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# QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS: TOWARDS A ‘WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT’ APPROACH

*Jon Baker*

*Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University*

Using the case study approach, qualitative evidence from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, Afghanistan will be evaluated in an attempt to assess the impact that Quick Impact Projects have had. The research objectives are: (1) to determine the level of involvement civilian agencies *should* have in the QIP decision-making process; and (2) to determine whether the level of involvement that civilian agencies currently have meets this standard. This article will argue that the military and civilian agencies of the Canadian government have made progress in coordinating their efforts, but further improvement of the PRT structure will be severely hampered until valid and reliable measures of effectiveness for QIPs are developed and implemented.

## INTRODUCTION

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are increasingly used by military actors during Peace Support Operations (PSOs)<sup>1</sup> around the globe. These are usually short-term, small-scale ‘hearts and minds’ initiatives that are designed to have an immediate impact contributing to post-conflict stabilization or recovery. QIPs can benefit military personnel by increasing force protection, intelligence gathering, acceptance of foreign troops, and, conversely, opposition to enemy forces. Some observers, however, argue that QIPs are neither effective nor efficient from a development perspective because the military is simply unsuited and ill-equipped to provide such aid; moreover, they argue, involvement by the military compromises the neutrality and political independence of those NGOs who are most appropriate to carry out such projects. The result, critics say, is an approach that is at best ‘stove-piped’ rather than genuinely ‘whole of government,’ and at worst operating at cross-purposes. The research question, therefore, is rooted in whether the use of QIPs by the military to win ‘hearts and minds’ helps or hinders the overall ‘whole of government’ (WOG) approach.

Using the case study approach, qualitative evidence from the Provincial Reconstruction Team<sup>2</sup> in Kandahar Province in Afghanistan will be evaluated in an attempt to assess the impact that QIPs have had. The research objectives are: (1) to determine the level of involvement civilian agencies *should* have in the QIP decision-making process; and (2) to determine whether the level of involvement that civilian agencies currently have meets this standard. All this is based on the assumption outlined in Canada’s International Policy Statement that “an integrated ‘3D’ approach, combining diplomacy, defence and development, is the best strategy for supporting states that suffer from a broad range of interconnected problems” (Government of Canada, IPS, 2005).<sup>3</sup> This article will argue that the military and civilian agencies of the Canadian government have made progress in coordinating their efforts, but further improvement of the PRT structure

will be severely hampered until valid and reliable measures of effectiveness for QIPs are developed and implemented.

## DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

The rationale behind a formalized WOG<sup>4</sup> approach is two-fold. The first motive is to avoid duplication of efforts, interfering with the plans of other departments, and the consequent waste of energy and resources. The resulting information flows between actors increases situational awareness and enhances the capacity for ‘strategic’ planning and intelligent decision-making, including more awareness of second- and third-order effects (Gizewski 2007). This is vital given the number of actors who must coordinate their activities in contemporary PSOs—military, diplomatic, development, police, and so on (Savage 2006, 19). The second motivation for a WOG approach stems from a recognition that the goals of military and civilian organizations are co-dependent: “without security, development cannot happen, and without development, lasting security cannot be sustained” (Peabody 2005, 4). Harmonizing these efforts requires compromises and understandings between military and non-military actors.

If the number of actors involved in contemporary PSOs has increased, so too has the number of belligerents. According to many scholars, developments since the Second World War indicate that warfare is increasingly returning to a decentralized form in which states have lost their monopoly on combat forces.<sup>5</sup> Those of most concern are ‘spoilers’—non-state actors who profit from instability or lawlessness and therefore seek to prevent or ‘spoil’ the establishment of peace.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the strategy that spoilers have adopted is one of *asymmetric* warfare:

In the past, the asymmetric threat was normally just a component of the larger conventional conflict. Today however, there is only one superpower in the world and this ‘asymmetric’ gap between the U.S. military forces and those of her adversaries continues to grow. As a result, the only method of attack against this superpower and western coalitions will be through asymmetric means (Marcella 2006, 61).

Insurgents<sup>7</sup> constitute a type of spoiler group that frequently makes use of asymmetric warfare.

In virtually any counter-insurgency (COIN) operation, the support of the local population constitutes the ‘centre of gravity’ for both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces (Lewis 2006, 19-20).<sup>8</sup> Not only can they provide the former with money, shelter, and food, but more importantly they are the primary intelligence source for both the insurgents and counter-insurgents. According to John Lynn, local populations (based on perceptions of legitimacy, security, or a grievance) are divided into those sympathetic to the government, those sympathetic to the insurgents, or those who are neutral. If COIN operations are ineffective or indiscriminate, they may target not only insurgents and their leadership, but also the pro-insurgent population and the neutral population as a whole—thereby breaking the population’s allegiance to and support for the government, and eroding counter-insurgency intelligence gathering capabilities. The problem is

compounded further if little or no effort is made by the government to address the grievances of the insurgents and their supporters, allowing the insurgents to gain legitimacy in




Figure 1: Lynn's Successful Counter-Insurgency Model

the eyes of the population (Breede 2006, 25-26). Therefore, in order for COIN operations to be successful, “government must make a real effort to address the grievances of the pro-insurgent population . . . By increasing the pro-government population base and building trust in the neutral population, intelligence will begin to flow which will allow for the more focused use of force against the insurgents (Breede 2006, 26). According to H. Christian Breede, one way governments (or counter-insurgent forces acting on their behalf) can address grievances is through Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) (Breede 2006, 27).

While there is always a civil dimension to consider whenever a military deploys,<sup>9</sup> “in most complex peace operations as well as during successful counterinsurgency operations, civil–military cooperation [has] moved to centre stage, becoming the primary means to reach a combined political goal and establish peace (Zaalberg 2006, 414). Recognizing this, many western militaries have begun to institutionalize CIMIC<sup>10</sup> within their force structures in order to facilitate effective communication and coordinated activity between military and civilian bodies towards a ‘whole of effort’ approach (let alone a ‘whole of government’ approach). At the tactical level, CIMIC’s core functions include: civil-military liaison and assessments of the local civil environment; maximizing civil support for the military force; and committing resources *where necessary* to facilitate the execution of operations and hasten a return to normalcy (Demers 2005, 2). This last function can and often does include the use of Quick Impact Projects, which are usually short-term, small-scale initiatives that are designed to have an immediate impact contributing to post-conflict

stabilization or recovery (Department for International Development 2005, 7). QIPs can be divided into at least two categories: (1) social projects, which include support to education, public health and sports programmes; and (2) infrastructure improvement projects, which include water, electricity and any minor repair or reconstruction of physical structures (Demers 2005, 3). Consistent with the WOG cooperative interdepartmental approach, Canadian Forces' (CF) CIMIC doctrine states that, "Within the Government of Canada (GoC), the planning for CIMIC activities and objectives must be coordinated with [other government departments], particularly Foreign Affairs and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)" (Department of National Defence 2006, 6).

In the context of COIN ops, QIPs can be one of the quickest and easiest ways to address the grievances of the local population (at least in the short-term) and thereby win 'hearts and minds.' Destroyed infrastructure, human suffering, economic collapse, and social divisiveness are all endemic in war-affected societies. The accrued benefits with respect to security from the QIPs that tackle these problems can then be used to undertake larger, long-term development projects<sup>11</sup> that go even farther in addressing grievances.<sup>12</sup> QIPs are not the exclusive domain of CIMIC; government agencies (or International Organizations [IOs] and Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs] acting on their behalf) can and do implement QIPs as well—but their use by the military is what remains controversial, as discussed below.

### THE DEBATE OVER QIPS

In 2004, retired Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie wrote that "soldiers are not social workers with guns. Both disciplines are important, but both will suffer if combined in the same individuals" (Adinall 2006, 50). Over the years, many have echoed this sentiment, arguing against the use of QIPs by the military for two primary reasons. The first is the 'blurring of the lines' effect, whereby militaries undertake many of the same reconstruction activities as humanitarian actors.<sup>13</sup> In so doing, critics claim aid is used as a tool for implementing foreign policy and crisis management in order to serve the economic and geo-strategic interests of donor states, leading certain local actors to *perceive* that humanitarian actors, by extension, are no longer neutral and independent.<sup>14</sup> The result, they say, is that these civilian actors face rejection or have to deal with high levels of insecurity that reduce their room for manoeuvre (Groupe Urgence Réhabilitation Développement 2006, 4). The second set of criticisms stem from the execution of QIPs. Since the military lacks expertise in aid delivery and development work, civilian actors claim that aid projects undertaken by the military have not proven to be cost-effective, high quality or sustainable, yet these military projects have displaced other aid and development efforts.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, military interventions are subject to political shifts and thus tend to be more short-lived and less reliable than the presence of humanitarian actors, who generally stay as long as it takes to relieve suffering. Similarly, the high turnover of military personnel (e.g. six month

rotations for Canadian soldiers) is also frustrating for civilians, as they constantly have to adjust to working with inexperienced counterparts (Peabody 2005, 7).

Canadian Forces CIMIC doctrine acknowledges that, when it comes to QIPs, NGOs and IOs are often “better funded, more knowledgeable in this field, and better suited to take on this responsibility” (Department of National Defence 2006, 95). However, the doctrine goes on to state that “especially in the earlier and riskier stages of an operation there may be a role for CIMIC projects where a small amount of money, well spent, will do much to ameliorate hardship in the civil sector” (Department of National Defence 2006, 95). There are, after all, times when the military has specific skills, assets, and capabilities that are suitable to QIPs.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, the military’s use of QIPs is generally kept to a minimum in both scope and time precisely because CIMIC activities are intended to support the mission goals of the force, not supplant or control the efforts of civilian agencies like CIDA. As much as the military might want to “ameliorate hardship in the civil sector,” its reasons for undertaking QIPs clearly go beyond altruism. As outlined in Lynn’s COIN model, addressing local grievances enables intelligence gathering and prevents the unfocused use of force that could otherwise have “blowback” consequences for force protection.<sup>17</sup> This has tangible benefits as a ‘force multiplier.’ To put it another way, “without good intelligence, a counterinsurgent is like a blind boxer, wasting energy flailing at an unseen opponent and perhaps causing unintended harm. With good intelligence, a counterinsurgent is like a surgeon, cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact” (Department of the Army 2006, 1-19). Indeed, evidence suggests insurgents themselves recognize that QIPs can have this effect.<sup>18</sup> In response to the criticisms of poor execution, Captain Graham M. Longhurst, argues:

If CIMIC is conducted properly, as trained for by CIMIC operators, there should be little conflict between what the military and the civilian organizations are doing. . . . The only time conflict occurs is when organizations don’t take the time to coordinate the distribution of limited resources. It could be argued that the causes of these conflicts are more as a result of poor training and/or personality conflicts between the organizations (Longhurst 2005, 47).

In any case, a report by the U.S. Institute of Peace that evaluated QIPs with the American-led PRTs noted that, “although there have been reports of PRT assistance projects being poorly implemented, the incidence of this is on par with similar NGO-sponsored projects” (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005, 10). Furthermore, only a small number of respondents to a 2005 survey of NGOs in Afghanistan actually pointed to ‘blurring of the lines’ between humanitarian and military space as the cause of violence directed toward them.<sup>19</sup> Instead, the threat to ‘humanitarian space’ seems to have more to do with the nature of asymmetric warfare. In a report for the Humanitarian Practice Network, Max P. Glaser observes:

Rather than being tactical targets, civilians have moved to the forefront of warfare as objective targets in a deliberate strategy of control. [The commanders of armed non-state actors] have concomitantly adapted their strategies both with regard to civilians and *with regard to [Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies] and other humanitarian agents coming to the assistance of civilians* (Glaser 2005, 6).<sup>20</sup>

Glaser notes that this is particularly true of spoilers, spawned under the ‘War on Terror’ rubric, who seek to “exploit instability and oppose Western occupation. These groups demonstrate little concern for civilians or aid workers, as both are considered proxy targets in the achievement of their goals” (Glaser 2005, 5). Nor does it help that civilians and aid workers are ‘soft targets’ compared to military personnel, who generally have weaponry and training far superior to that of the insurgents. The result is that the provisions of international humanitarian law may be breached and humanitarian access challenged as a deliberate strategy of war by spoilers. In light of this operating environment, CIMIC could serve as a force multiplier not only for the military, but also for civilian organizations working toward common goals (Longhurst 2005, 47).<sup>21</sup>

### **THE WAY FORWARD: A METHODOLOGY FOR QIP DECISION-MAKING**

With respect to the first research objective, it would seem that the compromise is for *all* government agencies (not just the military) to identify and implement only those projects that will have a net positive ‘3D’ impact. Not only must ‘negative’ projects be avoided, but also those projects whose net impact is simply ‘neutral,’ so as not to waste valuable resources. In fact, even projects that have a net positive impact need to be prioritized, as it may not be possible to implement all of them given the scarcity of resources that are usually available to a PSO. Clearly, all this is easier said than done, but at least this sort of WOG approach rejects the principle that the military mission has supremacy irrespective of the short- and long-term consequences for development and diplomacy.

Despite the emphasis on a WOG *impact*, a WOG *process* is implied in this methodology. It is based on the assumption (consistent with the basic premise of this article) that a single dimension, acting on its own, lacks the ‘perspective’ required to achieve a truly ‘3D’ impact in the absence of meaningful consultation with the other dimensions.<sup>22</sup> The modalities of this process can take a variety of forms and change over time,<sup>23</sup> but ultimately they must be a function of and responsive to the impacts measured on the ground. After all, the greatest collaborative process is of little value if its virtues fail to translate into a positive impact.

In Figure 2, a matrix is presented for gauging the utility of a QIP with respect to the security and development dimensions. The value -1 signifies a project that will have a *negative impact* on a given mission; the value 0 signifies a project that will have *no substantial impact* on a given mission (positive or negative); and the value 1 signifies a project that will have a *positive impact* on a given mission. Nine possibilities are given for projects, of which only three have a net positive impact (seen in bold).

		Development Mission		
		Negative	Neutral	Positive
Defence Mission	Negative	-1,-1	-1, 0	-1,1
	Neutral	0,-1	0,0	<b>0,1</b>
	Positive	1,-1	<b>1,0</b>	<b>1,1</b>

Figure 2: QIP Utility Matrix – 2-Dimensional

There are, however, (at least) three dimensions to the WOG approach. As such, the QIP impacts listed in Figure 2 need to be cross-referenced with the impact they will have on the overall political environment, as presented in Figure 3. This time twenty-seven possibilities are given for projects, of which ten have a positive impact (seen in bold).

		Diplomacy Mission								
		Negative			Neutral			Positive		
		Development Mission			Development Mission			Development Mission		
		Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.	Neg.	Neut.	Pos.
Defence Mission	Negative	-1,-1,-1	-1, 0,-1	-1,1,-1	-1,-1,0	-1,0,0	-1,1,0	-1,-1,1	-1,0,1	<b>-1,1,1</b>
	Neutral	0,-1,-1	0,0,-1	0,1,-1	0,-1,0	0,0,0	<b>0,1,0</b>	0,-1,1	<b>0,0,1</b>	<b>0,1,1</b>
	Positive	1,-1,-1	1,0,-1	<b>1,1,-1</b>	1,-1,0	<b>1,0,0</b>	<b>1,1,0</b>	<b>1,-1,1</b>	<b>1,0,1</b>	<b>1,1,1</b>

Figure 3: QIP Utility Matrix – 3-Dimensional

If ranked according to net positive impact, the priority scale for QIPs would appear as follows:

	Defence	Development	Diplomacy	Net Impact Value	Outcome
<b>1</b>	1	1	1	3	‘win-win-win’ (tridimensional impact)
<b>2</b>	1	1	0	2	‘win-win’ (bidimensional impact)
<b>3</b>	1	0	1	2	
<b>4</b>	0	1	1	2	
<b>5</b>	1	0	0	1	‘slow and steady’ (unidimensional impact)
<b>6</b>	0	1	0	1	
<b>7</b>	0	0	1	1	
<b>8</b>	1	1	-1	1	‘2 steps forward, 1 step back’ (ambivalent impact)
<b>9</b>	1	-1	1	1	
<b>10</b>	-1	1	1	1	

Figure 4: QIP Net Impact Rankings

A few observations must be made. First, each dimension can only be expected to pursue projects from which it will receive a positive impact—unless another dimension is for some reason (e.g. security) incapable of implementing its own projects. Thus, CIMIC would normally only be involved in implementing the QIPs in the ‘defence’ column that are shaded. Second, even when the net impact value is the same, there might still be a need to rank projects according to their ‘dimension.’ For example, in the early stages of a PSO when establishing security is paramount, those projects with a net impact value of 2 *and* those that include a value of 1 in the defence dimension might need to be prioritized over those that do not. Conversely, development might be the dominant dimension for projects of with a net impact value of 2 on more mature PSOs. Third, those projects that include a negative impact on any particular dimension should be ranked lower than those projects of an equal net impact value that do not include a negative impact; a feeling of resentment might develop if two dimensions gain from a particular project at the expense of another dimension, possibly undermining future support for the WOG approach. Fourth, all values listed in Figures 2, 3, and 4 need not be restricted to whole integers. A more sophisticated project assessment approach could make qualitative distinctions to one decimal point in order to further refine the rankings.<sup>24</sup> Finally, strides will need to be taken to establish objective criteria (as much as reasonably possible) that can be used to quantify a project as either +1, 0, or -1 (or a value in between) for each dimension.

## **FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: KANDAHAR PROVINCE**

The situation in Kandahar province very much reflects the model for COIN operations presented earlier. The central government is struggling to consolidate its power and exert influence in the Afghan countryside while a variety of illegal, armed spoiler groups disrupt the nation-building process.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, the population can be divided into three groups: the first comprises hardcore Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and criminal elements (pro-insurgent); the second group is the vast majority of the Afghan population who desire security and stability, regardless of who provides it (neutral); and the third group is the central government and its supporters (pro-government) (Eyre 2006, 82). Rather than employing its own COIN forces, the weak central government has had to invite foreign militaries into Afghanistan to fight the insurgency until such time as the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are strong enough to do so. This decision has not been without problems in Kandahar province, where rural Pashtuns have a deep-seated xenophobia and an innate hostility towards foreign occupation. According to Gordon Smith:

Reaction to the presence of armed forces has prompted a reflexive and violent resistance in the isolated rural south, especially as NATO troops conduct invasive anti-Taliban actions in the villages. The active combat mission, designed to seek out and destroy both dormant and operational Taliban forces, has resulted in large civilian casualties . . . . Because of the loss of civilian life, these actions have, on the whole, fostered increased support for anti-NATO and anti-government insurgency, including support for the Taliban. . . . [v]ictimised Kandahari tribes will also seek revenge for the death of their family



members. [The now deceased] Mullah Dadullah precisely expressed this vicious circle with his statement that “for every Talib you kill, I can recruit twenty more” (Smith 2007, 16).

As outlined in Lynn’s model, indiscriminate attacks of this nature by foreign forces threaten to produce a self-defeating vicious cycle by breaking the population’s allegiance to and support for the central government, and by eroding counter-insurgency intelligence gathering capabilities of NATO forces. The other half of the vicious cycle equation arises from the government’s inability to address the grievances among the population:

[I]nsecurity obstructs reconstruction; blocked reconstruction fostered insecurity; and security and reconstruction difficulties prevented sufficient progress in the area of governance reform for the promotion of public order and significant economic progress. By the fall of 2006, such interdependent difficulties resulted in a highly deteriorated situation . . .” (Smith 2007, 20).

This insecurity has meant that few civilians are engaged in aid and development in the province, and NGOs are leaving because of the same concern for their safety.<sup>26</sup> Coupled with a severely flawed policy towards poppy production,<sup>27</sup> the situation in Kandahar province represents a textbook scenario for implementation of QIPs by CIMIC.

## **PRT KANDAHAR: A QIP CASE STUDY**

### **Structure and Roles**

Canada took over command of Kandahar’s Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) from the United States in August 2005. The PRT’s composition includes officials from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),<sup>28</sup> Correctional Services Canada, and the Canadian Forces—consistent with the WOG approach. Within this context, a division of labour seems to have naturally developed. CIDA and DFAIT interact with Afghan government officials at the ministerial level (both provincial and national) and implement large projects over the medium- and long-term that have a significant impact on development. Since all major development projects are implemented centrally through the Afghan government (to build its capacity and enhance its legitimacy), very few staff from CIDA and DFAIT are needed in the PRT for oversight of these projects and minimal travel is required outside of Camp Nathan Smith (where the PRT is based). Meanwhile, the military (through CIMIC) interacts with locals at the district level (e.g. mayors, chiefs of police) and implements QIPs in order to meet the immediate needs of locals in the short-term and build their confidence in the Canadian effort—effectively buying time until the larger projects can come online (Chase 2007). Implementation of the QIPs is completely decentralized, meaning that the number of projects that can be undertaken at any given time is limited by the number of CIMIC teams and their mobility outside of the camp.

The justification for this particular division of labour appears to be three-fold. First, the security situation makes it too dangerous for staff from CIDA and DFAIT to be ‘outside the wire’ carrying out decentralized projects for extended periods of time. Second, the number of CIDA and DFAIT (*vis-à-vis* CF) personnel available for deployment to the PRT is insufficient to meet the demand that exists for QIPs. Finally, the small-scale and limited scope of QIPs means that soldiers, rather than civil servants, can be trained to execute them without much difficulty. The same is not necessarily true of CIDA’s and DFAIT’s large-scale projects, which require greater expertise. In any case, all departments were subject to a learning curve, with numerous examples of CIMIC, CIDA, and DFAIT projects alike that had less than successful results (Howard 2007). Moreover, no department had any particular advantage in terms of knowledge of the local context; CIDA gained most of its information from locally engaged staff—a practice that the CF mirrored as well (Howard 2007).

### **Decision-Making Processes & Principles**

Four budgets are available to fund CIMIC’s QIPs: the Commander’s Contingency Fund (CCF) and the departmental budgets of CIDA, DFAIT, and USAID,<sup>29</sup> respectively. A ‘Targeting Board’ composed of the PRT commander and the various leadership positions in the PRT (including at least one representative from each government department) is convened periodically in order to approve large projects of strategic value and determine the most appropriate budgetary source. This is a key step in the coordination process. Not only do all the stakeholders come away with increased situational awareness, but projects are exposed to various ‘lenses’ in order to consider second- and third-order effects. If projects are not feasible, they are either rejected or sent back for retooling. However, the Targeting Board only reviews projects above CDN\$5000; anything costing below that amount (which includes the vast majority of QIPs) can be authorized by the PRT commander alone and funded from his/her contingency fund. Indeed, this is the primary purpose of the CCF (Chase 2007). The advantage is that it saves both time and bureaucracy. After all, the very purpose of a ‘quick impact project’ is defeated if several months are spent filling out the paperwork that is required by Treasury Board regulations. QIPs can be successful precisely because they ‘buy time’ until the larger projects that are subject to stricter standards of accountability (sometimes valued in the millions of dollars) can be approved and implemented.<sup>30</sup> Yet this is not meant to imply that CIDA and DFAIT have no knowledge of or input into those QIPs costing less than CDN\$5000. CIMIC teams deployed to the field (sometimes for weeks at a time) send back daily reports to the PRT that are distributed to all relevant personnel by the operations officer. Moreover, the officer in command of CIMIC usually asks other departmental representatives informally for their input on projects not going to the Targeting Board (Tondreau 2007). However, this system is not perfect; one of the problems with these daily reports is

insufficient communications equipment,<sup>31</sup> the result of which is that CIDA and DFAIT would frequently learn about QIPs after the fact and thereby have no opportunity to offer input.<sup>32</sup>

Since Canada took over the PRT, principles such as capacity-building, sustainability, and ‘do no harm’ are always kept in mind during the planning process of a QIP,<sup>33</sup> which indirectly leads to consideration of the net impact. U.S. officials working in Kandahar, however, were less effective at this. Rather than going through mayors and *wakils* (village elders) to implement QIPs, which allows local leaders to share in the credit, reinforces their authority in the eyes of their people, and has a net positive impact for the diplomacy and governance dimension, American policy insists on ‘showing the flag’ and maximizing the credit for the U.S. government. Without this sort of local ‘buy in,’ there were cases of schools being built “whether people wanted it or not” (Chase 2007). In another extreme case, the Canadian PRT actually declined a U.S. offer of tractors after American officials had refused to let the farm equipment go through the *wakils* for distribution (Chase 2007).

## Measuring Impact

CIMIC teams supervise the implementation of QIPs and perform follow-up assessments after a period of one or two weeks. In the case of infrastructure, for example, pictures are taken and a site report is filled out. Yet there are no explicit measures of effectiveness (MOEs) in use: “we learned about [MOEs] during our training, but we never used them. If we’re building an irrigation canal and water goes through it, the project is effective” (Tondreau 2007). After all, the Canadian approach to QIPs stresses consultation with the locals—usually through a *shura* (council)—during which complicated issues that might have unintended consequences are usually worked out. Thus, if the project is functional and the villagers do not complain about it afterwards, it is deemed ‘effective.’ Another sign of a successful CIMIC project (at least for the defence dimension) is the amount of intelligence received from the local people, such as the locations of hide outs, weapons caches, and so on.<sup>34</sup> The biggest hurdle to employing sophisticated MOEs is time:

There were days when we were working 24 hours straight. Other days were slower, but even those were 10 to 12 hours long. We could use measures of effectiveness, but they would have to be streamlined. If they took more than 15 minutes to complete, you risk not having them complied with (Tondreau 2007).

Moreover, there is effectively no incentive on the part of CIMIC teams to employ MOEs so long as projects adhere to the aforementioned basic principles, which are thought to avoid clearly negative impacts.

Distinguishing between different degrees of impact and efficiency is unnecessary because:

There is no shortage of money [to build QIPs]. When it ran out, we simply got more from the Canadian government. There is no need to prioritize like we do for the big projects [implemented by CIDA or DFAIT]. We’re just trying to get them out the door as fast as we can (Howard 2007).

This results-based or ‘shot-gun’ approach assumes that the aggregate positive impact of *lots of projects*—even if many are by themselves marginal—is higher than that of a more deliberate, effects-based approach with *fewer projects* that are of higher individual quality. Thus, even if some projects have a net *negative* impact under the results-based approach due to hasty assessments or planning, the sheer volume of projects with a net *positive* impact will more than compensate. This sentiment is echoed by Rochus Pronk, the former political advisor to the Dutch PRT in neighbouring Uruzgan province: “Let’s not make rocket science out of [quick impact projects]. They are meant to be quick. ...The military is not just handing out money regardless of the consequences. It is responsible with its spending” (Pronck 2007).

## POLICY IMPLICATIONS

With respect to the second research objective, the evidence presented in this article suggests that the military and civilian agencies of the Canadian government have made progress in coordinating their efforts. The division of labour between military and civilian actors seems sensible, and the military makes attempts to seek input from the other two dimensions in order to improve its own situational awareness and enhance the net impact of its projects. While every project would be collectively vetted in an ideal world, the informal cooperation mechanisms that currently exist below the Targeting Board are likely the best that can be hoped for given the operating environment and the nature of QIPs. With proper training ahead of time in project management and cultural awareness, the evidence from Roto 2<sup>35</sup> suggests that there is no reason why CIMIC teams cannot achieve a net positive ‘3D’ impact with QIPs that is comparable to (if not better than) what CIDA or DFAIT staff could achieve under the same circumstances. However, the informal opportunities that do exist for cooperation need to be properly exploited—sufficient communications equipment must be provided to all elements of CIMIC both inside and outside Camp Nathan Smith, and a liaison officer must be appointed to brief and debrief the CIMIC teams whenever they come back in from the field for re-supply.

The practice of having a self-contained military budget for QIPs, separate from any cross-government arrangements, appears a necessary one. While a jointly managed budget for QIPs might foster further cooperation between the dimensions, it would only be of value if the streamlined procedures were kept intact:

One of the lessons learned . . . has been the need for expedited project implementation over the spectrum of deployment and not just at the end of a given rotation. The reality on the ground is that the period between project identification and implementation can be considerably drawn out due to the lengthy administrative oversight required to utilize CIDA funds. Projects identified at the start of tour were implemented (at best) by the third and fourth month, whereas projects under the force protection umbrella were completed in a much shorter time span. While the government’s 3D approach stresses coordination, it does not imply subservience of one branch to another (Skidd 2005, 7-8).

Although accountability to the Canadian taxpayer is important, the bureaucratic processes that characterize peacetime actions need to be modified when operating in a quasi-war zone where people’s lives are at risk.

One suggestion for improved effectiveness is to increase the threshold for Targeting Board review from \$5000 to between \$10,000 and \$15,000 (Howard 2007).<sup>36</sup>

In any case, it seems one of the obstacles to *interdepartmental* synergy has been a lack of *intradepartmental* synergy within the CF. According to Gordon Smith, “the Canadian Forces have a fundamentally different agenda than does the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)” (Smith 2007, 6), but this is not entirely true. The CIMIC operators who are on the ground interacting with the locals recognize that alleviating poverty must become a primary strategy for achieving security in Afghanistan. As Warrant Officer Dean Henley remarked, “You can’t win the insurgency by killing insurgents. You can’t kill the insurgency, you have to take away its support base” (Day 2007). Yet CIMIC operators feel there is a divide between the tactical and strategic level because the advice given from the bottom up is not followed (Longhurst 2005, 44).<sup>37</sup> Solving this problem requires not only spending more aid money in Kandahar province where Canada’s major military commitment is,<sup>38</sup> but also refocusing an overly aggressive military strategy that has led to far too many innocent civilian deaths.<sup>39</sup> The CF should attempt to expand the size of the PRT by creating “satellite PRTs” in the 15 districts of Kandahar province outside the capital city.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, the Senlis Council reports that in the neediest areas, such as the remote villages and refugee camps in Kandahar province, the inhabitants have neither seen a foreigner nor heard of CIDA, let alone received food or any other aid from the Canadians (Senlis Council 2006, 18). While some have rightly made the argument that the size of the foreign military presence in Afghanistan has been well below what might have been expected,<sup>41</sup> increasing the troop level in and of itself will be of little value if indiscriminate attacks persist and the local population continues to shift its support to the insurgents. Any increase in troop levels needs to be accompanied by an even greater proportional increase in the size and capabilities of PRT Kandahar.<sup>42</sup> After all, as Maslow famously remarked, “If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.”

## FUTURE RESEARCH

The absence of measures of effectiveness remains the thorniest issue. Anecdotally, QIPs seem to have a net positive impact, even across dimensions, but this cannot be concluded with any certainty. This is because the methodology outlined earlier in this article is premised on an effects-based approach. This is not present (nor even encouraged) in PRT Kandahar at the tactical level, where the CIMIC element has been given *carte blanche* by the Canadian government. Presumably, the current results-based approach is preferred by politicians since the output of QIPs is higher; even if these QIPs are less effective, the absence of MOEs means it is difficult to conclusively prove this—meanwhile the Canadian government can be *seen* conducting copious amounts of reconstruction and thereby bolster public opinion for the Afghanistan mission. While it is quite unlikely that the results-based approach is more efficient than the effects-based one,<sup>43</sup> it is entirely possible that the results-based approach could achieve a greater net positive 3D impact if provided with

unlimited resources. While citizens in a liberal democracy are entitled to consciously support inefficient policies when other values are prioritized (e.g. Europeans and the Common Agricultural Policy), they must be able to do so with the benefit of full information. Yet at present, Canadians have no idea exactly how effective or efficient QIPs have been. Canadians cannot know, nor can this author's methodology be effectively tested, until the PRT employs MOEs for its QIPs. Nor, by extension, can informed policy recommendations be made for improving the WOG coordination process within the PRT (beyond the relatively straightforward ones made in the previous section) without a firm grasp of the impact that the current processes are having. Consequently, the most pressing research agenda must be to develop valid and reliable MOEs that are sufficiently streamlined for rapid use by CIMIC teams deployed in the field. After all, it is doubtful whether the unlimited financial support for QIPs can carry on indefinitely, especially if the CIMIC elements of the PRT are greatly expanded, as recommended earlier.<sup>44</sup>

Once MOEs are developed, a relatively straight forward comparison between the results-based and effects-based approaches could divide up the districts of Kandahar province between the two methods. What's more, within the sample of effects-based approaches, further refinement of this author's methodology for evaluating 3D processes could be conducted. For example, does a dimension for local input need to be *explicitly* added to the methodology? Local input is only *implicit* in the current methodology—that is to say, if a particular QIP is not a priority for the local population, the net impact value for each dimension is unlikely to be very, if at all, positive. By the same token, do other dimensions also need explicit consideration with their own dimension (environment, human rights, gender, etc.), or are these simply sub-elements of development? How many dimensions can be considered before the methodology becomes too unwieldy? What sorts of timelines are required before the impact of each type of project can be effectively measured?

More broadly, a similar methodology needs to be developed to study how well QIPs are being coordinated with respect to the 'whole of effort' approach.<sup>45</sup> Initial evidence of the coordination between elements of PRT Kandahar and other civilian actors operating in the area suggests this has been limited.<sup>46</sup> The additional (and much more problematic) variable in assessing the 'whole of effort' approach is the lack of a superordinate authority. Unlike the WOG approach, in which all government departments are subordinate to the will of the Canadian cabinet (which insists on unity of effort), is it feasible for this methodology to create dimensions for actors such as NGOs over whom there is no executive authority? Perhaps the best that can be expected is a multi-tiered, or '*almost* whole of effort', approach in which true 'coherence' happens only with certain NGOs who volunteer to coordinate their efforts with the military, while nothing more than simple 'awareness' can take place with other NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontières who wish to maintain complete independence from anything associated with military operations.<sup>47</sup>

## CONCLUSION

As the local environment improves in some districts, it is likely that PRT Kandahar will be able to refocus its efforts away from QIPs and concentrate instead on longer-term projects that strengthen the capacity of the provincial government. Yet many districts in Kandahar province remain unvisited by the PRT, meaning that QIPs will most likely remain in use for the foreseeable future in order to fill the initial void in the flow of reconstruction assistance to these new areas.

QIPs (and the PRT structure that engenders them)<sup>48</sup> are valuable components of the WOG toolbox that will surely be used again in future Canadian PSOs to other failed and fragile states. Despite the natural aversion of certain organizations to cooperate, the imperatives of development, diplomacy, and defence are rarely mutually exclusive. As more practitioners recognize this and use it as a starting point for discussion, the task of harmonizing military activities with both the desires of the local population and the activities of the rest of the international community will become easier.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> PSOs are defined as “*multifunctional operations in which impartial military activities are designed to create a secure environment and to facilitate the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to create a self sustaining peace.* PSOs may include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian operations” (emphasis in original, Peace Missions Programme 2000, 27).

<sup>2</sup> PRTs are small joint civil-military teams that first began deploying across Afghanistan in early 2003, in an attempt to expand the legitimacy of the central government, enhance security, and facilitate reconstruction. Although only lightly armed, their very presence is intended to serve (1) as a deterrent to insurgents and criminals who have been active in these areas and (2) as a catalyst by enabling local government authorities, the UN, and NGOs to operate (Olson 2006, 5). Each of the individual implementing countries has developed its own PRT designs in an attempt to customize the concept to meet local conditions—with varying degrees of success.

<sup>3</sup> Although donor governments in the developed world can agree on neither the policy prescriptions to address failed states, nor how to prioritize failed states, nor a single definition for ‘failed state,’ there is consensus that policy responses should use the “whole of government” (WOG) approach. The 2005 International Policy Statement has placed the Canadian government firmly within this consensus (Prest, Gazo, and Carment 2005).

<sup>4</sup> Picciotti et al. identify three other levels of coordination in fragile state policy besides WOG: Intra-departmental rationalization, Inter-donor harmonization, and Donor-partner alignment (Prest, Gazo, and Carment 2005, 17-18). Together, these constitute a ‘whole of effort’ approach. While all levels are important (individually and collectively) and require further investigation in the context of the Canadian PRT in Kandahar, WOG coordination will be the focus of this article.

<sup>5</sup> For, for example, Lind (1989).

<sup>6</sup> Stedman classifies various types of spoilers, the most dangerous being ‘total spoilers,’ who are innately opposed to central authority and are unappeasable. The only method to constrain and ultimately uproot such implacable figures appears to be the application of sustained pressure, most likely involving the use of force (Sedra 2003, 2). Durch has argued that in Afghanistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda constitute ‘total spoilers’ (Durch 2003, 9).

<sup>7</sup> According to Breede “insurgencies are characterized by a desire to achieve some form of societal and political change. There is a grievance amongst the population and insurgencies form as a reaction to it.” This is distinct from a guerilla movement, which is purely a reaction to an external invasion without any binding ideology (except patriotism) or greater political end above and beyond the ousting of foreign (or in some cases even domestic) aggressors (Breede 2006, 25). Both of these are distinct from paramilitary groups and criminal gangs, who may not even have a legitimate grievance. In many cases, they are merely taking advantage of the insecure environment that has been fostered by an insurgency for their own gain.

<sup>8</sup> In the case of a failed or fragile state like Afghanistan, the counter-insurgent forces may be foreign militaries deployed on a PSO. Under these circumstances, insurgents have a huge tactical advantage because they are locals who speak the same language as the villagers, have the same history, and are often related by blood (Day, 2007).

<sup>9</sup> It may be in the form of the local population, refugees, local officials, or workers from international organizations. Moreover, this element exists not only in PSOs and COIN operations, but also in humanitarian assistance and warfighting deployments [Longhurst 2005, 35].

<sup>10</sup> According to the NATO definition, CIMIC is “the co-ordination and co-operation, *in support of the mission*, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies” (emphasis added, NATO Standardization Agency 2003, 1-1).

<sup>11</sup> There remains a debate—one that goes to the heart of the WOG approach in failed and fragile states—over the practicality of even undertaking long-term development work in a ‘war zone.’ As one aid worker put it, “PRTs doing school reconstruction doesn’t make a lot of sense. If the security situation is so bad that an NGO can’t do this work, then kids can’t go to school anyways” (quoted in Olson 2006, 24). Yet even if large-scale, long-term projects should not be pursued simultaneously with a COIN operation, there is still arguably a ‘force multiplier’ effect (discussed further in the following section) that small-scale, short-term QIPs can have for the military regardless of their consequences for development.

<sup>12</sup> Arguably, QIPs are one of the quickest and easiest ways to curry favour with *foreign* populations as well. In the case of Afghanistan, where foreign military forces are carrying out COIN operations on behalf of the threatened Karzai government, the support of the domestic population in each NATO member state is often conditional upon seeing evidence of tangible progress. In this regard, foreign populations can be divided along similar lines as local populations in a COIN environment—pro-intervention, neutral, and anti-intervention. QIPs can help shield foreign governments from anti-interventionist criticisms of the mission until long-term development projects show results.

<sup>13</sup> Humanitarian actors have traditionally provided *humanitarian aid*, which consists of material or logistical assistance provided in response to a crisis in order to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. This can be distinguished from *development aid*, which seeks to address the underlying socioeconomic factors (such as poverty or a lack of human rights) that may have led to a crisis or emergency. Moreover, development aid is typically not made available in situations of protracted crisis because the political framework for development is absent, nor is it necessarily bound by humanitarian principles like impartiality and neutrality. Virtually all of the QIPs undertaken by PRT Kandahar province development, rather than humanitarian, assistance (Howard 2007).

<sup>14</sup> Taliban and other anti-government elements in Afghanistan are reported to have told locals that Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are really ‘spies’ and should not be cooperated with, which has clear implications for the humanitarian actors who are seen to work closely with the PRTs. In one region, for example, local partners of the international NGO CARE were reportedly approached by the Taliban and told that as long as they continued to operate in the same way, they would not be targeted; but, if they accepted funding from the military-led PRT, “their security might be threatened” (Olson 2006, 14-15).

<sup>15</sup> In Afghanistan’s Badghis province, for example, one of CARE’s local partners had started up a micro-loan business that charged 10% interest as part of a long-term community project. The PRT came in and set up a short-term loans project with no fee, which attracted many people to what CARE considers a less sustainable option. Furthermore, sometimes differences between military-run aid projects and those run by NGOs have fueled distrust and cynicism towards NGOs, who often ask people to contribute labour and other local resources in order to build in local ownership of a project. When military-led projects in the same area refrain from requesting such inputs, rumours start that the NGOs have simply stolen money and materials meant for the project (Olson 2006, 17).

<sup>16</sup> According to the British Department for International Development, these include: 1) when there is a gap which cannot be filled by another actor; 2) where value is added for the recipient community; 3) when it is acceptable to the local population and culture; 4) when it is planned in such a way to support other assistance efforts; and 5) where the military has a specific comparative advantage [Department for International Development 2006, 8]. There is also the argument that CIMIC could not effectively execute its other roles (such as liaison) *without* the use of QIPs: “To simply go to meetings and try to build friendships without being able to help solve the issues . . . generates distrust on the part of the locals and is no way to build a trusting relationship” (Longhurst 2005, 44).

<sup>17</sup> The CF defines force protection as “comprising all measures taken to contribute to mission success by preserving freedom of action and operational effectiveness through managing risks and minimizing vulnerabilities to personnel, information, materiel, facilities and activities from all threats” (Skidd 2005, 7).

<sup>18</sup> In September 2004, for example, Canadian CIMIC operators in Kabul were advised that opposing military forces intended to specifically target them due to the success their projects were having in winning ‘hearts and minds’ (Longhurst 2005, 45).

<sup>19</sup> Indeed, M.H. Mayar, deputy director of ACBAR (the NGO coordination body in Afghanistan), points to the public perception that the work of humanitarian actors directly supports the Karzai government: “NGOs are seen to be helping the government



because they are working to improve people's lives. If the lives of regular Afghans improve, more ordinary people would support the government and this is what the insurgents do not want" (Olson 2006, 15-16).

<sup>20</sup> Emphasis added.

<sup>21</sup> It should also be noted that, regardless of the emerging asymmetric threat, the Government of Canada has issued guidelines for CIMIC that state: "To the greatest extent possible, CF operations should be conducted with a view to respecting the humanitarian operating environment" (Government of Canada, Guidelines, 2005).

<sup>22</sup> This does not mean that *implementation* of a given project always has to be shared by multiple government agencies if the planning process (in which all departmental stakeholders are involved) deems it unnecessary. Yet if the plan needs to be amended during the implementation phase, all stakeholders should be consulted.

<sup>23</sup> Julie Boileau and Richard Garon identify four models for civil-military interactions—Independent, Collective, Top-down, and Bottom-up—the first three of which are suitable to military stabilization missions (*vis-à-vis* non-military ones) like the one taking place in Kandahar province. While the stated goals of Canada's WOG approach resemble the collective model, Boileau and Garon claim the present CF approach to CIMIC is more akin to the stove-piped aspects of the independent model (Boileau and Garon 2005).

<sup>24</sup> If this were to happen, an additional category of outcomes would have to be created in the table presented in Figure 4: "1 *large* step forward, 2 *small* steps back" (unidimensional ambivalent impact). For example, a QIP could have a military impact of +0.8, but development and diplomacy impacts of -0.2 and -0.3, respectively. This project would still be acceptable because it results in a net positive impact of +0.3. Nevertheless, caution must be taken not to build a sense of added accuracy into the methodology that is not actually measurable in reality.

<sup>25</sup> Some of these spoilers are anti-government insurgents, while others are paramilitary groups or criminal gangs (the distinction between which was described earlier) (Smith 2007, 15).

<sup>26</sup> Numerous Afghan organizations (such as the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees) have halted all operations in the south, as have large international agencies like Oxfam (Smith 2007, 18).

<sup>27</sup> The British, American, and Afghan governments have sought to eradicate what is frequently the population's principal livelihood and sole source of desperately needed income. While the Taliban and warlords benefit from the poppy industry, these policies of forcible crop destruction only play into the hands of the Taliban (Smith 2007, 14).

<sup>28</sup> CivPol actually includes officers from other provincial and municipal police forces—not just the RCMP. Administratively, they come under the authority of DFAIT (Howard 2007).

<sup>29</sup> The United States, which ran the PRT prior to Canada, still has a USAID representative with a discretionary fund for projects attached to Canada's contingent. A fifth budget, the Assistance To Afghanistan Fund, is operated solely by the CIMIC chain of command. It consists of charitable donations made by service clubs, businesses, and ordinary Canadians back home who wish to have specific projects undertaken in Afghanistan (Chase 2007).

<sup>30</sup> Even some QIPs over \$5000 do not pass through the Targeting Board if the CIMIC staff and the PRT commander feel they are relatively "straight forward," i.e. there would be no value-added by having additional input from the other agencies in the PRT (Howard 2007).

<sup>31</sup> A shortage of Tactical Satellite Kit (TSK) radios meant that CIMIC teams had to use the Battle Group's TSKs if they were in the vicinity. Even when these could be borrowed, the CIMIC leadership in the PRT did not have their own TSK either, meaning that messages had to be relayed through the Battle Group or the higher chain of command in the PRT. When TSKs were not available, cell phones were used, but their signals were not encrypted (if a signal was available at all) (Tondreau 2007).

<sup>32</sup> This communication deficit was a two-way street, with poor passage of information from the operational level to the CIMIC teams deployed outside the wire. When these teams did return to camp, they were not always debriefed on the activities of the other government departments (Tondreau 2007).

<sup>33</sup> For example, past mistakes from QIPs in the Balkans, where soldiers themselves completed all stages of a project while community members watched [Peabody 2005, 10], have not been repeated. Projects in Afghanistan are almost always implemented by locals themselves, with CIMIC simply providing the funding (Tondreau 2007).

<sup>34</sup> While intelligence was often gained as a result of a QIP, it must be noted that this was never a condition for its provision in the first place by Canadian CIMIC operators. The primary purpose of QIPs is to win the 'hearts and minds' of the locals by addressing their needs, thereby encouraging their acceptance of the international presence and their patience for larger development projects to come. Any intelligence that is provided is simply a welcome side-benefit: "CIMIC tries to be passive intelligence collectors. If it comes, great. But we can be targeted if we're seen otherwise" (Chase 2007).

<sup>35</sup> This refers to the rotation of Canadian soldiers to PRT Kandahar during the period August 2006 to February 2007.

<sup>36</sup> Indeed, the Dutch PRT in neighbouring Uruzgan province has a mechanism similar to the Targeting Board, but its threshold is €10,000 (Pronck 2007).

<sup>37</sup> Many of those interviewed by the author noted that this barrier decreased over time. By the end of Roto 2, the Battle Group commander not only recognized the value of ‘non-kinetic’ operations, but even insisted on using CIMIC as much as he could. Whether this realization carries on into Roto 3 remains to be seen.

<sup>38</sup> Only 20% of CIDA’s \$100 million budget for Afghanistan will be spent in Kandahar province (Smith 2007, 18). A recent Senate Report went so far as to conclude that CIDA should channel more of its budget directly through CIMIC for QIPs until NGOs are able to safely function in Kandahar (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 2007).

<sup>39</sup> The U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual identifies nine ‘paradoxes of counterinsurgency,’ the first two of which are extremely noteworthy: “The More You Protect Your Force, The Less Secure You Are,” and “The More Force Used, the Less Effective It Is” (Department of the Army 2006, 1-22). The Dutch appear to have adopted these principles in Uruzgan province (Chivers 2007).

<sup>40</sup> By the end of the Roto 2, CIMIC teams were operating primarily in the districts of Zhari and Shah Wali Kot, but there was also a presence in Spin Boldak, Argandat, Daman, Maywand and Dand, which includes Kandahar City (Tondreau 2007). However, this still leaves nine districts without any direct assistance from the PRT.

<sup>41</sup> See, for example, Smith (2007). There is indeed a case to be made for additional troops to provide general security. As Zaalberg points out, QIPs in and of themselves cannot win ‘hearts and minds,’ at least not in the long-term; locals also need to believe that COIN forces will protect them against reprisals and intimidation before they can truly turn against the insurgents (Zaalberg 2006, 412). Currently, there are insufficient troops to provide general security in a province as large as Kandahar (roughly equivalent to the size of Nova Scotia). If Canada had the resources, it would be better to provide an entire brigade—just as the British have done in neighbouring Helmand province—instead of a mere battle group (Chase 2007).

<sup>42</sup> Although the Dutch have integrated their Battle Group in Uruzgan province with the PRT in order to increase the mobility of its CIMIC teams (Pronck 2007), some have argued that it might be too risky for Canada to decentralize its Battle Group in the same way given the security environment in Kandahar province. If Canada is unwilling to re-task its Battle Group assets, then more reinforcements from Canada—or even freshly graduated ANA units—will be required in order to provide the additional force protection required for the mobility of an expanded PRT.

<sup>43</sup> It is conceivable that the PRT’s CIMIC teams are so skilful that they can achieve high impact QIPs intuitively—without expending many resources on extensive assessments. Alternatively, if the Canadian mission can end sooner or if fewer Canadian lives are lost with a results-based approach, the short-term trade-off of efficiency for effectiveness could lead to efficiency gains in the long-term.

<sup>44</sup> The development of MOEs could spark a further policy recommendation for PRT expansion—the addition of an ‘assessment cell’ dedicated strictly collecting and analyzing data on QIPs on an ongoing basis, as well as improving the MOEs themselves over time.

<sup>45</sup> The other level of coordination identified by Picciotti et al.—inter-donor harmonization—is less of an issue for the PRTs as each one is either primarily or entirely composed of military and civilian staff from the same country.

<sup>46</sup> Savage argues that communications between the PRT and these bodies occur on an ad hoc and random (rather than formalized) basis, and that meetings with UNAMA and the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) committee have resulted in only information sharing rather than true coordination (Savage 2006, 59).

<sup>47</sup> NATO classifies four levels of coordination on its ‘spectrum of interaction’—awareness, deconfliction, cooperation, and coherence. In order to be flexible and accommodate the diverse interests it encounters in an operational theatre, NATO has developed a number of different coordination mechanisms across this spectrum that cater to non-NATO actors who seek either higher or lower levels of coordination (Icayan 2007).

<sup>48</sup> This implies that the military should avoid implementing QIPs in the absence of a WOG structure like the PRT—a principle which is consistent with the premise that WOG approaches achieve better results when addressing the problems of failed and fragile states.

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