the applicant state's ability to contribute to NATO collective defence efforts and new roles such as peacekeeping.

troops stationing and nuclear policy, performance in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program,[18] and in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions in Bosnia (Kocher and Thompson 1996:2). So from the view of the Alliance, classic security remains an integral and inescapable aspect of its mandate.

THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE

Even though the underlying motive of NATO enlargement was born out of the desire to remain a defensive alliance to preserve peace in the Euro–Atlantic area, and to continue to provide a feeling of territorial security for all of its members, the arguments that NATO now puts forward in support of enlargement place the emphasis on cooperative security more than on the pledge of Article V, thus turning from realism/neorealism to neoliberal institutional assumptions. George Robertson, the British Defence Secretary who recently replaced Javier Solana as NATO's new Secretary General, has listed as two of his priorities: further "expansion into eastern Europe", and working closely with Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet bloc republics (CNN 1999). These goals again reflect the inclination to inclusion.

The equating of enlargement with cooperation is also apparent in the *Study on NATO Enlargement* where of the following highlighted benefits, only the second–to–last one addresses collective defence. The study claims that the resulting larger organization will enhance stability and security for all countries in the Euro–Atlantic area by:

- Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military;
- Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of co–operation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current allies;
- Promoting good–neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro–Atlantic area, both members and non–members of NATO;
- Emphasizing common defence, extending its benefits, and increasing transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defence policies;
- Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and co–operation in Europe based on shared democratic values, and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;
- Strengthening the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;
- Strengthening and broadening the Trans–Atlantic partnership (NATO 1995).

[18] An association formalized in January 1994 to "forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and all those invited into the Partnership." See the NATO Handbook, 266. In addition to NATO members, the partnership includes many Central and Eastern European nations, as well as Russia.

The apparent benefits to be gained by broadening the Alliance largely find their focus on new notions of security—on solidifying relations and elevating NATO's ability to participate in non–traditional missions (even under the mandate of the United Nations or the OSCE)—yet again demonstrating the Alliance's evolution into an institution with a split–personality. The items at the centre of the debate over enlargement reveal these contrasting concerns of NATO as it passes its fiftieth anniversary. A survey of arguments against the Alliance's growth, followed by NATO's responses, once more makes this dichotomy obvious.

Those speaking out in opposition to the announcement to invite the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary into the 'club' also find basis for their arguments in both liberal and realist grounds. They range from conservative reservations such as the concern that too many members will weaken the Alliance's decision making structure, to radical alarmism charging that preventing NATO from expanding is insufficient. Much like those who questioned the Organization's perseverance in the early 1990s, the latter camp argues that the best thing for the 'archaic' military body would be to completely disband it. Other liabilities highlighted include the danger of creating new dividing lines in Europe and the financial burdens that could be too much for the current members to bear, let alone the newly democratic Eastern nations already struggling through a period of economic reform. On this point, the issue of United States hegemony has again been raised by both American and European opponents, the former complaining of the probability of having to shoulder too large a part of the inevitable bill, and the latter protesting against the apparent expansion of American economic imperialism, as new members are 'forced' to upgrade their military and communication equipment to match the standards set by the Alliance. Moreover, as mentioned above, some suggest that enlargement is little more than an exercise in extending American hegemony over the European region.

Additional concerns include the possibility that NATO will be unable to guarantee security to its members as its size grows. Berthold Meyer and others have put forward the argument that beyond this, enlargement may ultimately cause insecurity among those not invited to join (Meyer 1995:38; Roche 1998). Meyer cites difficulties in decision–making coherence that the Alliance experienced in Bosnia as an example of disunity already existing within the Organization,[19] and suggests that the only way to stabilize Europe through enlargement would be to bring all countries in at the same time. As this is clearly not a possibility given the decrease in efficacy and cohesion that an unlimited membership would bring, Meyer proposes that the best route to security is through the liberal approach of systematic economic assistance and democratization (Meyer 1995:39), not by NATO expansion. Critics also accuse NATO of having no influence over internal conflicts, and some hold that the OSCE would better fulfil the part of an overarching security body for the region, even though this body holds no military forces.

NATO appears to believe that while some of these issues contain elements of real concern, the majority are outweighed by the empirical evidence, and by the changing nature of the world system. But once again, the responses offered by the Alliance are founded in a dual understanding of the types of threats the regional security arrangement may be forced to face in the coming years. The Alliance seems hesitant to choose between them, opting instead to attempt to reconcile the two mechanisms of retaliation to the present environment—collective defence, or cooperative security.

To the charge that having more parties in the decision making structure makes consensus increasingly difficult—an effect that is particularly evident in the UN—NATO replies (in good realpolitik alliance form) that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were selected because their ideologies and security goals align

[19] Kosovo again brought problems of Alliance to the forefront as fault lines began to emerge over the need for ground troops and the proposed oil embargo against Yugoslavia.

with the present members, and it is unlikely that, as junior participants in the Organization, they will stray far from the 'party line'. Granted, as Bosnia and Kosovo have shown, the United States is largely responsible for determining that line, and it is indeed often difficult to keep all nineteen Allies and their electorates in full support of a given course of action, let alone achieve fluid consensus on policy formation. The NATO rebuttal to this is that of course there will be dissent in the diplomatic process, but the importance should be placed on common values, goals and interests, something the Alliance leadership sees all members as sharing.

As for the argument that broadening the Alliance will push Russia away, potentially jeopardizing progress already made in the East–West peace process, members set out about creating the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), established by the NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations at the December 1997 Paris Summit. Presumably out of concern that the July announcement of enlargement had created unsettling, easterly moving waves of mistrust, official statements affirm that this institution will work to keep communication lines open, intentions transparent, and ensure Russia's continued engagement.[20] The liberal institutional tendencies in this are obvious. But the Alliance's continued traditional realist worries regarding Russian intentions and unpredictability remain evident between the lines of cooperation, for the Founding Act is not legally binding, nor does it provide a veto to the former enemy. A recent report by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) has explained that the PJC will enable consultation with Russia, "but only as long as it agrees with NATO policy" (Smith and Butcher 1999). The Cold War hangover is unmistakable, and NATO's realist disposition, though disguised, remains, and even flourishes under the front of neoliberal institutionalism. And, upon the end of NATO's recent bombing campaign, as Russian troops claimed control of the airport in the Kosovo capital of Pristina unbeknownst to NATO information sources and with no prior communication from the Kremlin, NATO's fears on this front appear to have been substantiated.

Concern that new divisions will be formed in Europe between the invitees and those not extended the offer of membership is also dismissed by the Alliance. NATO points out that the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are all moving in the same direction, that is, integration into other existing regional structures in an ever–expanding "network of cooperative security relationships" (Solana 1999). Furthermore, official NATO publications reiterate that there is no longer an ideological rift to reinforce divisions should they occur. NATO maintains that the door of enlargement is not closed to further rounds, and while this is not necessarily without its complications, it does temporarily serve to placate those not invited. As well, as former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana argued, it provides an incentive for Central and Eastern European countries to "accelerate their political, economic and military reforms, to bury old enmities and to reject the destructive nationalism of the past" (1999). While idealists and integrationists can interpret this as creating stability through the embrace of cooperative security, the realists in NATO see this as a means of states using institutions to diffuse potential enemies, a move entirely in keeping with individual nations' interests. In this case, the duality is reconcilable for the action is the same, but the differing motives remain clear.

The charge that enlargement will be too heavy a financial burden on both new and old members is also misplaced from the viewpoint of NATO (Solana 1999). The rebuttal offered is that acceding nations were already in the process of upgrading their militaries and would have continued to do so with or without membership in the Alliance. In fact, now that their militaries are being reconstructed toward NATO interoperability, the Alliance appears confident that they will be more effective in a military coalition than if this were not the case. NATO acknowledges that there will indeed be costs for the current members as well, but US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright holds that the preventative effects the Alliance produces are well worth the expense. She quotes the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, in saying: "Even the costliest preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war" (1998). In the realist spirit of the arms race,

[20] See any given NATO publication, for example, Rühle (1998), or Solana (1998).

this was the justification for contributing almost endless funds to the purchase and development of weapons and weapons systems—all in the name of Cold War deterrence. On this point, the realist rationale within the Alliance's argument is clearly identifiable.

Current members also have a propensity to point out that the likelihood of NATO nations coming to the defence of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, even as non–members, was high to begin with. Though the chance of any of these three nations finding themselves under direct attack is slim, the Alliance's retained commitment to Article V acts as a deterrent mechanism by threatening full retaliation. Regardless, say NATO sources, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are already viewed as Western allies in the new security environment, and to make their military systems completely interoperable can do nothing but strengthen security, both by way of defence, and for future out–of–area operations.

NATO has rationalized all aspects of the most current round of expansion using both old and new justifications. It should be reiterated at this point, however, that though there are certainly two distinct security concepts, and two theoretical approaches to dealing with them, there are also areas where these concerns overlap.

V. LIVING WITH THE DICHOTOMY

Solana did acknowledge the necessity of balancing the old with the new. In a speech last year, he reiterated that NATO must, "continue to be relevant for organizing the collective defence [of its members] but also must tackle new missions," such as peace support operations and counter proliferation efforts (1998). Once more, the analysis turns to the two–pronged challenge the Alliance is facing, and two of the possible ways to address this almost task.

One observer suggests that another way to approach the apparent theoretical contradiction in how NATO is managing international security. Wolfgang Koerner articulates the two frameworks as balance of power and institutionalism (1997:4). The first coincides with what this paper has been referring to as realist/neorealist traditional threats based on notions of the risk to territory and conventional warfare, and the second with the neoliberal institutionalist view of a move toward cooperative security, and the improbable attainment of collective security through institutional inclusion.

As has been shown by the example of enlargement and the spin that Alliance officials have put on it, the overt portrayal is that NATO is doing its best to move toward the latter approach. This is also suggested by the Alliance's often stated commitment to integration, cooperation and transparency. Beyond enlargement, this is also discernible in the creation of the PfP, the development of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC, renamed the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997), the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) , the NATO–Ukraine Charter, and the Mediterranean Dialogue, among others.[21]

However, if there was a time in the early to mid–1990s that balance of power issues waned in importance, the setting at the end of the decade now suggests its resurgence. It appears the trend toward institutionalism is potentially once more giving way to issues of power, as instability in Russia again restates

[21] All of these sub–institutions and dialogues enjoyed NATO's renewed commitment in the 1999 Strategic Concept.

the possibility of a need for collective defence and power balancing, and the crisis in Kosovo adds fuel to the old fire of strained East–West relations.[22]

Because NATO is currently entertaining both means of managing security simultaneously, it is not surprising that its motives and methods are often subject to criticism and misinterpretation. John Baylis argues however, that NATO is not alone in attempting to embody both while making the transition into the post–Cold War world. He attributes it to the environment itself, where Europe has become "an area where old and new concepts of security, while being contested and on a collision course, are nevertheless being put to work simultaneously" (Baylis 1998:23).

Certainly, there are other examples beyond enlargement of NATO's continued dedication to its traditional mindset, and though it is impossible to explore them all here, one of the most prominent is the Alliance's addiction to its nuclear weapons. Although NATO has repeatedly assured those around it that it has "no intention, no plan and no reason" to create additional nuclear weapons deposits, it still clings mercilessly to its first use policy (much to Russian chagrin)—justifying it as a deterrent against any kind of weapon of mass destruction that could threaten its members. Granted, NATO has indeed scaled back its nuclear stockpiles (NATO 1997), and established a Nuclear Planning Group that allows for all members to participate in developing Alliance nuclear policy and posture. As well, conventional forces have, to an extent, been reduced and streamlined (Joulwan 1997). Again, however, the traditional mindset must now coexist with changing international norms.

Unquestionably, an evolving and presumably reinvigorated NATO is an invaluable asset to European collective defence. The fact that it continues to be perceived as a power/military body is evident both in the expressed desire of applicant nations to be under the security blanket and the distrust for the Alliance emanating from Moscow. As an instrument of collective defence, NATO unavoidably retains the tenets inherent in the realist concept of the balance of power.

But as an instrument of increased integration and cooperative security for the transatlantic region, NATO also finds a definition. The Alliance provides a cohesive military infrastructure it would not have otherwise. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott asked the question: "If NATO did not exist today, would we have to invent it?" He answered: "emphatically, yes" (1999). It would look much different than it does now, he continued, but it was nevertheless needed as a regional security ensurer and builder.

Those arguing in favour of the Alliance's perseverance and evolution toward cooperative security put forward several further observations. They point out that the United Nations is often unable to react to conflicts with the expediency required as a result of too large and diverse a decision making body; that the Western European Union lacks a mandate and the strength required to execute such a role; and that the OSCE remains simply a very broadly based political organization. NATO proponents suggest that this leaves the Alliance as the only body (regional or otherwise) able to respond with the immediacy, strength and cohesion of action necessitated by security or stability–threatening situations. They are quick to point out, however, that this is not to say that in its present form NATO is ideal for the job, for any observer can glean that the mistakes of Bosnia, and the lessons of Kosovo suggest otherwise. But though it may not be perfectly suited, nor completely prepared, to deal with these new security circumstances, NATO supporters hold that it is the best the region has. And as Baylis has pointed out, fallibility does not equal futility (1998:25), so the Alliance refuses to give up.

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[22] Russian displeasure at the NATO involvement in the Balkans has been exposed through such things as the Russian withdrawal from NATO offices, cancelled diplomatic visits (in one case resulting in the Russian foreign minister turned his plane around in the sky, and heading back to Moscow), and repeated statements condemning the actions being taken by the Alliance. These actions have been tempered, however, by the dependence of that country on the West for financial support as it continues its transition amidst a collapsed economy.

VI THE WAY AHEAD

TRADITIONAL SECURITY AND FUTURE ROUNDS OF ENLARGEMENT

Though the former Secretary General maintained that enlargement should be a continuous and ongoing process (1999) and his successor strongly supports this view, potential scenarios for further enlargement bring with them additional difficulties that once more illustrate classical security concerns that contrast with the ideal that neoliberal institutionalism may promise. These are drawn out quite explicitly by the dilemma posed by future expansion processes.[23]

Koerner identifies three possibilities: *open door*, where there is no limit to who could join (including Russia) other than a fulfilment of the qualification criteria and a desire to be a part of the Alliance (this would be consistent with collective security); *parallel expansion* in concert with the broadening of the European Union, thus limiting potential members to what the majority of Europeans consider "Europe" (more in keeping with cooperative security); and *limited enlargement*, where the number is capped according to "strategic criteria" (1997:4–5), (which corresponds most with traditional collective defence concerns). The majority of analysts voice serious concerns over the open door scenario, as it allows for the possibility that NATO could eventually develop into a toothless organization paralyzed and diffused by an enormous membership. The second case also comes with drawbacks, for while it excludes the Ukraine and Russia, the forecast size of the EU is approximately twenty–five countries. Once again, a military alliance of that size would no doubt suffer from a lack of strategic direction and cohesion (Koerner 1997), making it potentially ineffective not only for defence, but also for proactive collective security operations.

The final option, limited expansion, is arguably the most viable in light of NATO's apparent goals for two reasons, both based on classical notions of security. First, Russia has been tolerant of enlargement thus far, but the farther the Alliance edges eastward, the less likely that that patience is to remain, again bringing old security concerns to the forefront. Second, it is evident that few NATO nations have an interest in including the Baltics or the Balkans in the Organization because of the 'Russia factor', and thus having to provide unequivocal security guarantees in these regions. Opting for limited enlargement would ensure that NATO would not become overburdened, and would help minimize potential conflict with Russia. Of course, the ramifications of shutting the door following the 1999 accession of the three new members would be problematic in the eyes of hopefuls, so it is likely that the Alliance will continue to move toward future rounds. But as history has shown, NATO could easily be confronted with a vastly changed Europe in less than a decade, so making hard and fast predictions is not prudent.

The difficulty that future enlargement presents to NATO once again highlights the dilemma between pursuing the inclusion of neoliberal institutionalism, while attempting to sustain neorealist concerns regarding alliance cohesion, relations with the East, and ultimately, regional security.

REFLECTIONS ON THE 1999 STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND A FEW RECOMMENDATIONS

As this paper has shown, the current evidence suggests that the prevailing trend is away from the classical security outlook of the Cold War toward a purely cooperative, peace–creating mindset. Yet, it would be an error to assume that, first, realist power concerns have been abandoned, or second, that they will be soon.

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[23] On a point of interest, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia recently called for NATO to expedite its application into the Alliance, given that NATO troops are currently using FYROM soil as a staging area to Kosovo ("Macedonia appeals for swift entry into NATO" [28 March 1999]).

This is not a reason for pessimism. The way ahead for NATO will continue to include Article V, but will increasingly involve activities of institutionalism, and the idealistic and thus far elusive goal of collective security. Indeed, the 1999 Strategic Concept does disclose much about how NATO will behave in the coming decade. The conclusions of the Washington Summit reveal that there will be an increased commitment to crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations in and around the European region (a cause that the Kosovo crisis has made all the more immediate, and that NATO's actions have proven). Cooperative security will be the mechanism of choice to deal with these new threats, for classic military operations alone are an inadequate means of altering, establishing and assisting in the maintenance of peace institutions. Surgical operations are no longer the effective method, and long–term engagements are the new reality, as Bosnia has shown, and Kosovo reiterated.

As a military mechanism of enforcement, NATO can help buttress UN, OSCE and other multilateral diplomatic initiatives, and this was pledged in the new Concept. Increased use of soft power is a characteristic of the new politics of the post–Cold War era, but in many cases, it alone is impotent, as the failed Rambouillet talks confirmed.[24] NATO can provide the military compellence often necessary to back up diplomacy, and this is where it will be most needed in the coming decade. This showed itself to be the case in Kosovo. A NATO with a renewed mandate can prove an indispensable infrastructure, ready to combat the new dangers, specifically of ethnic conflict, rogue states, and weapons proliferation. It will, however, retain preparedness for the old threats that still endure in situations such as an increasingly unstable and unpredictable Russia, a perpetually unsettled Middle East, and of course, continued ethnic tensions in the immediate European theatre.

On November 12, 1998, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana identified two principles that should serve as guideposts to managing security in the 21st century: humanity and democracy. NATO certainly has a role to play within this context, but the Alliance must remain particularly attentive to its surroundings, and aware of the duality of mandate it embodies, if it is to retain and enhance its utility. There are those new security dangers that cannot be saved by a military coalition, such as failing economies and elusive terrorists, and NATO is clearly not the most ideal institution to address the root causes of conflict. On the other hand, security threats to territory cannot be averted by such pursuits as integrative motions or non–proliferation programs. Working with the other institutions in the region, however, can do nothing but benefit security on all fronts.

Despite some problematic attributes, enlargement of the Organization is consistent with increased integration of Europe, and will prove itself to be an invaluable contribution to the strength and weight the Alliance carries both within and outside the Euro–Atlantic theatre. It is also evident, however, that future rounds must be approached with caution. Though NATO did little to seriously re–evaluate its posture, either nuclear or conventional, in its 1999 Strategic Concept, or overtly turn its focus from collective defence to cooperative security, the words of the document are mindful of this trend and the balance it needs to strike. Both elements will remain, and realism will have to coexist with the liberal institutional perspective at least for the time being. In this way, NATO will move into the future with a convincing and capable air, and will indeed be both qualified and suited to work effectively toward true security.

CONCLUSION

It is certain that NATO faces a tough road in the coming decades. As a relic of the Cold War, it is now struggling to evolve within the most challenging security environment the global community

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[24] Issues of sovereignty remain, however, for NATO acted without a UN mandate in Kosovo, which in effect undermined the authority of that body. This appears to be something the Alliance is mindful of, and will no doubt strive to protect against such a situation developing in the future.

has ever faced. Contemporary security, as shown, is obscure, unpredictable, and perilous—begging no easy answer. It exists on a level beyond that of the nation–state and realpolitik. NATO's response to the two types of threats is understandably also not homogenous in nature. For the Alliance to abandon its original mandate of collective defence would not only be institutionally next to impossible to achieve, it would be strategically unwise, given that all the elements inherent in traditional security concerns have not disappeared with the Berlin Wall. Hence, Article V, for the time being, remains a pillar of the Alliance. The Organization's struggle to maintain security and stability in the Balkans is a testament to this. But as the example of NATO's handling of the latest round of enlargement has shown, while it continues to be integral, collective defence is no longer the only pillar. Cooperative security has stepped up beside it, and is (and rightly so) beginning to steal the spotlight. Neoliberal institutionalism has found just as large a place in the new NATO as old realism and neorealism have maintained. As the analysis of enlargement and how NATO has been living with the dichotomy have revealed, both these activities are a reflection on the security landscape that is now Europe. The threats are numerous and varied, and occasionally even dependent on, or indistinguishable from, one another. And yes, they are often paradigmatic opposites, at times seemingly irreconcilable, but as this is the reality, so too are the responses NATO must offer. The military alliance should not be criticized for imperfectly moving into the largely uncharted territory of cooperation and integration, or for seeking to redefine itself beyond the death of its original purpose, when it is doing so by adopting the late 1990s' humanitarian sentiments of inclusion, of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The pace of transformation of the security environment in the last ten years is unprecedented, but the nature of threats have been changing and evolving since international relations were born. And there is little to suggest that the duality that NATO is currently grappling with is an entirely new one, nor that it will fade in the future. Baylis quotes E.H. Carr as arguing in 1939 that:

> the most realistic aim of European statemen (sic.)... should be to continue the search for that 'uneasy compromise' between the realities of power and the moral and prudent imperatives of building a more peaceful, just and stable European order. (1998)

There is no doubt that understandings of security will continue to evolve as the Alliance moves into its second half–century, and the struggle to reconcile responses will not be quick to fade—but NATO is indeed evolving to meet these challenges, as its activities of the last ten years have demonstrated.

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RELUCTANT PARTNERS: INCLUDING NGOS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT POLICY-MAKING

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In the conflict management field, policy-making is a relatively new area of NGO activity. Instead of remaining at the periphery, NGOs are starting to be included in some of the decision-making fora. However, governments and NGOs are skeptical about the benefit of this change in the policy process. Both fear the other will co-opt them or the policy process. This paper questions how this relatively new group of actors will affect the conflict management policy arena—its actors, institutions and ideas. Government and NGO fears of greater cooperation in policy-making are described, as well as the case for collaboration and the challenges involved. The landmine ban process is used to illustrate how NGO involvement affects the policy-making arena. This paper concludes that collaboration between governments and NGOs in policy-making can be beneficial if certain factors keep them from co-opting each other. Furthermore, while NGO inclusion in the policy-making arena legitimizes the established actors and institutions, they are able to introduce new ideas to the system.

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The post-cold war response to conflict has changed from control, contain and suppress to that of solve—or at least manage—conflict in order to remove the threat of violence. This requires more than military intervention. Today, conflict management includes many tasks—prevention, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and peacemaking.[2] Within each of these is another multitude of tasks such as mediation, emergency food and medical aid, infrastructure building, election monitoring, and the list goes on. The concept of intervention has indeed expanded. With this new concept and the broad list of conflict management tasks, the number and type of actors involved in this field has expanded as well. Neither the UN, states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nor non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a monopoly on expertise for international conflict resolution and management. Each have qualities to contribute to the effort of achieving non-violence and conflict resolution. Multi-dimensional action is now being advocated as the best response to conflict.[3] NGOs are involved in many of these conflict prevention, management and resolution tasks.

A relatively new area of involvement for NGOs in conflict management is that of policy-making.[4] "The nonprofit sector has clearly arrived as a major actor on the world scene but it has yet to make its mark as a serious presence in...policy circles" (Salamon 1994:121). Traditionally, NGOs have affected the policy process by criticizing and lobbying. However, there are some academics, NGOs, and bureaucrats that are beginning to argue that if NGOs are so deeply involved in policy implementation,[5] they should be included in the design process as well. Even some state leaders, such as Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, are advocating this step: "one can no longer relegate NGOs to simple advisory or advocacy roles in this process. They are now part of the way decisions have to be made" (1997). However, this change in the policy process is viewed with caution by both governments and NGOs. [6] Both fear the other will co-opt them and the policy process. They fear that instead of cooperating, they will be used to further the other's goals while their own will be compromised. They fear that they will lose control over the policy process and outcome. They fear that they will become tools instead of partners. These fears of co-optation will be further elaborated upon in this paper.

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[2] There are varied definitions for these terms. The purpose of listing them is not to categorize conflict management, but to show that it is a complex endeavour of activities. In general, prevention and peacebuilding include political, civil and economic development in order to prevent violent conflict from recurring; peacekeeping employs troops and civilians to ensure that 'peace' is maintained; and peacemaking involves using military force to stop violent conflict.

[3] For example, see Gordenker and. Weiss (1997); Smith and Weiss (1997); and Smillie (1997).

[4] For the purpose of this paper, the policy-making process is defined as: "a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve" (Jenkins 1978).

[5] Throughout this paper the term 'policy' refers to conflict management policy.

[6] There is such a wide variety of NGOs that this paper cannot address the intricacies of each regarding their involvement in policy-making. The paper recognizes that there are national and international, northern and southern, big and small NGOs with different skills, foci, and objectives. Indeed, this is true of states as well. Thus, while this paper acknowledges the diversity of NGOs and that each have different fears and challenges towards collaborative policy-making, the concerns of co-optation that are outlined in this paper are common to all NGOs, in varying degrees.

Since the end of the cold war, the international system and global order have begun to change. New institutions, ideas, and actors are emerging. In "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics" Rosenau (1995) describes a model of global order. There are three components to this model which are the basic levels of activity and actors that sustain global order: ideas, politics, and institutions. The ideational level includes the ideas, values and international norms that sustain global order. The political level consists of the political actors who interact in the international system and maintain the global arrangements. The institutional level is made up of the institutions and regimes that implement the policies that maintain global order—such as the UN or the World Trade Organization. Global order is the product of these three levels. "Global order is indivisible. It is both idea and practice, stimulus and outcome, premise and institution" (Rosenau 1995:17). Each level interacts with, influences and maintains the others. For example, the values and ideas that the reigning political elite hold will be embedded in the policies of the international institutions which are maintained by the elite. One can use the perspective any of these three levels of global order to analyze the international system. This model can also be applied to particular areas of activity that include all three components.

This paper uses the model's language of actors, ideas, values, institutions, and regimes to examine what happens when a new group of actors is added to the conflict management policy-making arena. The fears of governments and NGOs regarding greater collaboration in formal policy-making will be described. The case for collaboration and the challenges involved are also outlined. Finally, the landmine ban process, to which Axworthy's quotation above refers, will be used to illustrate how this relationship affects the policy-making arena. This is an appropriate example to examine the question of government-NGO co-optation in policy-making because it is a recent case that occurred within a fairly short time period, and has been widely acknowledged for the large amount of NGO involvement in the process. Collaboration between governments and NGOs in policy-making can be beneficial; however, the landmine ban case shows that there are certain factors that kept NGOs and governments from co-opting each other. Moreover, the most significant impact that NGOs are likely to have on the policy-making arena is influencing the values of its actors and institutions.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The variety of organizations that are classified as NGOs makes it difficult to establish a clear definition of this type of actor. In general, NGOs are private, non-profit, voluntary organizations which are independent of governments and are largely not under their control. NGOs vary in ideology, values, focus, resources, expertise, influence, and motivation.

NGOs are active in a vast array of humanitarian concerns including health services, social welfare and development, human rights, labour, education, science, culture, refugees, the environment, economic development, crime, disaster relief, disarmament, conflict resolution, and global awareness of these humanitarian issues. Thus, NGOs are private in form, in the sense that they are not associated with government, but they are public in purpose.

Since 1945, the number of NGOs has dramatically increased. The actual number of NGOs is difficult to determine because there is no mandatory central registration procedure for them. Depending on the definition criteria, the Union of International Associations (UIA 1998) lists between 15 108 and 38 243 NGOs. NGO activity is so large that the value of assistance delivered by them is greater than that by the UN system, excluding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Smith and Weiss 1997:614).

NGOs, to varying degrees, have several unique characteristics. The first, and most important, is their independence from governments. This unofficial status is the basis for all of their other characteristics. Second, NGOs have the ability to mobilize large amounts of support from citizens all over the world. Advances in transportation and communication have provided NGOs with the means to connect people and groups with common interests who are territorially divided. Third, NGOs influence and set governments'

national and international agendas. Their broad support base, ability to disseminate information and facility with the media give NGOs the ability to influence the opinions of large sectors of the global community and hence, the actions of governments. Fourth, NGOs can be more flexible because they are not connected to governments. They do not have to follow the same time-consuming, restrictive rules of diplomacy that states and official organizations have to follow. Fifth, NGOs have a long-term focus and commitment to their projects. Finally, NGOs have ties to the grassroots community which help them better understand the cultures, issues, and needs of the people with whom they are working.

NGO influence on governments' national and international policies is increasing. "Individually and together, NGOs have significant power to influence the public policy agenda and the public policy process" (Draimin and Plewes 1995:76). The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is only one such example. While the frequency and intensity has increased, Peter Spiro (1995) ties similar NGO participation back to the end of World War I. Since then, NGOs have been involved in policy-making through inclusion in national delegations, working groups, and through delegation capture. NGOs are now more often included at official policy-making tables, helping to conceptualize a viable plan of action. Despite such collaboration, governments and NGOs will inevitably have different agendas and values to pursue. How the challenges and advantages of cooperation are reconciled with each other will determine how this relationship will evolve.

FEARS OF CO-OPTATION

When working together, both governments and NGOs are wary of being co-opted by the other. The perceived costs of collaboration deter enthusiastic advances in the NGO-government policy-making relationship. Both groups of actors question whether increased consultation will weaken or strengthen their credibility and effectiveness in achieving goals. Thus, traditional territories and roles are maintained for fear of the largely unknown realm of cooperative decision-making. As this is a relatively new endeavour between NGOs and governments, there is no hard evidence to support these fears. This section reviews the fears of co-optation that governments and NGOs have advanced as predictions of what may happen due to this increasingly closer collaboration in the policy-making arena.

STATE FEARS

States fear that including NGOs in the policy-making arena will compromise their **sovereignty**. There is a concern that the policy-making process will be captured by special interest groups who do not have to consider broader national and international concerns and objectives. Indeed, "environmentalist and human rights NGOs collectively speak for many times over the numbers represented by even medium-size states in the UN, and even narrowly defined NGOs would outrank the microstates" (Spiro 1995:52). If this influence were allowed a voice in the policy fora, states could lose control of the process and the outcomes. The policy-making institutions could be overtaken by NGO actors and values.

Governments also do not want to risk their **legitimacy** and credibility by inviting all types of NGOs to work with them without being able to control their actions. A major criticism of NGOs is that there is no central authority to whom they are accountable and to organize their efforts. There are no institutions which regulate NGO actions. Instead, they work independently—within and around state-maintained institutions. It is questioned if further including NGOs in state institution activities will erode the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions because the NGOs can bring different values and practices from those of the states or their institutions. Moreover, these values and practices cannot be regulated by states.

The possibility that the **rules of the system** will have to change to accommodate NGO involvement causes governments to proceed with caution. The traditional system and rules of policy-making institutions and regimes may not necessarily be followed when new practitioners join the decision-making club. "International public opinion, transnational NGOs, and revolutions in telecommunications and the mass media have all begun to erode the traditional boundaries and prerogatives of diplomatic praxis" (Lawson 1998:96).

States fear increased **public scrutiny** if they allow NGOs to be privy to their decision-making discussions. Information gained in these fora make governments vulnerable to negative publicity. Whereas traditional diplomatic rules may call for confidentiality, some NGOs may not respect such a system. Moreover, the capability of NGOs to inform and mobilize their constituents through advanced communication technologies guarantees wider publicity and scrutiny. "The surveillance capability of civil society has been greatly facilitated by the development of communications technologies, which make it difficult for governments to monopolize information...such information politics opens an important crack in the edifice of state autonomy that creates additional pressures towards compliance" (Price 1998:107).

NGO involvement in conflict management decision-making can also create **unrealistic expectations** in the public for what can be accomplished. NGOs are skilled at mobilizing public support, but if goals are not accomplished, negative opinions are created. Policy failures and unfulfilled promises, although frequent, are not good politics for most governments, especially for those seeking democratic re-election. Selling the public a conflict management plan and then not meeting its perceived goals can be detrimental to a government's reputation.

NGO FEARS

NGOs value their **autonomy** highly and indeed, define themselves by it. Hence, they question whether they will lose their autonomy by joining the state decision-making regimes. Although they will be able to contribute to policy development, will the subsequent implementation be under greater scrutiny and control because of the governmental connection? Will the flexibility and spontaneity of NGOs be constrained because of further links with governments? Participating in such fora not only enables NGOs to keep governments accountable, but also allows governments to scrutinize and criticize NGOs. Indeed, Gordenker and Weiss (1997:451) question whether this move toward greater cooperation is a step closer towards peer or government regulation. Traditionally, NGOs have seen themselves as accountable to the people with whom they are working and to whom they are giving assistance. Answering to governments risks making NGOs more accountable to their financiers than to the people in need. Moreover, global society may regard NGOs as an extension of the governments should they become a part of the official decision-making process—not as separate actors in the system. As such, NGOs would lose their reputation as alternatives to governments.

A major concern for NGOs is remaining independent of government influence. The primary characteristic of NGOs is that they are independent from, and an alternative to, governments. This results in NGO ideas and objectives that are often contrary to government interests. Joining official decision-making sessions may make NGOs more cautious about pursuing such initiatives as they would risk being excluded from further policy-making opportunities and from further funding. Most NGO budgets are significantly supplemented by government funds. Hence, NGOs risk **becoming dependent** on the policy decisions made.[7] Consequently, they might lose the will to address the conflicts which governments choose to ignore. "The ability of NGOs to articulate approaches, ideas, language, and values that run counter to official orthodoxies may also be compromised" (Edwards and Hulme 1996:7).

The desire for inclusion and/or funding can also create **competition** between NGOs for recognition. To increase support, NGOs are likely to conform to government priorities and interests.

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[7] Although the purpose of this paper is to focus on government-NGO policy-making relations, it is important to note that there are similar questions put forward in the literature concerning the effects of government funding on the independence of NGOs. For an example, see Edwards and Hulme (1996).

NGOs "may seek funds for whatever conflicts are 'popular' with foundations or relatively conspicuous in the media, even though the particular tools they have at their disposal...may have relatively little efficacy" (Lund 1996:137). Abandoning previous projects, objectives and specializations, and making unrealistic promises could result from such fierce rivalries. NGOs risk distancing themselves from their original priorities.

If too many NGOs succumb to **chasing government** interests and values, homogenization of NGO activities will occur. This would undermine the distinctive, alternative nature of NGOs from governments. "Their priorities in terms of countries and locations within countries, their target groups, their approach and their choice of sectors can all be manipulated" (Smillie 1997:565). NGOs cease to be an alternative to government operations when they follow government objectives instead of their own.

That the policy-making process would be **captured by government interests** is a further concern. For states, conflict management is another means to pursue their foreign policy objectives. What policies are chosen and how they are implemented are affected by these objectives. "Relations are not solely governed by such considerations as generosity and solidarity between peoples; other constraints, such as security, diplomacy and economic interests, impose a definite limit to the cooperation and partnership" (CCIC 1988:23). NGOs do not want to be limited or constrained by state concerns that they do not share. Moreover, exposure to the conundrums of reconciling diverse state objectives may make NGOs more sympathetic to the process, which in turn could make them more reluctant to criticize governments. It is more difficult to criticize a process when one is part of it.

In any decision-making forum, the number of members are limited by certain criteria. NGOs fear that they will be **forced into partnerships** with each other, regardless of objectives, ideologies or methods, in order to be heard by the policy makers. They may have to compromise standards and values in order to accomplish their goals. This may even be necessary just to be included in the policy-making process.

Moreover, NGOs fear that they will be **inadequately represented** because only a few of them will be recognized as important enough to participate. The NGOs actors with more money, better contacts, and that address popular issues are likely to receive the attention. Hence, it becomes the NGO elite who join the government elite. "Arguably, it is more often money than membership that determines influence, and money more often represents the support of centralized elites, such as the major foundations, than that of the true grass roots" (Spiro 1995:52). Consequently, the smaller, grass-roots NGOs continue to be largely ignored by the decision-making fora and institutions. To gain access to governments and their regimes, valuable time and money must be spent on policy-making and administrative issues rather than projects. While the elite may grow, does it actually become more representative?

ARGUMENTS FOR COLLABORATION

Despite the fears that states and NGOs have of greater cooperation in policy-making, there are valuable arguments for such collaboration. By including NGOs in decision-making, **more information** and ideas will be brought to the fora. NGOs have valuable contacts, experience and ties to the consumers that would help better inform the decision process. The NGOs could be a closer link to those the policies are actually going to affect. NGOs "may have access to more complete, less managed information about their terrain of work than either IGO or governmental agents" (Gordenker and Weiss 1997:446). Consequently, NGOs can better inform the decision makers of the dimensions of a situation's problems and needs. Their involvement could not only bring more information, but also new ideas on how to deal with the situations, thereby expanding the scope of conflict management policies. "The institutions at the periphery of society, and not the government, have historically been the originators of new ideas" (Draimin and Plewes 1995:71).

A popular theme in international relations literature today is the democratization of foreign policy through the participation of civil society.[8] The traditional concept of democracy—one equal vote for each member—has changed to one of representation, majority rule and the rule of law. Whereas states represent constituents of territories, NGOs represent constituents of interests. NGOs are capable of making official policy-making fora **more representative**. They add more members, ideas and constituents to the process. The criticism of this argument is that the NGOs who join such processes are the rich and informed few—the elite NGOs. Thus, policy-making does not become more democratic, but more elitist. Nevertheless, even if the inclusion of NGOs does not make foreign policy-making more democratic in the traditional sense, there is greater representation of constituents and more information available. This is likely to help the legitimacy of the policies and their implementation.

The ability of NGOs to **disseminate information** and to run publicity campaigns is likely to bring a further benefit to the conflict management policy process. Many NGOs are skilled at using communication technologies to gain support for initiatives. Informing the public and generating their support is key to successful policy implementation.

Working together at the policy stage of conflict management has the potential to **better coordinate** all subsequent efforts by governments, IGOs and NGOs. Generally, many conflict management actors pursue projects affecting the same issue and community with little or no consultation or coordination. "Coordination between two or more entities is comparatively rare; far more common is the simultaneous but uncoordinated pursuit by several governments and organizations of differing policies in a particular area" (Lund 1996:189). This does not maximize the limited resources available to prevent and resolve conflicts. To have these actors moving in the same direction with a similar vision would be a tremendous achievement for conflict management.

CHALLENGES TO COLLABORATION

The field of conflict management will benefit from government and NGO actors collaborating in the policy-making process on the condition that they are able to create a working relationship that will maximize the benefits of this collaboration and that will guard against the fears of each. The obstacles to a more coherent conflict management policy process are not insurmountable. However, there are several factors to developing such a relationship that will have to be addressed.

NGOs have different areas of expertise. Not all NGOs should be expected to, or attempt to join the official policy-making process. Currently, there are no universal guidelines for choosing which NGOs are involved in the policy-making process of a specific issue. The size of the NGO, those that have a previously relationship with the government or IGO, those that are the most vocal and have the greatest public recognition, the ones with the best lobbyists and most money—these are all criteria for their selection by governments. However, these characteristics do not necessarily apply to the NGOs with the best information, work ethic, or other characteristics relevant to the particular issue. In order to achieve a coherent, legitimate and viable conflict management policy, the most qualified NGOs and governments should be involved in the process. But who decides the criteria for these qualifications? Will it be necessary to have guidelines for participation, and who of the NGOs and governments will select the participants? When **choosing who** works in policy-making fora, one must also be aware that the participants have diverse ideologies, orientations, values, operating styles, and approaches which will clash and make the decision-making environment more difficult.

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[8] For examples, see Cameron (1998) and Lee (1998).

For most NGOs, policy-making is a relatively new role. They are changing from the critics of policy to the contributors. With greater influence comes greater responsibility. "The real test of NGOs' policy usefulness will be the quality of their policy contributions: how do they move from being critics of policy to playing the role of informed and thoughtful sources of viable policy alternatives?" (Draimin and Plewes 1995:66). This new challenge presents the need for NGOs to **develop policy-making skills**, capacity and expertise in order to be respected and effective in the formal policy-making process. Some critics may see these qualities as incongruous to the unique NGO characteristics of informality, spontaneity and flexibility. Nevertheless, if NGOs are to be valuable contributors to the formal policy process, more formalized techniques must be used to work effectively within the established system.

Although governments have created the policy-making process and do not seem willing to drastically change it, they too have to understand that adding a new group of contributors will alter how the fora are run. If governments include NGOs, using their expertise and adjvice, they must **accept changes** to the process and develop the skills to work effectively with this new partner.

THE LANDMINE BAN

APMS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 800 people are killed and 1 200 are maimed every month by anti-personnel mines (APMs) (Miyet 1997). APMs greatly inhibit social and economic development in the regions and countries which they contaminate. Farm land, living land, and transport routes become unusable, increasing the poverty of the victims and the country. Victims need immediate and long-term care, services which most underdeveloped and developing countries do not have the resources to give. Neither do they have the resources to remove the APMs. "The countries that bear the heaviest burden are the very ones whose economies are most impoverished by landmines...de-mining is extremely expensive and time-consuming. So the poorer a people is, the less they can afford to clear away mines—and the longer they remain poor" (OneWorld News Service 1997). Thus, APMs not only kill and maim, but they continue to decrease the chances for development, creating a weak population and a country unable to implement development programs. An environment of poverty and danger is likely to exacerbate inter-group tensions, making violent conflict more imminent and resolution more difficult.

APMs also affect conflict management projects. Projects to alleviate tensions and develop the society with the goal of preventing violent conflict, are constrained or not even attempted because of the presence of APMs. "Children's groups, development organizations, refugee organizations, medical and humanitarian relief groups—all had to make huge adjustments in their programs to try to deal with the landmine crisis and its impact on the people they were trying to help" (Williams 1997b:2-3). APMs are also a major obstacle to the repatriation of refugees and their development. An example of this problem took place when trying to implement the 1991 Cambodia peace agreement. Part of the agreement was to bring hundreds of thousands of refugees back to Cambodia. Part of the repatriation process included giving each family enough land to be self-sustaining. However, there were so many APMs in Cambodia that they could not give the land. Instead the refugee families received $50 and a year's supply of rice (Williams 1997b:2).

THE BAN PROCESS[9]

On December 2-4 1997, 122 countries signed the Ottawa Treaty which banned the use, production, development, acquisition, sale, stockpiling, and transfer of APMs. The process which led to this event is a good example of NGO-government interaction in conflict management policy-making. The interplay between bureaucrats, parliamentarians, government leaders, and NGOs who contributed to the ban is complex. All played crucial roles to make it happen. One could look at any of these players and argue it was their initiatives that were the impetus and key to the ban. In reality, all were vital. This paper looks at one group—NGOs—while recognizing that their efforts alone would not have achieved the success that occurred. The events leading up to the signing of the Ottawa Treaty will be reviewed, with a focus on the Canadian government's interaction with Mines Action Canada (MAC)—the Canadian coalition of pro-ban NGOs.[10]

The constraint that APMs were placing on conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding projects prompted NGOs to attempt to deal with the root of the problem. While most of the world viewed APMs as a military necessity, NGOs came to the conclusion that they violated the values of human security.[11] NGOs decided that the solution to the problem was the complete elimination of APMs. Thus, in early 1992 a coalition of NGOs formed the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), of which MAC is a member, and aimed to have an international APM ban by 2000. The ICBL, along with the ICRC and other NGOs began a forceful campaign to change national and international policies regarding landmines. Their influence did not stop at creating awareness of the problem or agenda-setting—NGOs were active participants throughout the ban policy-making process.

The NGO strategy began by urging signatories of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to review the Convention, which in Protocol II attempts to regulate the use of APMs. It was hoped that APMs would be banned during this review conference. However, consensus was not reached at the October 1995 CCW negotiations, and they were suspended until January and May 1996.

In Canada, MAC requested regular updates on the government's APM activities and policies. These meetings enabled MAC to inform the government on the APM issue. MAC also pushed the government to include someone with humanitarian expertise on the Canadian delegation to the CCW review. The government consequently invited MAC to send a representative with its delegation to the May conference. MAC was concerned about being perceived as a government ally by other NGOs. "Participation in the government delegation also risked MAC's standing in the ICBL. Only a handful of countries...had NGOs on

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[9] An excellent chronology of the APM ban process has been compiled by the International Peace Bureau and can be found at www.pgs.ca/pages/lm/ldchronl.htm. Other informative web sites are: www.minesactioncanada.ca and www.mines.gc.ca. For more description of this process, see the references that I use in this section.

[10] There are several chapters that focus on the landmine ban campaign in other countries including the US and Europe in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin (1998).

[11] Human security prioritizes the needs of the individual over the needs of the state. For discussions on this concept see Axworthy (1999) and Hampson and Oliver (1998).

their delegations, and there were concerns that MAC's image would be diminished among other NGOs....[P]eople in the ICBL were suspicious of MAC, which they regarded as a newcomer and an organization that was working closely with government" (Cameron 1998:156). However, MAC decided that this was an important opportunity to contribute information to the policy negotiations that were otherwise closed to NGO input.

While the ICBL and ICRC were not allowed inside the CCW review meetings, they were present throughout the negotiations, providing information on the APM issue and pressuring governments for an APM ban. Several restrictions were added to the Convention regarding APMs, but they were not banned. The NGOs felt that they could not wait for the next CCW review in five years. Consequently, the ICBL decided to go outside the traditional diplomatic process and invited governments who had taken serious action to ban APMs, and those who had publicly declared their support for an immediate ban, to discuss how to reach that goal.

These meetings prompted Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) Canada to host a meeting of pro-ban governments, IGOs, and NGOs in October 1996, to strategize the ban campaign. At first the ICBL was skeptical: "one campaigner remembers wondering if the move was really designed to ensure that momentum for a ban would be sidetracked by more government discussions leading nowhere" (Williams and Goose 1998:34). Perhaps this was a trick to co-opt and stall the process. However, DFAIT decided it wanted to fully include the ICBL and MAC in the planning and strategizing of the meetings. The ICBL was consulted about all the details of the conference and it was intended that NGOs would be equal participants and involved in all the discussions. "Noticeably absent from the initial supporters of the Ottawa process were all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council...All five states shared suspicions of the process and its strategic alliance with the NGO community and each continued to reserve the right to use AP mines" (Lawson 1997:21). Many governments objected to this unprecedentedly high level of NGO involvement in a formal conference. This brought accusations from states that Canada was being co-opted by the NGOs. Hence, DFAIT devised a compromise where some of the meetings would be closed to NGOs unless they were part of official government delegations, as MAC was on Canada's. However, these restrictions were circumvented by allowing the number of accredited delegates for each government to be increased by one, if the delegation included an NGO. About 15 governments used this incentive (Cameron 1998:158). Moreover, the ICBL was given a seat at the negotiations as a full participant in the meetings, while governments could choose whether they were full participants or observers—according to their ban position. The NGOs were also actively involved in creating the final declaration and the action plan to build political will for an APM ban. This conference was the beginning of the Ottawa Process.

At the October meetings, 50 governments attended as full participants (24 as observers) along with the UN, UNICEF, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the ICRC, the Federation of Red Cross Societies, and many NGOs from the ICBL. The 50 official full participants signed the 'Ottawa Declaration' which stated their intention to ban APMs and to take tangible steps toward that goal. At the close of the conference, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, challenged these states to return to Ottawa in a year to sign an international treaty banning APMs. Jody Williams writes that the diplomats were "horrified" at this challenge which put those states who had publicly announced that they supported an immediate ban on a fast-track process to sign the treaty (1997a:4). Axworthy also stated that the Ottawa Process planned to work closely with the ICBL for this purpose. In turn, the ICBL committed that the Process would be its highest priority for the year.

This meeting began the close year-long collaboration between pro-ban governments and NGOs to achieve the APM ban. "Public diplomacy efforts by key foreign ministers and senior officials were effectively combined with NGO-led civil society advocacy campaigns. Videos, posters, fax campaigns, e-mail, conference calls, and the Internet all facilitated the rapid co-ordination and transmission of the key messages of the constantly evolving Ottawa Process" (Lawson 1998:96). The ICBL continued to help plan and

participate in the subsequent government conferences at Brussels, Oslo and Ottawa. In June, at Brussels, 155 states and over 100 NGOs signed a Declaration in support of an APM ban treaty, the negotiations of the treaty in Oslo, and the signing of the treaty by the end of 1997.

In September, treaty negotiations began in Oslo. A significant difference between these negotiations and those of the CCW was that decisions were not taken by consensus. This meant that the few dissenters could not stall the process or dilute the outcome. The ICBL was an official observer with the same status as state observers. This status enabled the ICBL to attend all sessions, except for expert meetings, and contribute to the formal discussions. Moreover, the ICBL contributed significantly to the wording of the text. Eighty-nine states endorsed *The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*, commonly known as the Ottawa Treaty. Essentially, the treaty prohibits the use, production, development, acquisition, sale, stockpiling and transfer of APMs; states that APMs must be destroyed within four years and cleared within ten years of the treaty going into effect; and that signatories must increase assistance for APM clearance and victim aid. "Asked to identify the factors that influenced their country's decision to sign the Convention, delegates most frequently cited the pressure exercised by NGOs, particularly as a presence at the table during the treaty negotiation process where they were able to influence policy decisions" (Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin 1998:10).

On December 2-4, 1997, 122 states signed the Ottawa Treaty. Over 400 NGOs and international organizations attended the event along with 157 states. On March 1, 1999, the treaty entered into effect and became binding in international law. As of November 21, 1999, 136 states have signed the treaty and 89 have ratified it (MAC 1999).

NGOS, POLICY-MAKING AND THE BAN

From this account, it seems that both actors in this policy process—the governments and NGOs—were afraid of being co-opted by each other. The governments were largely afraid of letting NGOs join a process that was traditionally reserved for official diplomats. The implications of their involvement meant moving out of the CCW conferences and creating a new round of negotiations based on different rules. Some states were also concerned of losing control of the process and the outcome of the negotiations, and making public their positions and negotiating tactics by letting NGOs participate in the policy process. Finally, many states considered the one year deadline for creating and signing an APM ban treaty an unrealistic expectation created by the NGOs. However, this was a mistaken perception since it was Canada's Foreign Minister who gave this challenge, whereas the ICBL had aimed at achieving a ban by 2000.

NGOs were also afraid of being co-opted by the governments. Until the governments took notice of the issue, the NGOs had control of the ban campaign. When the governments became interested, NGOs had to share responsibility for the momentum of the process. This meant that some of their autonomy and dependence might have been compromised. MAC and the ICBL had concerns about being seen as government allies and being captured by their interests, rather than staying focused on their own goal. They were also worried that government involvement would delay the process. However, it seems that the process was actually sped up by the involvement of key pro-ban governments. Furthermore, the goals of the NGOs were accomplished by achieving a comprehensive ban. "The initial objectives of groups like MAC were accomplished, point by point, in the Ottawa Process" (Cameron 1998:159). Although coalitions of NGOs were formed to move the campaign forward, there is no evidence that these NGOs regretted this partnership.

Despite government and NGO fears of co-optation, most participants and researchers agree that the NGO-government cooperation on this issue was vital for the success of the campaign. "NGOs and governments can work together very effectively to achieve widely-desired goals...the vitality of the NGO campaign in Canada and elsewhere can be rightly seen as fundamental to the success of the landmine ban" (Axworthy 1998:1). Arguments for greater collaboration between governments and NGOs in policy-making are supported by the APM ban process. NGOs were able to bring government officials more information

regarding the issue and options on how the treaty should be worded to most effectively address the problems created by APMs. The NGO involvement in the Ottawa Process allowed for greater representation of concerns, expertise, information, and peoples than the CCW conferences. "Although the working relationships needed for continued progress became closer than many governments and NGOs were used to or comfortable with, the necessary exchange of information and open discussions ensured that the interests of mine-affected communities were better represented at the negotiating table" (Warmington and Tuttle 1998:57). The collaboration of governments and NGOs also allowed for a coordinated effort of information dissemination and the understanding of each other's goals and objectives.

The success of the government-NGO policy-making cooperation in the Ottawa Process is due to several factors. A significant number of governments accepted changes to the policy-making tradition in order to incorporate NGOs into the process. NGOs also agreed to increase their own participation from lobbyists and agenda-setters to policy decision-makers. They were required to defend their position, question governments, provide expert information, and contribute to the wording of the treaty. They needed quality policy-making skills in order to maintain their position at the table and get the attention of the governments. It was this grasp of information and ability to present it at the policy-making fora that kept NGOs from being co-opted or shut out of the process by the governments. Another essential factor that prevented NGOs from being co-opted was that they remained focused on their goal—a comprehensive APM ban. The NGOs established the parameters of the debate and did not let governments move them off course.

The governments were not co-opted by the NGOs because the debate was placed in a regime in which they had experience and over which they had control—international treaty law. NGOs needed the governments' complete participation in the process in order to create international law. While the NGOs were involved in all aspects of the policy-making process, it remained the states who shaped the negotiations and made the final decisions on whether or not to sign and ratify the treaty. As long as states are the only ones capable of creating international law, their sovereignty in the policy-making process remains intact. Moreover, many states did not sign the treaty, demonstrating that the NGOs had not co-opted the process or their sovereignty. Some important non-signatories included the US, China, Russia, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Iran, and Libya.

CONCLUSION

The Ottawa Process is evidence that multilateral diplomacy is changing. NGOs are being included to a greater degree in international policy-making than ever before. Although both governments and NGOs fear co-optation by the other, there are benefits to their cooperation. The concerns are manageable. It is possible for governments and NGOs to work together and be successful in their objectives. This partnership does not apply to all endeavours, however some issues would benefit from greater cooperation and consultation. In order to avoid co-optation it is necessary that NGOs be well-equipped with accurate information and policy skills, that they remain focused on their goals, and that governments accept their involvement.

The global order model that Rosenau describes is useful to illustrate the changes in multilateral conflict management policy-making. NGOs are new political actors joining traditional state leaders and diplomats. They are bringing new ideas and values to the international system which cannot always be accommodated by the existing international institutions, nor accepted by the established political actors. This was seen in the Ottawa Process: NGOs viewed APMs as a threat to human security—a relatively new value in the international system; in order to accommodate NGOs and their concerns, the negotiation process was taken out of the CCW conferences and a new negotiation forum was created.

Rosenau's model presents several questions regarding how the traditional actors and institutions of the policy-making system will react to the emergence of new actors, ideas and institutions. Will they endorse change, or covertly or overtly oppose it? In the Ottawa Process, some governments accepted the NGOs, the

issue, and the process. Other governments, particularly the US, joined the process in order to try to circumvent the momentum, while other governments refused outright to support the campaign.

Will the actors choose the institutions and ideas which let them maintain or gain power? The Ottawa Process provided middle powers with a leadership role and recognition, whereas the CCW conferences was based on consensus which could be essentially controlled by major powers.

Finally, will the conflict management policy-making system be changed by adding NGOs to the arena? Ultimately in the Ottawa Process, the traditional actors and institutions kept their legitimacy and position. By incorporating NGOs into the existing order, governments ensured their authority in the international system. The majority of negotiators were states, not NGOs. It remained the states who were able to endorse, sign and ratify the ban treaty. Moreover, the traditional regime of international law was used to legitimize the APM taboo that NGOs had created. Thus, incorporating NGOs into the policy-making system endorsed and legitimized the existing actors and institutions. However, the NGO involvement in the conflict management policy process brought prominence to a new value in the policy arena—human security. This landmine ban case reveals that incorporating NGOs into the policy-making arena does not transform it but alters its characteristics, particularly the values of the actors and institutions.

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BOOK REVIEW: JOCELYN COULON'S SOLDIERS OF DIPLOMACY

Jocelyn Coulon's *Soldier's of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and The New World Order* is an updated, English translation of 1994's *Les Casques Bleu.* Despite the author's additions to the original work, the book is primarily concerned with United Nation's Peacekeeping Operations (UNPO's) during the first half of the decade. Thus, in addition to examining the fundamental quality of Coulon's assessment of these operations, it must be determined if the issues she deals with remain significant.

Coulon begins by discussing the optimistic attitude towards peacekeeping that existed at UN Headquarters during 1993, she considers the origins of peacekeeping in the Suez Crisis, and then details her own surveys of the missions in Cambodia, Western Sahara, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. It should be noted that Coulon is a long-time foreign affairs reporter for *Le Devoir*; in keeping with her background, Soldiers of Diplomacy is written in a informal journalistic style and is clearly designed for an audience broader than academics and the foreign policy community. The book must be evaluated with Coulon's target audience in mind, although, considering the author's extensive field research, numerous interviews, and solid documentation, she uses a very high standard of research for a popular work.

The most important theme explored in Coulon's work is the idea that the United Nations and, by extension, UNPO's are only what member states choose to make of them - the institution itself has no real power. In relation to the 1993-94 period in which she carried out her investigation, Coulon writes: "…the UN believed that it could be an independent agent, free to make decisions and take actions…There was an atmosphere of euphoria in the corridors of UN headquarters…But the euphoria was short-lived; the member states, particularly the great powers, were quick to remind the UN that it was only an instrument in their hands."(x) Although the author offers ample evidence to support this contention, she confuses the issue, in various instances, by focusing on problems within the UN bureaucracy which lead to serious difficulties in a number of peacekeeping operations. Coulon does not always clearly indicate that nearly all of the problems within the UN bureaucracy stemmed from issues well beyond its control. Additionally, she seems to suggest that these problems, (which are beyond its control), can somehow be solved by the organisation.

The strength of Coulon's argument, however, lies in her detailed discussion of the manipulation of the UN by the great powers, particularly the tight control which those powers maintain over their own troops in various UNPO's and the way in which such control detracts from the coherence and harmonisation of missions. She also discusses the fundamental problems of the Security Council and its inability to make quick, decisive, and meaningful decisions in times of international crisis.

One of the most significant issues the author deals with is the economic cost of peacekeeping for donor states. Noting that many developing countries which provide peacekeepers do so primarily for financial gain, Coulon is highly critical of the UN's compensation system which provides uniform reimbursement to states providing peacekeepers, despite the vastly different real costs of providing these troops. Coulon notes that some nations have received compensation for one year's peacekeeping activities which is equivalent to more than half of their annual military budgets; as well, equipment and transportation costs are seldom footed by contributors from the developing world. In contrast, the compensation received by developed countries for better trained and equipped troops generally amounts to less than one quarter of their real cost, exclusive of the cost of support, equipment depreciation, and other expenses. The compensation issue has remained timely, (and unresolved), with examples of the ongoing problem apparent in the deployment of an UN-administered police force in Kosovo. Numerous police contingents have arrived without proper equipment, in some cases even lacking light weapons.

Certainly, one of the major alternatives to costly UN peacekeeping is peacekeeping missions delegated by the UN to regional organizations. Numerous individuals have suggested that an effective way of dealing with conflicts without incurring the heavy costs that UN peacekeepers create lies in UN reimbursement of regional organizations for the real cost of the regional organisation's troops, which would then

undertake UN-authorised missions. Coulon's work could have been improved by examining the use of regional organisations as an alternative to UNPO's, particularly the case of Economic Community of West African States'(ECOWAS) Military Observer Group in Liberia, ECOMOG. The ECOMOG operation, which commenced in 1989, has been hailed as both a great success and, in light of recent events in Sierra Leone, condemned as a mere front for power politics. Nonetheless such operations warrant consideration.[1] It seems that the UN must make a concerted effort to forge stronger links with regional organisations or risk being side-stepped altogether as in the NATO operation against Kosovo.

Coulon approaches UNPO's from a distinctly Canadian perspective, giving an account of Lester B. Pearson's role in the creation of the original Suez peacekeeping mission. More importantly, she notes the competition which Canada faces in attempting to preserve its traditionally prominent role in peacekeeping, largely due to increased participation from other nations: "Other countries are doing this, and some of them have a lot more resources than Canada."(166) This statement touches on the fact that the role which Canadian politicians expect Canada to be able to play in the world is grossly disproportionate to the resources they are willing to devote to the military and, to a lesser extent, foreign affairs. Recent international events have shown how thinly stretched Canada's military is, and suggest that there will be a time in the near future when Canada will be unable to participate in UNPO's or NATO operations. Recently, the Prime Minister's commitment of forces to the NATO-led, UN-authorised peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, and his promise that Canada will also participate in the UN mission to East Timor, have been followed by comments, (from his own Minister of National Defence), that the Canadian Forces are barely able to field the requisite troops. Indeed, Canada's commitment of slightly over 1,000 troops to Kosovo has been followed by indications that the number of Canadian troops in Bosnia will have to be pared due to budgetary concerns.[2] In this respect, one of Coulon's statements seems prophetic: "Cuts to the Canadian Armed Forces and massive participation in peacekeeping operations by dozens of countries with better-equipped or more substantial armed forces have meant that Canada is increasingly being relegated to a secondary role."(xi)

If there is a major fault with Coulon's piece it is her unwillingness to consider one the possible, albeit unfortunate, conclusions which can be drawn from her own assessment. It is quite possible that the organisation will never be able to live up to the role envisioned for it by past supporters such as Lester Pearson and Boutros-Boutros Ghali. Coulon suggests that "…the UN must return to the great principle that governed its creation of the Blue Helmets: to keep the peace where this is what parties really want", and refrain from forceful interventions.(194) Many would argue that an inability to engage in 'forceful' interventions would be such a great omission that the UN would be unable to maintain any appearance of utility in its presence. Late and ineffective action in the face of the crises in Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor, combined with almost complete inaction in a plethora of horrific conflicts in places such as Sierra Leone and Sudan, has, after all, seriously damaged the organization's reputation. Timely and effective intervention, however, seems to be well beyond the organization's capability. Perhaps the UN is, (for a variety of reasons such as the structure of the Security Council and its universal membership), simply too unwieldy and unmanageable an organisation to engage in military interventions. Unfortunately, at the same time, there seems to be a more urgent need for 'muscular' interventions than for traditional UN peacekeeping operations. Perhaps the organisation ought to divest itself of any thought that it can act effectively in times of

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[1] For differing views on the role of ECOMOG, see: Andrew McGregor. "Quagmire in west africa: Nigerian peacekeeping in Sierra Leone (1997-98)" *International Journal* Vol. LIV(3) (Summer 1999). 483-501. and Mark Malan "The crisis in external response" *Peace, Profit, or Plunder: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies* Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason, eds.(Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1999) 37-59.

[2] Jeff Salot. "NATO considers troop cuts in Balkans: Eggleton says allies feeling cash crunch" *Globe and Mail* 21 September 21, 1999. A15.

crisis and act only by designating, and necessarily funding, regional organizations to take on vigorous peace enforcement roles. Perhaps, in light of recent events, Coulon would agree.

—Graham Boswell

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THE NEW RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY, EDITED BY MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS PRESS, NEW YORK, 1998

In his latest work, Michael Mandelbaum assembles a line-up of four heavy hitters to analyze the disconcerting trends emerging in Russian foreign policy and to explore possible future scenarios for Russian behaviour on the international scene. Surveying Russia's relations with the "civilized world" and with its new neighbours to the west and south, the authors underline the shift away from the conciliatory approach of "perestroika diplomacy" in 1992 towards what they define as the harder, neoimperialist, and possibly anti-Western, strain of Russian foreign policy. Each contributor examines a particular aspect of this shift: Leon Aron looks at the changing domestic political context; Sherman Garnett explores Russia's relations with the West in the "new borderlands" of Ukraine and the Baltic states; Rajan Menon analyzes Russia's involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia; and, Coit D. Blacker examines Russia's attempts to "reconcile the irreconcilable" with the West. Taken together, the message of the book is clear: While Russia may be weak today, beware the sleeping bear.

Mandelbaum sets the tone of the book in trademark style with his introduction detailing the history of Russian foreign policy since the fall of communism. After a brief overview of the era of "perestroika diplomacy," he argues that Russia's "new" foreign policy line that followed the dramatic 1993 parliamentary election of communists and "nationalist xenophobes" is incompatible with the more hospitable cooperative and integrationist stance originally pursued by Yeltsin's administration. It is clear that in the eyes of Mandelbaum, and the rest of the authors, Russian opposition to Western international objectives is undesirable. Of the scenarios that Mandelbaum paints for future courses of Russian foreign policy, he writes, "the most desirable remains integration with the West." What is interesting, however, is that "integration" is never clearly defined. Mandelbaum insists that Russia is in a position today to become more like "the rest of Europe" domestically, and that this is key for it to become a part of the West internationally. But while it is indeed important for Russia to strive towards a liberal democratic political system, and to participate constructively in European economic and security institutions, it remains unclear as to whether Russia actually *should* become part of the West, if this means that it must support the West in everything that it does on the international stage. Furthermore, it is questionable as to whether the West would accept Russia into the fold with open arms in the first place.

Nevertheless, the starting point for the book is clear: What would be best for all those concerned is that Russia cooperates with the West and strives to integrate itself into the rest of Europe. From this, Mandelbaum states that the book will analyze the 'new' Russian foreign policy by seeking to address two fundamental questions: What are the international purposes of the new Russian state? And, where and how will it achieve them? Given that the Council on Foreign Relations, an organization that seeks to provide new ideas for U.S. foreign policy, published the book, it is not surprising that the authors tackle these questions strictly from an American perspective. It is also not surprising, then, that with the exception of Menon's chapter on Russia and the newly independent states to its south, the book focuses almost exclusively on Russia's relations with the West. To begin with, Aron's piece on the domestic context argues that the rise of neoimperial political forces in Russia has caused the Yeltsin administration to take a harder line in its foreign policy towards the West. He likens the new Russian foreign policy to Gaullism, one that is suspicious of the West, and that strives to distinguish itself from, and possibly challenge U.S. hegemonic interests. However, Aron notes that Russia has refrained from antagonizing the U.S.-led West with its "calculated" opposition, and he predicts that when U.S. foreign policy positions are firmly and unambiguously communicated, such as in the cases of NATO expansion and Bosnia, then Russia is likely to concede to, or even cooperate with U.S. interests. Similarly, in his chapter, "Russia and the West in the New Borderlands," Garnett predicts a rocky future for the security zone separating NATO and Russia, given the vital interests of both Europe and Russia in the region, and that Ukraine and the Baltic states are "tilting toward the West." Like Aron, Garnett also argues that Russia is constrained in terms of its policy options, and holds that any ambitious neoimperial objectives Russia may hold towards the region can be curtailed if Russia works cooperatively with the West to

"muddle through" these differences. Finally, Coit Blacker injects his own American perspective, arguing that it is a "dangerous indulgence" for Russia to demand integration into Western institutions while also insisting on preserving its independence from, and autonomy within these European organizations. While he notes that this "contingent cooperation strategy" reflects the political pressures Russian leaders face from anti-Western domestic forces, he argues that it has strained Russia's international credibility, as well as confused and irritated the West, without whose support Russia will not be able to complete the painful process of political and economic transition. The problem, Blacker contends, is how to sustain a pro-Western integrationist foreign policy in the absence of meaningful domestic support. It is held that this pro-Western foreign policy is indispensable to the restoration of Russia's economic health and political well being.

However, while the U.S. policy-lens approach may be useful for those studying the implications of Russian foreign policy behaviour vis-à-vis American interests, it does not necessarily provide for a balanced and objective analysis overall. When reading the book, it is important to keep in mind that the argument that Russia can and should become like the West is typically American, and is made by those who wish to bring Russia on side with American foreign policy goals. Moreover, it is also necessary to recognize that this argument negates the possibility that it is a good thing to have a European power that constructively challenges Western international actions and hence keeps the West accountable and in check. Russia spans two continents – Europe and Asia, and all too often people assume that Russia ends at the Urals. While cooperative relations with the United States and Europe are indeed key to successful and productive Russian relations on the world stage, this approach should not preclude the formation of a distinctive identity and foreign policy that can act as a balance to Western unilateralism, as well as provide a useful link to the rising Asian powers such as China, India, and North Korea. It is clear that the authors of this book do not necessarily share this point of view. In particular, not only does Blacker's assessment of the foreign policies conducted by Kozyrev and Primakov following the shift in Russia's domestic political situation question the idea of Russian "national interests," but it only gives a cursory examination of Russia's attempts to create a balance through diversifying its foreign policy interests. Russia's relations with China and India are reduced to economics – forging closer ties with the East would "complicate, and in all likelihood retard" Russia's economic and political recovery. Again, writing from the American point of view, Blacker inevitably discounts that it may be beneficial for the international system in its entirety to have a strong European power than can act as a distinctive 'balancer' for both Western and Eastern interests.

Given the narrow lens through which this book conducts its analysis, it becomes clear as to why Mandelbaum's The *New Russian Foreign Policy* is difficult to find in Canadian stores and libraries. Nevertheless, the book does provide useful insight for those studying the subject, particularly if they are doing so with American interests in mind. Regardless of the authors' biases, the chapters provide detailed and relevant analyses of current Russian behaviour on the international scene, and allow for a deeper understanding of Russian actions via the examination of domestic political determinants. Taken with a grain of salt, this book is a valuable reference for scholars of international affairs.

--Lisa Bokwa

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REVIEW – THE WARRIOR'S HONOR

The assortment of reports and reflections that comprise Michael Ignatieff's collection *The Warrior's Honor* are the product of the author's four years of travel through what he describes as "the landscapes of modern ethnic war" - Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and Afghanistan. Out of these travels, Ignatieff introduces to the West tales of the new warrior, the "ethnic irregular." Particularly striking are his descriptions of the child soldier within this warrior class: "adolescents are supplying armies with a different kind of soldier - one for whom a weapon is not a thing to be respected or treated with ritual correctness but instead has a phallic dimension...to traverse a checkpoint in Bosnia where adolescent boys in dark glasses and tight-fitting combat khakis wield AK-47s is to enter a zone of toxic testosterone."

Compelling as they are, narratives like this oftentimes transform Ignatieff's text into a tabloid for the sophisticated mind. Yet, although he frequently engages in the type of journalistic voyeurism that he warns his reader against in his piece on "the Ethics of Television", (albeit in the medium of print), Ignatieff also attempts to provide answers to the questions that have plagued the globe since the end of the cold war. Why do we in the West feel that we have a moral obligation to become embroiled in the internal conflicts of distant lands? What inspires the hatred that drives "the new architects of postmodern war, the "paramilitaries, guerrillas, militias, and warlords" to engage in localized campaigns of violence and destruction? What path can we follow to pull us out from the midst of this new despair? In pondering these questions, Ignatieff produces some quite brilliant insights; in attempting to answer them he relies on a liberal ethic of moral universalism that has failed to produce the particularistic and practical solutions that are required not only where ethnic conflict has erupted into full scale warfare, but even in our own country where it simmers and broils beneath an ever precarious politics of accommodation.

Perhaps Ignatieff's greatest success in this volume is found in his description of the ambivalence prevalent in broader Western society that has likely informed much of his own experience as a reporter. In his piece "Is Nothing Sacred? The Ethics of Television" Ignatieff describes how we in the West process and understand the images of famine, war and other atrocities that reach us through our television sets. "These images," says Ignatieff, "could be interpreted in radically different ways, either as an instance of the promiscuous voyeurism a visual culture makes possible or as a hopeful example of the internationalization of conscience..the difficulty of course, is that both of these opposing interpretations may be true." Ignatieff is right in his assertion that much of the humanitarian action witnessed in the past decades was inspired by the medium of television - the footage of Ethiopia brought real action. He also correctly identifies the opposite effect that the bombardment with such images can have; we pause at a channel in the same way that we pause in front of an accident, but reposing in our armchairs we tire quickly of regions of the world where it seems that everyone is killing everyone, they are not like us, they are all insane.

That this latter sentiment is a disappointment to Ignatieff is clear. If only we could produce more documentaries rather than relying on prime-time news sound-bites that strip victors and victims alike of their humanity, then perhaps we could believe what he believes - we are all the same, distinguished only by individual differences that cut across race, language, ethnicity, culture. Within the chapter "the Narcissism of Minor Differences" Ignatieff begins to develop with more complexity

a theory of nationalism and the individual that rejects Samuel Huntington's premise that ethnic war accrues as a result of cultural and confessional differences that are so fundamental as to make violent conflict unsurprising, perhaps even inevitable. Ignatieff uses a poignant narrative with a Serbian irregular to illustrate to us just how illusory nationalist sentiment can be. When he asks the soldier to explain his hatred of Croats he get three answers. First, these are Serbian cigarettes; over there they smoke Croatian cigarettes. Second (after troubled reflection), Croats think they're better than us; they want to be gentlemen; they think they're fancy Europeans. Third (this time after no pause) we're all just Balkan shit. Ignatieff uses this example to illustrate his contention that "nationalism is a fiction" that requires "the willing suspension of disbelief." Presumably, the Serb in the narrative knew in his heart of hearts that he and his Croat neighbor were the same - but incredibly minor differences, a cigarette brand, a perceived attitude - could serve as the justification for senselessly taking the life of a brother.

Ignatieff turns to Sigmund Freud to find the psychology that will explain such irrationality. Freud noted from his clinical practice that "it is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of hostility between them." Freud memorably called this phenomenon "the narcissism of minor difference" and Ignatieff sees it as the key to the ethnic warfare of our time. In Ignatieff's mind particularistic nationalism is founded on the myth of difference. But he also admits that the panacea solution to ethnic particularism that he presents throughout the collections - liberal universalism - is also based on a fiction. Ignatieff tells us that in order to have access to the liberal and civic nationalism that will deliver us from particularistic strife, we must engage in a process of abstraction that says: "We are first and foremost juridical subjects, first and foremost equal citizens, equally entitled to a range of practices and protections; all differences are minor, and if they confer advantage, should be strenuously opposed."

How do we as a society engage in this constructive abstraction? Ignatieff encourages those of us who live in multicultural, multiethnic societies to embrace the liberal fiction in its entirety for the first time; to treat X, who may differ from us in religion, class, gender, race, age, as a rights bearing equal rather than a member of a group. Conversely, in his concluding chapter "the Nightmare from Which We are Trying to Awake," he beseeches those who do envisage their identity in terms of the group to emulate James Joyce, who said in *Portrait of the Artist,* "when the soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets." Our salvation, believes Ignatieff, lies in the separation of ourselves, and our willingness to separate others, from the myth of collective identity.

Perhaps Ignatieff is right. Perhaps we in multinational polities have not given the liberal democratic inspired dialogue of individual rights a chance to take root and flourish. But, and I believe this to be more likely the case, perhaps liberal democracy provides no compelling answers to the problems faced by the modern multinational society.

The human rights movement is impressive and ignoble, but we have to recognize today that it does not contain the solution to the paradox between nation and state. In many of the states where ethnic conflict boils today; Northern Ireland in the UK, the Basque Country in Spain; Kashmir in India, the liberal tradition has failed to inspire loyalty to the greater state, has failed to assuage the fears of national minority groups. Long subject to persecution and the denial of whom they are, these groups find little comfort in the promise that they will be treated as equals, that they will be accorded "individual rights." Afraid of losing their languages, their cultures and their traditions, yet simultaneously afraid that their children will be denied educational and economic opportunities if

they retain these vestiges of their identity, nations within nation-states desperately seek assurance.

What these groups seek in the assurance that they can survive as a collectivity without being alienated from society, are not individual but rather "collective" rights. Although many states, including our own, have been forced by political necessity and the threat of instability to accommodate the aspirations of minority groups, the world has been slow to recognize the validity of such claims. Having fought so hard to secure international recognition of the precepts that underlie theories of individual human rights; a belief in equality and in unity, we are loath to accord special status to the group. States that choose to extend special guarantees to collectivities face accusations of displaying bias in their definition and/or selection of which groups are eligible for protection. Above all is the fear that collective rights will undermine civic nationalism - the allegiance to the state based on legal guarantees and legitimate representation rather than on ethnicity, language and culture.

Yet in our own polity, we have recognized - albeit slowly and with a degree of success that cannot be debated here - that it is legitimate to feel allegiance to more than one entity within the state. While presumably most Canadians living outside Quebec direct their political allegiances to the federal government, many in Quebec may feel that their allegiance lies first and foremost with the province and only secondarily to the federal state. The federal structure is, of course, only one way that our society has accommodated the need to assure a minority collectivity that its legitimate concerns will be well represented. Canada also has a long tradition of constitutionalizing collective rights guarantees, for example, the minority language rights enshrined in s. 133 of the Constitution.

If my somewhat muted recollection of introductory psychology is correct, then Freud, while undoubtedly a brilliant academic and theoretician, was somewhat insensitive and ineffective in his clinical practice. If we are to find the solution to the ethnic conflicts which threaten the peaceful co-existence of us all, then we need to accept that which Ignatieff recognizes but wishes to deny, that "the nets do bind most of us...few of us can be artists of our own lives." Once we have accepted that the fear of loss of identity is real, that it is legitimate, we can work toward developing institutions that assuage those apprehensions.

There can be no doubt that Ignatieff has poetically captured the essence of both the individual and national psyche that lurks behind modern ethnic conflict. But no solution to the dilemma of the multiethnic state is found in his urging that we come awake, that we leave behind "lives spent in the twilight of myth and collective illusion," that we become self-conscious. Only concrete political action at the level of the state, and not a collective exercise in soul-searching, will bring internally warring nations out of the iron grip of ethnic turmoil. Unfortunately, while there are examples of group accommodation to draw from, the worst conflicts are occurring in countries that are far from possessing the internal institutional capacity or political will to implement such measures. Chances are that we cannot save the Rwandas and the Kosovos from their internal strife. But we can save ourselves. While we do what is possible to prevent the worst of atrocities elsewhere, let us not become complacent in our struggle to assure those in our own society who feel their identity to be at risk. Ignatieff is right: there is nothing in our natures that makes ethnic or racial conflict unavoidable, but history, even of very recent vintage, has proven that avoidance is no mean task.

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CLOSING IN ON THE GOVERNANCE GAP: A REVIEW OF BARRY EICHENGREEN'S TOWARD A NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: A PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA

Financial crises are the bane of the globalised economy's existence. More than two years have elapsed since the Asian crisis began and the international policy community is still putting forth compendia of specialised tweaks to the international financial architecture, in an effort to come to grips with its weak points. These proposed amendments to the institutions, structures and policies that make up the international financial architecture are rooted in the modern day ideological war over state involvement and market autonomy. Broadly speaking, recommendations for architectural improvements fall into two categories: state-based, which advocate the restraint of international capital flows[1]; and market-based, which support continued liberalisation. Barry Eichengreen's **Toward a New Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda**, falls under the capital liberating category, although his recommendations may further be described as "progressively market-based".

It is with reluctance that one accepts the grim realities that Eichengreen describes; that is, the inevitability of capital account liberalisation and recurring financial crises. His bottom line is that crises will happen, and this is reflected in his focus on crisis management, rather than crisis prevention or crisis prediction. In essence, Eichengreen participates in the pervasive neoliberal approach that dominates the current international financial architecture, and continues to justify a global financial system based on inequities of power and access. It is problematic that states are not reacting fast or forcefully enough to counterbalance the governance gap which opened up in the 1970s, after the fall of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates and controls on capital flows. The consequence may be that the gap is being filled such that interest groups promoting the market-led approach are benefitting at the expense of less powerful groups who rely on state regulation for protection.

Eichengreen insists that his recommendations are practical. What his "practical" analysis does not highlight is the interplay between ideas, interests and institutions, the result of which can also be referred to as the international financial architecture. In a somewhat contradictory manner, Eichengreen is wary of short term capital and warns emerging markets to decrease their dependence on foreign short term flows, in particular. Yet he also advocates the benefits of opening their borders to international banks, and at the same time attributes the depth of the Asian crisis to the nascence of securities markets and the dominance of banks, in Asian financial sectors. It leads one to think that beyond so-called practical visions for reform, what is lacking is some analysis of the structural imbalances that are indigenous to both the international financial architecture and the proposals that are put forth to reduce its crisis-prone nature.

Governance, whether it be led by states or markets, is critical to the global economy because of the preponderance of risk in the culture and climate of international capital flows. A governance gap is exemplified in the evolution of financial sectors in advanced industrialised countries, as banks and other financial intermediaries have increasingly been competing with "non-bank" institutions. In other words, as the competitive race has intensified among individuals, firms and economies, the drive to cut costs has also extended to the price of capital.[2] Banks traditionally incurred infrastructure costs in order to evaluate the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, administer and monitor loans, and litigate in cases of default. Banks

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[1] For a review of more state-based approaches see David Felix, "Repairing the Global Financial Architecture: Painting over Cracks vs. Strengthening the Foundations", **Foreign Policy In Focus**, Special Report, September 1999, http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/papers/gfa/index.html

[2] Timothy J. Sinclair, "Between State and Market: Hegemony and Institutions of Collective Action under Conditions of International Capital Mobility", **Policy Sciences**, no. 27, 1994, p. 449

are also required to meet capital adequacy standards, which mandate them to hold certain ratios of assets to loans outstanding. The result, however**,** is a higher cost of capital compared to that prevailing in equity markets.

If one accepts the premise that in the past, financial intermediaries played a stronger part in the governance of international financial flows, then clearly their reduced role in the global governance system opens up a gap. Timothy Sinclair's theory, designed to explain the rise of global bond rating agencies such as US-based Moody's and Standard and Poors, is one way of demonstrating how that governance gap may have been filled. In his view, banks traditionally served a public function by regulating financial markets, and acted to control risks and reduce the uncertainties for the political authorities, as well as for borrowers and lenders.[3] Whether rating agencies are influential enough to act as "private makers of public policy" may be unknown, but this is an example of a new institution filling the gap, one which neither borrows nor lends and thus has entirely different legal obligations from banks. The influence of these new institutions on macroeconomic policy making is not often a topic of public debate, yet the difficulties of allowing non-governmental institutions who are removed from the borrower-lender relationship to govern are fairly obvious. To whom are these actors accountable? How are they regulated?

Eichengreen advocates a combination of market and state governance, for example, in the creation of international standards. Internationally recognised standards seem to complement globalised activity of any kind, particularly in this case because financial flows are nimble and difficult to trace across state borders. Eichengreen pays special attention to international standards for auditing and accounting practices, effective creditor rights, investor protection laws, and fair and expeditious corporate bankruptcy procedures. His market-based solution, however, is to allow existing private sector bodies to negotiate the standards, and then require governments and international institutions to monitor and enforce them. He suggests that the IMF and other multilateral organisations could participate in the standard-setting process simply through active consultation with private sector groups.

His view may be that states' roles should be minimal, but why public bodies would favour such a hands-off approach to governance when the aftermath of a crisis is their responsibility, is not clear. In terms of feasibility, the approach of relying on private sector bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Committee and the International Corporate Governance Network, and international committees of national financial regulators such as the Basle Committee, may be simple because coordination is a part of the mandates of those organisations. However, to reduce the policy making process to handing over private sector and central bankers' wish lists to public bodies with enforcement mechanisms, is unrealistic, as well as a poor reflection of negotiations between countries who espouse Western democratic ideals.

Among market-led approaches, what characterises Eichengreen's views as "new" is his recommendation to "bail in" private sector investors, in the event of a crisis. Traditional approaches to crises, he argues, are too limited. They have included: (1) institutional bailouts by the IMF and central banks; and (2) privileging the "invisible hand" of the competitive market by watching banks collapse and economies suffer. Eichengreen's third, market-based alternative, is to force international investors to "take a hit" by agreeing to restructure loan payments with the banks and governments in crisis. Typically, capital is not written down to reflect actual asset values as interest rates fluctuate. If interest rates are rising, then asset values that are kept at their "book value" levels are no longer applicable and should be lowered to reflect the realities of the crisis. Banks could then suspend debt payments if necessary, and stay afloat by paying out amounts that reflect the current availability of capital. Eichengreen's practicality is again called into question here, not only because he is suggesting that national accounting practices be changed, but also because he is suggesting that many governments simultaneously adopt the same practices. As with other political dimensions of his

[3] Sinclair, p. 450

recommendations, he does not offer any advice on how to instigate these policy changes, other than delegating duties to states and multilateral organisations such as the IMF.

The "bailing in" concept is a market based solution with implicit, but understated, state involvement. Loans could be restructured if changes were introduced to loan and bond contracts, and international creditors' committees were created. However, the introduction of such clauses into loan contracts would only be possible if interests converged and states decided to cooperate by making legislative and regulatory changes simultaneously. The second component - having committees of creditors on standby, ready to jump-start negotiations between creditors and debtors in the case of a crisis **-** would require governments, central banks and the IMF to lobby reluctant market participants to create these committees. Representatives of the creditor community would include bondholders, banks, hedge funds, and others. Their purpose would be to overcome informational problems and reduce transactions costs. The recommendations of these committees would be nonbinding on the part of bondholders, but the borrowers and lenders would presumably reach agreement faster with their assistance.

After reflecting on Eichengreen's proposals, one is left with the feeling that perhaps Eichengreen is seeking to solve the wrong problem. His practical focus on strengthening institutions and contractual agreements while maintaining an efficient level of systemic risk, may lead him to propose improvements that bear the same structural flaws as the principles upon which the international financial system is based. For this reason, the risk-loving culture that financial and economic relations are embedded in needs to be examined critically. Eichengreen's deterministic agenda contains too little acknowledgement of the level of state involvement that is actually required to effectively govern international financial activity. His neoliberal denial of the political complexity of global governance seems naive. It also stresses the academic distance between disciplines that must be bridged before economists come to terms with changes in political processes, such as growing demands on the part of civil society, to be involved in international policy making. In the end, it matters whether states or markets lead the global governance process, but what matters more is reducing the economic violence that seemingly distant participants in the global economy may feel.

-Natasha Parriag

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