THE HONEST COUNSELOR: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

Andrew Brunatti
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

ABSTRACT

This paper is meant to address the role of the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister (NSAPM), which was created under Canada's post-9/11 National Security Policy of April 2004. The NSAPM was created with very little in the way of an identifiable mandate, save for the general responsibility of coordinating national security policy and this leaves open the possibility for significant problems. While the National Security Advisor is new to the Canadian framework, it has a long history in the United States government as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA). This paper examines the major formative points in the history of the U.S. position to address lessons that have been learned. This examination is then used to address how the Canadian government should approach the formulation of its own National Security Advisor in order to achieve successful results. The conclusion reached is that the NSAPM needs to be an active, yet honest, counselor to the Prime Minister and to the cabinet on national security issues. The paper presents several ways to operationalise this concept, including that the NSAPM relinquish its more direct role in the Canadian intelligence community to a new Deputy National Security Advisor for Intelligence (DNSA-I) in order to maintain bureaucratic neutrality and to ensure better overall national security and intelligence community management.

INTRODUCTION

In 2004, former Prime Minister Paul Martin put forth Canada's new National Security Policy: *Securing an Open Society*. The policy was designed to guide Canada in the post-9/11 world, ensuring that the country could respond to transnational and dynamic threats that were in many cases much more difficult to identify and counter than during the Cold War. The reorganization outlined within the National Security Policy of 2004 was Canada's answer to similar reorganizations that had been taking place in many states across the globe, all with the prime goal of fusing national security policy and intelligence more closely in order to meet newly dynamic transnational threats. More recently, the American invasion of Iraq illustrates the importance of ensuring that, as much as possible, policy be based around intelligence and not the opposite. While it is highly unlikely that the adoption of a single bureaucratic change will meet all these requirements, what is certain is that the management of the national security community and the policy advice given to the Prime Minister will be very significant factors in ensuring that Canada is ready to meet the national security environment of the 21st century.

This work focuses on one of the changes contained within Canada's National Security Policy, specifically the creation of the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister (NSAPM). The national security advisor, or a similar position, has a longer history in the governments of many of Canada's closest allies; examples from these states, specifically the

United States, will provide the basis for analysis of the current Canadian situation and for the final recommendations that come out of this paper. Furthermore, this analysis will address how the NSAPM should manage the Canadian intelligence community in relation to the rest of the national security establishment, putting a strong focus on the need to ensure policy-neutral intelligence as an ingredient to executive national security policymaking.

Ultimately, it is argued here that Canada should expand on its adoption of a U.S.-style national security advisor by ensuring that it is a powerful position with regular access to the prime minister on all foreign policy and national security matters (akin to a 'special assistant' status), and that the NSAPM should appoint a Deputy National Security Advisor for intelligence. These two positions, and their executive status, would centralize national security policymaking and intelligence community management in a single office, ensuring that the products of the intelligence community fit national priorities while maintaining the utmost level of policy neutrality, and, ultimately, making this intelligence the basis for the national security policymaking process.

PARLIAMENTARY PRECEDENT

Partly by default, the primary example used in this paper is the U.S. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), now more commonly referred to simply as the National Security Advisor (Baker 2007, 106). The example of the APNSA is relied upon here primarily because the position's longer existence means a more thorough analysis can be carried out on how the position best functions, and what responsibilities are most appropriate to it.

It may be argued that this comparison is difficult to make, considering the Canadian position of the NSAPM was implemented in a parliamentary system of government, while the APNSA is based on the presidential system. While this concern is valid, it is becoming apparent that a difference in governmental systems is not considered overly important when creating a national security advisor, and that the personal nature of the advisor's position enables it to operate within each system. Israel, which operates a parliamentary system of government, created a National Security Advisor to the prime minister in 1999 (Halevy 2006, 237). Former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy held the position of National Security Advisor in Israel from 2002-2003 (ibid.).

India, another example of parliamentary system, created a national security advisor in 1998 (Subash, 2000). India's example, although relatively young, is especially interesting for Canada, considering its similar governmental system and British colonial history. The Indian national security reform, through which that country's National Security Advisor was created, appears to blend aspects of the American and British national security machineries, such as a joint intelligence committee, *in addition to* a national security advisor (ibid).

The United Kingdom itself has for some time had a Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister, who is considered the U.K. counterpart to the U.S. APNSA in everything but name. During Tony Blair's government, the Foreign Policy Advisor had an especially close relationship with the prime minister (BBC 2003; Tenet 2007, 309). The status of the U.K.'s Foreign Policy Advisor was demonstrated after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 when, while air traffic in the United States was completely shut down on Sept. 12, a U.K. private aircraft was allowed into U.S. airspace. Its passengers were Sir Richard Dearlove (chief of the Secret Intelligence Service), Eliza Manningham-Buller (Deputy Director General of the Security Service), and the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor, Sir David Manning (Tenet 2007, 174).

These cases show that a national security advisor, or a similar position, can indeed function effectively in a parliamentary system of government, and that an analysis of the American APNSA is apt considering its historically premier position. India in particular has implemented a committee-based national security and intelligence community management framework, but has created the National Security Advisor as its overall chief (Subash 2000). This appears to the be the direction in which Canada is moving, considering the creation of not only the NSAPM within the 2004 National Security Policy, but also the National Security Advisory Committee which reports to the NSAPM (Privy Council's Office 2004, vii; Privy Council's Office 2005, 8). Therefore, while there are subtle differences between presidential and parliamentary national security frameworks, the national security advisor appears to play an increasingly important role in both systems.

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (APNSA)

Creation of the NSC System

The analysis of the case of the United States will take the form of two general steps: an overview of key developments in how the U.S. position has been executed throughout its existence; and what lessons this lends to how the Canadian NSAPM should function in its management of the national security community, and more specifically the intelligence community.

It is necessary to begin with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 which laid out the basis for the U.S. national security community. The act created, among other bodies and functions, the Department of Defence (DoD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC) (Rothkopf 2005, 28). Section 101(c) of the act states, "(t)he Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian Executive Secretary who shall be appointed by the President"(United States Congress, July 26 1947). In this statement, one finds the beginnings of the APNSA position.

Under presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, the NSC Executive Secretary acted just as the name suggests it would: managing NSC meetings, the in- and out-flow of policy decisions, and the coordination of NSC-related committees such as the Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board (Falk 1964, 420-23). A considerable drawback of the NSC system was that the members of the Council who were also department or agency heads (Secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Director of Central Intelligence, etc.) began relying heavily on their departmental analysis for what they brought to NSC meetings (ibid). This made it difficult for the president to gain independent analysis that bridged all the departments. To help remedy this, Eisenhower created a second position above the NSC Executive Secretary, which was directly within the Office of the President. In 1953, Robert Cutler was appointed the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), and what is now known as the national security advisor was born (Rothkopf 2005, 65). Throughout the Eisenhower administration, however, the APNSA continued in a weak organizational role. The election of John F. Kennedy in January, 1961 was to change this significantly.

Bundy of the White House

If the APNSA had continued to function as it had under Eisenhower's administration, it is unlikely that many people would be aware of its existence now. When John F. Kennedy was elected to the presidency, he appointed McGeorge Bundy as his national security advisor. Both men had taken an interest in the results of the Jackson Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, which had faulted the Eisenhower NSC system as being too rigid and a paper mill, churning out memos with little return (Preston 2006, 39-40).

To suit the more informal and dynamic Kennedy presidency, the Operations Coordinating Board and the Planning Board were abolished, and the NSC staff was cut down and reorganized into a geographically focused group of specialists (Preston 2006, 40-41). In the place of the OCB, Bundy created the National Security Action Memo (NSAM) series, which were memos written by the President, Bundy, or Bundy's deputy on specific national security decisions. The memos were distributed to all relevant departments and agencies. Because the NSAMs held executive authority, adherence to their instructions was assumed by all (ibid).

While these largely bureaucratic changes streamlined the national security system, Bundy also implemented a vast series of innovations which continued to increase the standing of the APNSA. Bundy's office moved from the Old Executive Office Building to the basement of the West Wing, increasing by a great amount the proximity of the APNSA to the president in a building where proximity is all-important (Preston 2006, 46). Also, after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, when it was deemed that the president was not receiving enough information from the departments, Bundy created the White House Situation Room, which would receive copies of all diplomatic and national security-related communications and would be overseen by the APNSA and members of the NSC staff (Bohn 2003, 2-3).

After the death of JFK in 1963 and the swearing-in of Lyndon Johnson to the Presidency, Bundy not only kept his role as national security advisor, but increased his standing. Johnson did not enjoy the formality of actual NSC meetings, and opted for even more impersonal decision making. At the same time however, he limited the number of people with open access to his office. As a result, while the NSC staff's influence declined because they no longer had direct access to the president, the APNSA's influence grew (Preston 2001, 635-59).

Even with the growing influence of Bundy's position, his acute understanding of his role ensured that he enjoyed productive and congenial relationships with important NSC members and presidential staff. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated in his memoirs that Bundy was by far the most able national security advisor he has seen in forty years (Preston 2006, 248). There is little to support the claim that Bundy tried at any point to upstage Dean Rusk as Secretary of State, even while frustration with Rusk's indecisiveness was obvious (Preston 2001, 654). His relationship with other presidential aides such as Theodore Sorensen and Bill Moyers was equally amiable (Bock 1987, Chapters on Kennedy and Johnson). While this may seem like an unnecessary point, it must be remembered, as will be examined below, that one of the national security advisor's main functions is to ensure coordination among all members of the national security community, and this cannot be effectively done without productive relationships.

Iran-Contra and the Tower Commission

McGeorge Bundy was given greatly increased power during his five years as national security advisor. While he exercised this power impressively, it appears that he also knew the responsible limits to his position. Those who came after him into the APNSA position were

caught on the slippery slope created by a largely undefined position and were not nearly as self-limiting as Bundy.

During the decades between Kennedy's election and the Tower Commission investigation into Iran-Contra, the APNSA steadily gained more power and took on new roles. By the time Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter became APNSA consecutively during the Reagan administration, the NSC staff and the national security advisor had, in fact, taken on an operational role. McFarlane and NSC staffer Oliver North covertly visited Iran to arrange arms deals to the Iranian government in exchange for the release of western hostages held by Hezbollah. The profits from these covert transactions were then used to finance Contra rebels in Nicaragua (Prados 1991, 512-36). These actions broke several U.S. laws and, when the scandal broke, the national security advisor, who is ultimately supposed to protect the interests of the president in national security and foreign policy affairs, was found to be a central figure in a scandal that shook the Reagan presidency to the core and severely damaged the White House's reputation.

A Presidential Special Review Board, headed by John Tower, was formed to investigate the Iran-Contra affair and propose changes that would prohibit such an event from happening again. Known as the Tower Commission, the review board's final report was taken as the blueprint for a wave of national security management reforms (Powell 1995, 335-36; Inderfurth & Johnson *Fateful Decisions* 2004, 285-88).

Colin Powell, who was Deputy APNSA 1986-87 and then APNSA 1987-89, stated that the Tower Commission's final report was the 'Bible' from which both he and Frank Carlucci (APNSA 86-87) worked in the last years of the Reagan administration to reform the NSC staff and APNSA's roles and mandates (Powell 1995, 335). When George H.W. Bush was elected to the presidency, he appointed General Brent Scowcroft as his APNSA. Scowcroft had served on the Tower Commission and cemented the post-Iran-Contra reform process at the NSC (Inderfurth & Johnson 2004, 285). Importantly, Scowcroft, as the APNSA during the Bush administration, reverted to a role very similar to that molded during McGeorge Bundy's time as APNSA. He enjoyed a close relationship with the president, was held in high respect by his colleagues through his 'honest broker' execution of the APNSA office, and was active both as a process manager and presidential counselor (Gates 1996, 457-58). Like Bundy, Scowcroft had an excellent understanding of what his role as APNSA was supposed to be, and, possibly more importantly, what it should not be – he tailored it to suit both the presidency and the changing times.

Levels of Activism of the APNSA

The above examples explain the development of the APNSA's role; however, it is necessary to examine the overall trends in this development in order to determine where the national security advisor has failed, and where it has succeeded. The classification typology produced by Cecil V. Crabb and Kevin Mulcahy will be used to define how certain national security advisors have executed their roles, and will indicate several interesting lessons for Canada's National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister.

Figure 1 in the Appendix summarizes Crabb and Mulcahy's examination of the APNSA's activism levels (2004, 181). It consists of five levels of activism ranging from a low-level 'administrator' classification up to a high-level 'insurgent' classification, and plots each holder of the position along this spectrum. As one can see, the level of involvement of the APNSA rises sharply to the 'counselor' classification with the changes instituted by Bundy during the

Kennedy administration. Activism continues a steady rise until wildly and dangerously fluctuating during the Reagan administration and the Iran-Contra scandal. After the Tower Commission, Carlucci and Powell even out the APNSA's role. Finally, under Scowcroft (during George H.W. Bush's administration), it returns to the level that Bundy had operated at under Kennedy.

The variables used to determine the positioning of each APNSA are generally the two spheres of the APNSA's activity: their responsibility for policymaking, and their responsibility for policy implementation (Crabb & Mulcahy 1991, 176-190). The administrator classification has a low responsibility in both spheres, while the agent has a high responsibility in each and therefore a high level of activism. The coordinator has a high policy-implementation responsibility, but little to do with policymaking, and the counselor has a high policymaking responsibility, but less to do in the sphere of policy implementation. These variables are illustrated in Figure 2 of the Appendix.

Of course, it is interesting to note from Figure 1 that the typology allows enough flexibility to consider the individual preferences of each administration, and the slightly different responsibilities for each APNSA that can result. For instance, while both McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Rostow are considered counselors, Bundy's responsibilities in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were higher than Rostow's, and therefore Bundy lands a somewhat higher level of activism within the same categorization.

The 'Ideal'

In order to adequately justify the necessary level of activism and a number of key ingredients for a successful Canadian National Security Advisor, it is apparent that an 'ideal' must be forged from the example of the U.S. APNSA. Some may argue that this is an impossible task considering that each national security advisor must ultimately adapt to the executive and administration that they serve. This however ignores the fact that there are still underlying requirements and roles that the national security advisor must fulfill based on the community they manage and the global geostrategic environment that defines national security priorities.

Some may argue, especially after the Iran-Contra debacle, that the national security advisor's role should be closer to a coordinator, or on the more passive end of Crabb and Mulcahy's typology. While this is an understandable reaction to either the overpowering presence of Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford presidencies, or the abuses of the Iran-Contra era, it does not take into account the hugely increasing scope of national security policy. Crabb and Mulcahy stated that the coordinator and administrator positions were now accepted as too weak to be successful considering the expanding responsibilities of the national security community in a post-Cold War world (1991, 190). Strong and dynamic management is needed, considering this expansion of responsibility and the corresponding expansion of players that are to be managed under presidential authority.

The insurgent and agent classifications are also far from optimal. John Poindexter's activities as APNSA during the Iran-Contra era brought the advisor and NSC staff into an operational role they were neither prepared nor mandated for, and resulted in a massive embarrassment for the very institution whose interests the advisor is meant to safeguard (Crabb & Mulcahy 1991, 181-85). Karl Inderfurth and Lock K. Johnson, two long-time observers of the U.S. NSC system, summed it up:

> The wide swings between passive and assertive advisors proved both inadequate (the administrator and coordinator roles failed to assist the president in grappling with policy choices) and dangerous (the insurgents brought to the nation the Iran-contra affair). (Inderfurth and Johnson 2004, 275)

It is necessary to note that, while there have been four APNSA's following Brent Scowcroft's tenure under George H.W. Bush, there is only enough space here to address defining moments. It appears that these four APNSAs (Lake, Berger, Rice and Hadley) have tried to maintain Scowcroft's model, admittedly with varying degrees of success. Ultimately, the APNSA has settled on the role of 'counselor' mainly out of necessity, as the growing complexity of national security issues need to have an active yet limited advisor to the chief executive (Inderfurth and Johnson 2004, 275). For Canada, this lesson is also very relevant. While the U.S. APNSA has gone through a trial-and-error history, finally settling on the role of a counselor, this should be an indication to Canadian observers that this is the best place to start the mandate for the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister.

With the Role, What Responsibilities?

While much time has been spent discussing the overall role a national security advisor should likely take within a modern administration, it is also necessary to examine what responsibilities such an advisor should take on. Through this examination, it will be easier to determine how the Canadian NSAPM should best handle specific circles within the larger national security community, such as the intelligence community.

Several authors have offered a catalogue of what responsibilities the U.S. APNSA has been asked to execute. This paper uses the list of APNSA responsibilities laid out by Bradley H. Patterson Jr. in his work *Ring of Power: The White House Staff and Their Expanding Role in Government* (1988). It has been cross-referenced with former APNSA Colin Powell's article 'The NSC Advisor: Process Manager and More' (2004). Patterson's chapter on the APNSA lists eight responsibilities that have been ascribed to the national security advisor at one point or another through its decades of existence in the U.S. system: 1-Process Manager, 2-Source of Independent Policy Advice, 3-Packager of Information, 4-Monitor of Policy Execution, 5-Negotiator, 6-Crisis Manager, 7-Articulator of Policies, 8-Operator (Patterson 1988, Ch.8).

To start, it is necessary to immediately decrease this list by three items. It was already discussed that the preferred role for a national security advisor has become that of a counselor (continuing with the previously discussed typology.) Therefore, the responsibility of operator can be discounted. Also, the responsibility of articulating policies to the public should be deleted from the national security advisor's desired responsibilities. In most governments, there is a secretary of state, foreign minister, or in Canada's case, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is the accepted head of the government's chief foreign policy department. If the national security advisor was to begin articulating foreign policy to the public, there would be confusion as to who is in fact making foreign policy (Bock 1987, 184). The responsibility of negotiator will also be eliminated for the same reason, and also because it strays very close to operational boundaries.

Of the responsibilities that are left, the most important are that of acting as a process manager and acting as a source of independent policy advice. Because Canada does not have a national security council similar to that of the United States, Israel, or India, the NSAPM's responsibility as a process manager becomes even more important. The PM's Cabinet acts as the main forum for foreign policy formulation, but at the same time must deal with all domestic policy issues. The lack of a dedicated foreign policy and national security forum means that the

NSAPM must put even more emphasis on acting as the process manager and 'honest broker,' to ensure that all departments and agencies dealing with national security get equal access to the PM (Inderfurth & Johnson 2004, 271-72). Former APNSA Brent Scowcroft, considered by many the epitome of the 'honest broker' national security advisor, states that:

> … if you are not the honest broker, you don't have the confidence of the other members of the NSC. If you don't have their confidence, then the system doesn't work, because they will go around you to get to the president and then you fracture the system. (ibid.)

This is also true for the Canadian case. The NSAPM must behave as an honest broker, but at the same time have the power and executive backing to do so, especially considering this may mean reinforcing the bureaucratic system against department ministers who feel they can bypass regular lines of communication to get to the prime minister.

Acting as a source of independent policy advice is a responsibility which the NSAPM must hold as equally important in Canada for the same reasons the APNSA must do likewise in the U.S. system. Key foreign policy or national security figures are also cabinet ministers (ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Safety), and they are in charge of agencies or departments that come with their own ideologies and policy preferences. It must be the job of the NSAPM to ensure the information coming from department chiefs is accurate, and that dissenting information is not suppressed. Colin Powell, commenting on this responsibility in the case of the U.S. APNSA, states that the adviser "cannot allow unpleasant information to be shunted aside. He cannot allow minority views to be ignored because they do not reflect the consensus view" (Powell 2004, 160). Powell's words support the conclusion that a national security advisor must independently present policy views to the chief executive if these views are not being brought forward by the department and agency heads.

The above factors also play into the third and fourth necessary responsibilities, namely acting as a packager of information, and a monitor of policy execution. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, it was apparent that the president was not receiving all the relevant information needed to make proper decisions. As previously mentioned, Bundy remedied this by creating the White House Situation Room (Bohn 2003, 2-3). In the case of the United States, it was then up to the advisor and the NSC staff to synthesize all the incoming paper into coherent reports and updates for the president. This can, and should, be mirrored by the NSAPM in Canada through its position in the Privy Council Office, which acts as the nerve center for the federal government and centralizes the flow of information to the PM's office. The path of information to the PM would also make for the simplest method of monitoring the implementation of policy decisions, a role that has been historically accepted for national security advisors in the United States since the National Security Act of 1947, in order to ensure that policy implementation does not stagnate at different points through the bureaucracy.

While an examination has now been made of the ideal role and resulting responsibilities of a national security advisor, it is now important to take this examination and draw from it some basic conclusions for the Canadian National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. What is necessary for the NSAPM do to its job effectively?

NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Bureaucratic Muscle

As has been shown, it was necessary for McGeorge Bundy in 1961 to strengthen the position of the APNSA in relation to the cabinet-level NSC members in order to effectively manage the system for the chief executive. While national security concerns are only growing in complexity, a weakening of the advisor's position could be as detrimental as an over-strengthening of it. The NSAPM in the Canadian system must be given the bureaucratic power that will be necessary to protect the prime minister's interests, manage potentially difficult department heads, present unpopular information, and ensure that decisions are implemented through the full realm of government. The NSAPM can most easily guarantee this bureaucratic power by being directly tied to the Prime Minister's Office through a status akin to the U.S. APNSA's 'Assistant to the President' title (and the executive power it affords), and independent of any department or agency save the Privy Council's Office.

Close Proximity to the Prime Minister

Because the NSAPM ultimately serves the prime minister and the cabinet as a manager of the national security community, it is imperative that the advisor have close proximity to the chief executive in order to anticipate the needs and preferences of the PM and cabinet. In the case of the United States, the system has worked best when the president and his national security advisor have had a close relationship. In his seminal article on McGeorge Bundy, David Halberstam wrote, " 'Godamnit Mac,' someone heard Kennedy say, 'I've been arguing with you about this all week,' and *that* was power, the access to argue all week long" (Halberstam 1969, 22). Bundy and Kennedy were extremely close, as were Scowcroft and George H.W. Bush (Ibid 22, 27, 29 and Bush & Scowcroft 1998). The effectiveness of the systems these APNSAs instituted were due partly to their understanding of their role, and partly to their relationship with the presidents, born out of a close proximity which allowed them to best serve the chief executive and the NSC principles. The same proximity must be given to the NSAPM in the Canadian system, by ensuring that the advisor has open and regular access to the PM and cabinet-level ministers.

Strategic Thinker

In order to be an effective process manager, independent policy advisor, and honest broker, the NSAPM must operate at a strategic, not tactical, level. That is to say the advisor must operate at a level above that of the managers of specific sectors of the larger national security community, such as the intelligence community. The very essence of the advisor is that they will operate independently of major departments or agencies, and in a way that attempts to guarantee cohesiveness of national security policy throughout the government.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Policy-Neutral Intelligence

The natural place to start this work's discussion on intelligence as it relates to the Canadian NSAPM is on the current debate within intelligence studies over whether intelligence

should be policy-relevant or policy-neutral. Policy-relevant intelligence is considered intelligence which is tailored around pre-conceived policy requirements, while policy-neutral intelligence is intelligence which would inform policy-making decisions by telling the policymakers what they *need* to hear, as opposed to what they might *want* to hear (Caparini 2002, 6-7).

Reliance on policy-relevant intelligence is dangerous in that it leaves open the possibility that policymakers will not be made aware of indicators which suggest a policy is flawed (Caparini 2002, 6-7). One analysis of the problems with the Bush administration's war planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq states that the administration, "[conceptualized] its positions prior to the consultation of intelligence estimates or military planners," and the planners "[forced] often contradictory military and civilian intelligence to support their preconceived expectations and assessments" (Fitzgerald and Lebow 2006, 889). With this in mind, there must be emphasis on ensuring a certain amount of policy-neutrality in intelligence.

Intelligence Community Management

Wesley Wark states that one of the major issues facing modern-day intelligence communities is maintaining and strengthening the coordination between the producers and consumers of the intelligence community's product (Wark, 2003, 179). Martin Rudner takes this directly to a more Canadian perspective stating that one of the fundamental challenges to the Canadian intelligence community is the "weak capacity for co-ordination of Canada's decentralized and diverse security and intelligence community" (2002, 163).

These statements, made by two observers of the Canadian intelligence community, indicate the need for Canada to have an intelligence community manager similar to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. Currently however, this role is filled most by the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, as stated by the current NSAPM, Margaret Bloodworth (Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 2007). This cannot remain the case. As discussed, the advisor must remain an honest broker, independent of any specific department or agency (or in this case group of agencies) within the national security community. As manager of the Canadian intelligence community, the NSAPM runs the risk of losing credibility with other departments or bodies, such as Foreign Affairs or the Canadian Forces. The advisor risks being seen as too close to the interests of the intelligence agencies.

While it is imperative for the NSAPM to maintain the honest broker status, it is also necessary for the office of the NSAPM to have a close relationship with the IC in order to ensure it receives strategic policy-neutral product from the community. Because the NSAPM would ultimately act as the process manager for the national security community, it puts the advisor in the best position to ensure that the intelligence product is fused correctly into the policymaking process. This presents a predicament in that there is need for intelligence community management in Canada; it should not be done by the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, but it should be done by somebody closely affiliated with both entities.

Deputy National Security Advisor for Intelligence

The second aspect of this paper's thesis is that there should be a Deputy National Security Advisor specifically tasked with intelligence community management in order to alleviate the predicament discussed above. The DNSA-I would operate directly under the NSAPM; however, the position would have a mandate similar to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence.

The DNSA-I's creation would have effects throughout the IC and its corresponding review and oversight bodies, but these effects would likely not be profound. The DNSA-I would essentially be acting in the coordinating function which the NSAPM is currently performing, and would free the NSAPM of direct IC management, allowing the advisor to be purely strategic and independent. A DNSA-I would also provide a purely intelligence-dedicated figure for oversight and review bodies to address when concerned about the policies governing the intelligence community, or when they require clarification about what instructions the IC members have been given.

It is necessary here to address the role of the Integrated Threat Assessment Center, or ITAC, which was also created under the new direction of the Canadian National Security Policy. While there is little information on ITAC, its role as described in a backgrounder on the ITAC website is stated as "[producing] comprehensive threat assessments, which are distributed within the intelligence community and to first-line responders (…) on a timely basis" (ITAC Backgrounder 2007, 2). While ITAC provides major Canadian security agencies a venue in which to coordinate general threat assessment functions, it appears to have a weak role in actively managing the intelligence community, and virtually no role in coordinating policy implementation. If an active role in intelligence community coordination which goes beyond threat assessment is desired for ITAC, appointing its director as the DNSA-I could have the appropriate effect if accompanied by the necessary powers.

With the creation of the DNSA-I, the NSAPM could remain the honest broker and independent counselor necessary to the successful execution of their role. However, maintaining the intelligence community manager's position within the NSAPM's office in the form of a deputy directs the flow of policy-neutral intelligence product into a single office, which can then synthesize it with the overall policymaking process.

CONCLUSION

The National Security Policy which PM Paul Martin introduced in 2004 put security back on the political map as a priority for Canada. The creation of the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister formed a dynamic new position with true potential. However, if this potential is to be recognized, it is necessary to learn from history while anticipating the future.

Canada needs a strong National Security Advisor with open, regular access to the prime minister on all national security matters. The NSAPM must also have a Deputy National Security Advisor for Intelligence to provide intelligence community management, allowing the NSAPM to maintain the role and responsibilities that allow a national security advisor to be truly effective. These two positions and their executive power could effectively fuse the national security policymaking process with the product of Canada's intelligence community, resulting in balanced, educated policies and better overall management.

Canada must examine new possibilities for its national security community in the 21st Century. Al Qaeda will not be the last transnational threat, and the 9/11 attacks, the invasion of Iraq, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, and many other occurrences indicate that security will remain a paramount concern for many states throughout the world. In addition, issues such as Arctic sovereignty, global warming, and numerous trade disputes indicate that the very definition of what is considered a 'national security priority' could change drastically in the coming century. It is paramount that Canada has a national security community prepared to face, and overcome, these eventualities.

APPENDIX

Figure 1—APNSA Activism Levels



Figure 2—APNSA Activism Variables



*Figure 1 is drawn from Crabb and Mulcahy's chapter in Inderfurth and Johnson's *Fateful Decisions*, and Figure 2 is drawn from Crabb and Mulcahy's book 'American National Security: A Presidential Perspective.'

REFERENCE LIST

Baker, James E. 2007. *In the Common Defense: National Security Law for Perilous Times*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

BBC. 2003. "Profile: Sir David Manning." BBC News Online. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3159419.stm

Bock, Joseph G. 1987. *The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant: Friendship and Friction at the Water's Edge*. New York, NY: Greenwood Press.

Bohn, Michael K. 2003. *Nerve Center: Inside the White House Situation Room*. Washington, DC: Brassey's.

Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft. 1998. *A World Transformed*. New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf.

Caparini, Marina. 2002. *Challenges of Control and Oversight of Intelligence Services in a Liberal Democracy*. Conference Paper. Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Crabb, Cecil V., and Kevin V. Mulcahy. 1991. *American National Security: A Presidential Perspective*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing.

------. 2004. "The Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair for National Security Policy Making." In *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*, edited by Karl F. Inderfurth and Lock K. Johnson, 162-172. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Falk, Stanley L. 1964. 'The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy." *Political Science Quarterly* 79(3):403-434.

Fitzgerald, Michael and Richard N. Lebow. 2006. "Iraq: The Mother of all Intelligence Failures." *Intelligence and National Security* 21(5):884-909.

Gates, Robert M. 1996. *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They won the Cold War*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

Halberstam, David. 1969. "The Very Expensive Education of McGeorge Bundy." *Harper's Magazine*.239(1430):21-41.

Halevy, Ephraim. 2006. *Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led the Mossad*. New York, NY: St Martin's Press.

Inderfurth, Karl F., and Lock K. Johnson. 2004. "The Evolving Role of the National Security Advisor: From Exectuvie Secretary to Activist Counselor." *White House Studies* 4(3):265-79

Integrated Threat Assessment Centre. 2007. *ITAC Backgrounder*. ITAC-CEIM. http://www.itac-ciem.gc.ca/md/bckgrndr/bckgrndr13-eng.pdf

Kapila, Subash. 2000. *India's National Security Council-A Critical Review*. South Asia Analysis Group. http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper123.html

Prados, John. 1991. *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush*. New York, NY: William Morrow and Company.

Preston, Andrew. 2006. *The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.

------. 2001. "The Little State Department: McGeorge Bundy and the National Security Council Staff, 1961-65." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 31(4):635-659.

Privy Council's Office. 2004. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Privy Council's Office. 2005. *Securing an Open Society: One Year Later-Progress Report on the Implementation of Canada's National Security Policy*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. March 26, 2007. *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence: Issue 13-Evidence*. Senate of Canada. http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/13ev-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=39&Ses=1&comm_id=76

Powell, Colin. 1995. *My American Journey*. New York, NY: Random House.

------. 2004. "The NSC Advisor: Process Manager and More." In *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*, edited by Karl F. Inderfurth and Lock K. Johnson, 158-161. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Rothkopf, David J. 2005. *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Pow*er. New York, NY: BBS Public Affairs.

Rudner, Martin. 2002. "Contemporary Threats, Future Tasks: Canadian intelligence and the Challenges of Global Security." In *Canada Among Nations 2002: A Fading Power*, edited by Norman Hilmer and Maureen Appel Molot, 141-170. Don Mills,ON: Oxford University Press.

Tenet, George. 2007. *At the Center of the Storm: My years at the CIA*. New York, NY: Harper Collins.

United States Congress. July 26, 1947. "National Security Act of 1947." [50 U.S.C. 401.] http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml

Wark, Wesley K. 2003. “Canada and the Intelligence Revolution.” In *Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Heike Bungert, Jan Heitmann, and Michael Wala. London: Frank Cass.

This page has been intentionally left blank.